What makes a painting sad?

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What makes a painting sad?

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This is not a
love story.
It is a
whodunnit.
In seven chapters

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Abstract

Here are two claims to be examined in detail in this thesis. The first claim is that whenever we see pictorial content, what we see is mediated by a pictorial perspective. The second claim is that adequately seeing expressive content in paintings mandates imagining a persona occupying the pictorial perspective. In this thesis, I develop an argument to show how these two claims weave together to explain what makes a painting sad.

My thesis, which concerns seeing emotions in paintings, appeals to considerations about perspective-taking that are also relevant to seeing emotions in faces. I challenge the widely held view that 'emotion' refers to a state, 'expression' to the dynamic effect of that state, and 'artistic expressiveness' to the mere presentation of outward characteristics associated with the state. I show how this mistaken way of understanding what expression is, is put to work by theorists to explain how paintings can be expressive while failing to be expressions proper or failing to emanate from the kind of thing that can undergo an emotion. My work draws on a range of foundational issues in philosophy of perception and the philosophy of art to provide an account that corrects a common misconception about how we directly and immediately see emotions. I apply this account to a productive examination of the painterly case.

My proposal is that the phenomenon of expression is explained by invoking a constitutive persona theory.[1] Viewers must or *do* see the picture from a persona's emotional perspective. This is what we mean when we call a painting sad and expression cannot get going without it. The arguments in this thesis aim at establishing this conclusion.

[1] Of course, there is a delicate issue about what exactly a persona theory is and I will be providing a definition to clarify what I mean by this term in the final section of Chapter Two

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Figure 1 William Hogarth, Satire on False Perspective, 1754

Introduction

The Project

This thesis makes two claims: first, that whenever we see pictorial content what we see is mediated by an imagined perspective, and second, that adequately seeing expressive content in paintings mandates imagining a persona. I develop an argument to show how these two claims weave together to explain what makes a painting sad.

Current answers to this question can be broadly grouped into (a) contour theories, which hold that viewers can immediately perceive expressive properties, cashing this out by appeal to expression looks, construed robustly in terms of experienced or sensory resemblance, or minimally where this condition is given up (Davies, 1994, Lopes, 2005, Green, 2007); (b) metaphorical and gestalt views, which hold that audiences immediately perceive expressive properties, variously construed in terms of visual or perceptual metaphor (Langer, 1957, Davies, 1994, Wollheim, 1993d, Peacocke, 2009, Carroll, 2001), and (c) evocation views, which hold that the spectator's aroused emotions stand for the expressive properties of the work or complete the viewer's adequate comprehension of them (Robinson, 2005, Matravers, 1998). The different views give different answers to the question of what expressive properties are supposed to be as well as how we can be acquainted with them (the phenomenon of expression). Within these broad categories there is little friendliness, and some condemnation, extended towards persona views. Persona views are identified by a shared headline claim: a hypothetical persona or implied artist's mental states are necessarily implicated in expressive properties (Robinson, 2005, Levinson, 2006b, Vermazen, 1986, Cochrane, 2010b). In short, they think that adequate apprehension of expressiveness involves picking up on someone's emotion.[2]

Against the prevailing view, I will show that a proper account of the phenomenon of expression mandates a persona theory. Jenefer Robinson presents a version that aligns our theorising in respect of the phenomenology of expression with a rich seam of criticism and appreciation of particular works (Robinson, 2005, Robinson, 2017a). I find

[2] Of course there is a delicate issue about what exactly a persona theory is and how to it is different to an evocation view and I will be providing a definition to clarify this in last section of Chapter Two.

this approach intuitively appealing as it offers crucial advantages over its impersonalist rivals. In particular, it can make sense of the additional expressive meaning that seems to arise from our impression of the kind of person who is executing the picture. However, I challenge her claim that viewers *should* see the expression as someone's expression of emotion. First, I deny her argument for a psychological tie between artist and implied persona. Second, I reject her evocation claim that spectators must be aroused to empathetic 'fellow-feeling' in order to adequately understand pictorial expression. Thirdly, I show that the normative tone of her headline claim that viewers *should* view the picture as an expression of the persona's emotion is misconceived. I put forward an alternative constitutive view, grounded on a theorisation of the role perspectives play in our experience of seeing paintings. I say that viewers *do or must* see the emotion as a hypothetical persona's expression. Briefly, I argue that the viewer has to shift out of their immediate (or their actual) perspective and into a surrogate mediating perspective in order to see the emotion in the paint. This surrogate experiential perspective qualifies as a 'persona'. I then offer a precise analysis in respect of (i) what constitutes this persona and (ii) why it is a substantial and productive discovery and one that is friendly to art criticism, and (iii) how it yields novel explanations for the interaction, interplay and interconnection between what the picture expresses and the viewer's response.

The systematic question animating my thesis is: what are the conditions that make seeing emotions in a painting possible? My novel contribution, drawing on a range of foundational issues in philosophy of perception and the philosophy of art, is to unpack an undertheorised feature of the phenomenon of expression, namely perspective.

My thesis appeals to the considerations about perspective-taking that are relevant to seeing emotions in faces. I challenge the widely held view that 'emotion' refers to a state, 'expression' to the dynamic effect of that state, and 'artistic expressiveness' to the mere presentation of outward characteristics associated with the state (Lopes, 2005, Smith, 2018). I show how this mistaken way of understanding expression is put to work by theorists to explain how paintings can be expressive while failing to be expressions proper or failing to emanate from the kind of thing that can undergo an emotion (Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002, Matravers, 2014, Wollheim, 1987, Goldie, 2000, Green, 2008, Walton, 1999, Robinson, 2017a, Robinson, 2018). My work draws on a range of

foundational issues in philosophy of perception and the philosophy of art to provide an account that corrects a common misconception about how we directly and immediately see emotions (Martin, 2002, Martin, 2017, Noordhof, 2002, Noordhof, 2008). I apply this account to a productive examination of the painterly case (Green, 2007, Clarke, 1965, Soteriou, 2018a).

As a result, my proposal avoids a common pitfall found in extant persona theories. That is to over-psychologise the painterly persona (Lopes, 2005, Robinson 2007, 2018) and to assume a re-enactment theory of time (Currie 2002, Matravers 1998, Matravers 2014, Robinson, 2007, Walton 1999). These moves leave existing models ill equipped to account for the spectator's emotional status when imaginatively engaging with the work. I correct this by presenting an alternative role for narrative and evocation.

The thesis amounts to a new persona view, one that takes seriously the idea that we can bear witness to our most compelling and complex emotional conditions when looking at, say, a Rembrandt, a Rego or a Rauschenberg. In this way, the view aligns our theorising in respect of the phenomenology of expression with a rich seam of criticism and appreciation of particular works. The theory vindicates our asking each other 'is this painting nostalgic?' and it shows how we may treat disagreement that follows as more than sentimental banter. In brief, it examines and celebrates a particular and rewarding encounter.

Methodological Preliminaries

This thesis is intended to confront a puzzle in the philosophy of art. For this reason, it may seem surprising that the argument rests so decisively on the literature in the philosophy of perception. In addition, it may be that the contribution I want to make to our understanding of painterly expression turns out to be generalisable to all expressive art, but this would be an unintended consequence of the theory. The goal of this thesis is much more modest. That is, to give an account of expression for a component of the expressive arts. Since my thesis is limited to giving a theory about a visual form of art, there is good reason to think work in philosophy of perception will be illuminating.

Since the question constrains the analysand to a discreet *kind* of art it should be of no surprise that the answer is going to draw on art criticism as well as philosophy. This has, of course, prompted many necessary (and not entirely unpleasant) trips to visit 'old friend' paintings. Old friend paintings are exemplars of what we can term the 'perception pump', a close cousin of the intuition pump, but one instantiated in our experience of looking at a thing. Perceptual pumps are paintings that trigger experiences that cause us to ask, 'why is *this* painting sad/happy/nostalgic etc'. The perceptual pump, like cash in a business, is the fuel that motivates the philosophical question 'what makes (any) painting sad/happy/nostalgic'. Hence, compelling art criticism is a secondary perceptual pump, and one that evocatively captures the sheer delight of encountering painterly emotions.

The structure of the thesis is as follows:

Chapter One defends the controversial view that emotions can be seen 'in the face' immediately and non-inferentially (Green, 2010, Smith, 2018). The purpose of this is to clarify how perspectives play their role in the paradigm case so that we can later compare and contrast the derivative case of the phenomenon of painterly expression. An argument advanced in this chapter involves examining an undertheorised aspect of our *experience* of 'seeing-x' (Martin, 2017). That is, the respect in which the perspectives we take are tools for seeing, that determine both what and how we see (Clarke, 1965). I conclude by outlining why this is significant for the analysis of the phenomenon of expression.

Chapter Two introduces and clarifies the category to be analysed, namely paintings. This is followed by a review of the existing debate in regard to pictorial expression in analytic philosophy.

Chapter Three introduces the first family of views which deny the persona theory. I first consider Stephen Davies' (1994) experience resemblance model before turning to examine the view of Dominic Lopes (2005) who is one of the few philosophers to consider the question specifically in relation to pictures (Davies, 1994, Lopes, 2005). Lopes' identification of three categories of expression (figure, scene and design) has

shaped the progress of the debate. I discuss some advantages and disadvantages of his deflated contour view and point out that the role played by perspectives is overlooked. I consider an alternative contour view, based on experienced resemblance due to Mitchell Green (Green 2007, Green 2010). Although Green is concerned to accommodate the idea of a subjective or experiential point of view, this is not adequately developed, and thus key aspects of his account remain under-analysed.

Chapter Four examines an alternative way to construe the phenomenon of expression using two metaphorical accounts. The first concerns a type of textual-pictorial metaphor due to Noël Carroll (Carroll, 2001). The second involves the notion of a perceptual metaphor, due to Christopher Peacocke (Peacocke, 2009). The models pursue the idea that we immediately 'see' the expression by mapping or fusing two distinct objects in experience. In this sense, they elevate the idea that viewers experientially frame the contents in the picture. I suggest that this can be better explicated by a more fundamental concept: perspective. I conclude that in order to progress the debate we need to theorise the role played by pictorial perspectives in the phenomenon of expression.

Chapter Five examines Jenefer Robinson's persona theory and in particular the notion of an 'implied persona' whose point of view or perspective unifies and coheres the painting's emotional meaning (Robinsons, 2005). I raise some concerns with Robinson's account. Using the notion of a painterly narrator as a rough heuristic, I consider afresh the idea of an experiential perspective, from which a viewer might gain access to non-depicted pictorial objects (Walton, 1976).

Chapter Six follows a 'back to basics' approach, beginning with the way perspectives play their role in our experience of seeing objects 'face to face', continuing by comparing this to pictorial depictions and then moving on to pictorial expressions (Hopkins, 1998). The analysis appeals to arguments in the philosophy of perception concerning visualising (Martin, 2002, Noordhof, 2002). I show that the viewer must imaginatively 'try on' a persona's experientially rich perspective in order to 'see' a painting as a sad or happy painting. This means that my proposal is a constitutive persona theory, in which

the imaginative shift into the persona perspective is an analysis of the phenomena. Viewers must or *do* see the picture from the persona's emotional perspective.

Chapter Seven involves sketching out one way in which the new persona theory can demonstrate its productive credentials. It is intended to further the case for personas, by showing what they do. In particular, I will discuss a contribution the new persona theory can make to one of the perennial debates in the literature concerning emotional and evaluative responses to pictorial expressions. As we will have seen some theorists suggest that fully understanding a pictorial expression requires a viewer to respond empathetically to it (Robinson, 2017b, Green, 2007, Walton, 1999, Matravers, 1998). Theorists disagree on the details, but the issue raises an interesting puzzle for the constitutive persona view. That is, how we should understand the nesting or embedding of perspectives in the phenomenon of expression. I examine an existing solution that the viewer bridges the gap between the perspectives by re-enacting persona expression. I flag a reason to resist plugging this solution into the new constitutive model and outline an alternative concept of interacting persona perspectives. Drawing on the theory of affective imagining, I argue that we can extend and develop an analogy with autobiographical memory (Arcangeli, 2018). In particular, I apply Peter Goldie's notion of bridging and aligning emotional perspectives (Goldie, 2003, Goldie, 2012). I use this to highlight a mode of engagement with pictures that respects the integrity of the perspectival roles involved and exposes how the argument for either dry-eye cognitivism or misty-arousal presents participants in the debate with a false choice.



Figure 2 © David Slater, Monkey Selfie photo

1 The 'Air' of Faces

(J1) *Nighthawks* is melancholy [3]

(J2) Emma is melancholy

It is natural to think we can see emotions in paintings (Bouwsma, 1950, Tormey, 1971, Wollheim, 1987, Walton, 1999, Robinson, 2017a). We might find peculiar pleasure in the horror of Bacon's immense canvases suffused as they are with anxiety, filled with terrified extruding and disintegrating faces, part meaty decay, part predatory alien. Or discover loss in the heavy, grieving, humanity seen in Rembrandt's *Self-Portrait with 2 circles*. Perhaps in a moment of excited anticipation we see our exhilarated state represented in Van Gogh's *Sunflowers*. Yet we do not think paintings instantiate emotions, like a person does. The very idea is absurd. So, what are the differences between seeing human and seeing painterly emotions? To answer this question, we need to make sense of (J2). I am not suggesting that we need to solve the problem of emotions. I am not going to attempt to say what Emma's melancholy is. Also, my account of the painting case is not conditional on the human case. My aim is simply to provide a way to think about the human case that can guide us in the painting case.

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In this chapter I want to defend the idea that we can be made immediately aware of another's emotional condition. We see Sophie's joy in her smile, hear Charlie's sadness in her voice and feel Chloe's nervousness in her handshake. These are our common-sense ways of speaking and I want to show that they are not misleading in suggesting we can directly or immediately perceive emotions. The simplest account of how this happens is that we perceive the emotion and form perceptual beliefs about what we see. Call this the common-sense view (Green, 2007, Green, 2010, Sias and Bar-On, 2016). [4] The common-sense view is, despite its simplicity, under pressure from alternative candidate explanations. For instance, that we infer the emotion from perceptually acquainting ourselves with the expression (Smith, 2015, Smith, 2018). I offer two

[3] Hopper E. *Nighthawks* (1942) Art Institute of Chicago.

[4] See Bar-On and Stout for alternative ways to construe common-sense Sias and Bar-On (2016), Stout (2010)

responses to this. In the first part of the chapter I show that we have reason to think that expressions can be proper parts of emotions, denying that they are mere effects. This is intended to neutralise ontological objections to the common-sense view (Robinson, 2018, Martin, 2010, Smith, 2018). In the second part of the chapter, I consider how we can see the whole by seeing a proper part of it. This is intended to neutralise the inferentialist objection in respect of seeing emotions. My plan is to elucidate the role perspectives play in our experience of seeing in order to defend the claim that we are sometimes acquainted with the emotions (and so minds) of others.

Similar discussions turn up in regard to how it is that when Sophie reaches out to grab the cup, I see her reaching and grasping even though her action comprises various components that go beyond what is actually visible (Hume, 2003, Michotte et al., 1963). Her bodily movements, desires, intentions and psychological states are all involved in her grasping action. The states produce the bodily movement and we consider that to be part of the action, not just an effect of it. Given that we all take ourselves to see the grasping, when in fact all we see is the bodily movement, whatever justifies the move from the latter to the former could be helpful to an argument for common sense.

In the grasping case the bodily movement is taken to be a constituent of the action. I propose that the emotional expression case is a parallel case and that expression can also be considered a constituent of the emotion (Green, 2007, Soteriou, 2018a, Martin, 2017). I'll argue for this as follows. In the first part of the chapter, I will argue that we have good reason to think emotions are complex wholes, whose constituent parts sometimes include expressions and that these can be held in a grounding rather than merely cause-effect relation with the other constituent parts. The primary aim here is to defuse the ontological obstacle to thinking that emotions can be seen when seeing expression-parts just as one can see an iceberg by seeing the bit of it that is over the surface. In the second part of the chapter, I defend the idea that we can immediately and directly see emotions in the face. The obstacle here is epistemic. The inferentialist says that mental states are (simply) not part of the visible world and so we must infer the emotion even if we are seeing the expressive facing part of it. My counter to this does not amount to a denial that we sometimes infer emotions from seeing parts of them, or that we infer them from seeing other things that are not parts of them. My minimal claim is that direct acquaintance is a tenable option. My plan is to elucidate a

phenomenological distinction that has been overlooked but can restore the possibility of common sense.

1.1 Emotions and Expressions

There is no easy or uncontroversial definition of an emotional expression (Goldie, 2000, Green, 2007, Smith, 2018, Russell, 2016).[5] Expressions form a highly heterogeneous set including but not limited to, changes in the face, body and prosody. Many theorists deny that expressions are proper parts of emotions, and the thought that expressions guarantee emotions is philosophically fraught (Glazer, 2018). Despite the lack of guarantees however, we certainly seem to monitor each-others' faces and claim to see emotion there in virtue of seeing the expression. Although the range of things we might want to call expressions reaches beyond the grimace, grin and curled lip, I will use these sorts of facial expressions as the main examples for my common-sense cases (Martin, 2010). For example, the idea that when I beam my happiness at you in a megawatt grin, I make possible a connection between my psychological state and yours, thereby allowing you to know my emotional condition.

Some concepts of emotion exclude expressions being parts of them. My aim is to show that we do not have to accept this. This means I need to give some account of what general ontological category I see emotions as belonging to.

For instance, we might think that since emotions are short-lived, they are events (like sunrises or explosions). Alternatively, if we take emotions to be comprised of several events that unfold in a series of stages then they might be better thought of as processes (Robinson, 2018. Goldie, 2000). Other theorists hold that the only way to secure the genuine explanatory contribution of an emotion is to say that it is a disposition. That is, we should identify Susan's irascibility with *a disposition* (to lose her temper) (Smith 2018:131). This also explains how Susan's resentfulness and irascibility can endure even when she is distracted by other things, namely: joyfully cycling the Maratona, tranquilly swimming in the ponds or carefully tending the garden. In this way, emotions

[5] Rather than offer a metaphoric gloss on a range of examples which deserve a precise analysis, it can be simply noted that expressions comprise a disparate and often controversial set.

are used to explain the predictability of Susan's nasty comments in terms of her resentful and irascible dispositional states in the same way we can predict the fragile object will be disposed to shatter when handled roughly (Wollheim, 1999).

What are the specific objections to possibility that an expression can be part of an emotion? The first objection is that for a constituent to be a proper part of a whole it must be a necessary part of it. Since we can have emotion without the expression, for example when secretly joyous, expression cannot be a proper part of an emotion. A second objection arises from a worry about the explanatory role emotions play. That is, emotions are invoked to explain expressions. But if expressions are explained by emotions (Chloe's blushing is explained by her embarrassment, and Emma's smile by her joy) then how can they also be part of the emotion? Since it is implausible to claim that observers perceive a cause (the emotion) by perceiving its effect (the expression), it must be that we infer the emotion when perceiving the expression.

1.1.1 How can expressions be constituent parts of emotions?

In this section, I aim to block the first objection, which is that 'parts entail necessary parts'. Joel Smith (2018) holds that an emotion is essentially a dispositional state. Emotions are said to be belief-like in this regard because they persist even when we are not attending to them. An implication of this is that (dynamic) expressions are precluded from being parts of emotions, since emotions are held to be pure stative conditions. But on this view all sorts of associated events are also ruled out of being part of the emotion, for example, feelings and physiological changes. While these may not seem central to sophisticated emotions such as nostalgia or schadenfreude, it is odd to think that fear or joy can be adequately captured without mentioning feelings or bodily arousal.

An alternative view and the one endorsed by many psychologists as well as some philosophers is that emotions are componential kinds made up of purely dynamic events or processes (Prinz, 2004).[6] For instance, Robinson privileges bodily arousal as

[6] These approaches have to overcome Prinz's worry that there are too many processes none of which is the emotion so unifying them will not add up to an emotion' (Prinz 2004). A slightly different worry is that there is no unifying or

the crucial component of an emotion (Robinson, 2018). This cluster of views deny that emotions are dispositions essentially or otherwise and say that all talk of emotional dispositions is just a pragmatic locution and not a property with some explanatory power. The most promising version of this kind of emotions as process view is due to Goldie (Goldie, 2000).[7] Goldie suggests that multiple events make up a single emotion, for example, grief. The emotion is given coherence by the way events are sequenced within an overarching narrative arc (Goldie, 2000, Goldie, 2009). In this way he adverts to narrative to perform the explanatory role played by Smith's dispositional state (Goldie, 2003, Goldie, 2012). Goldie thinks that grief coheres within a narrative, within which emotions can gradually (or not so gradually) alter and disappear. This view nicely captures the complex and subtle ways that emotions engage with our feelings, thoughts, memories and wider socio-cultural influences.

But it does not seem that in all cases we need to explain the processive events in terms of a narrative. When someone asks, 'why is Sophie emptying the jug of water onto Charlie?' it seems sufficient to say, 'because she is angry'. That is, we do not want to rule out the explanatory value of adverting to states. Yet how can we reconcile the claim that expressions can be parts of emotions with the claim that emotions can be genuinely explanatory in regard to expressions?

One need not go as far as giving up the idea that there are essential features. One could instead hold that not all parts are essential. Smith as we saw privileges dispositions, Robinson privileges bodily arousal and Goldie privileges unifying narrative. Thus, they isolate and identify the emotion essentially with either states (Smith 2018) or events or processes (Robinson 2018, Goldie 2000). But as we have seen the strategy of tidying up the concept of what an emotion is by identifying it with some essential component leads to an unsatisfying result.

For this reason, we may instead look to a *hybrid* model of the emotions. That is, one that acknowledges that neither wholly stative nor wholly dynamic models appear to

cohering property even if they collectively could add up to an emotion. This worry can be levelled at Robinson (2005) Emotion as Process' and Goldie (2000) Narrative emotion' models.

[7] Although in his published papers Goldie denies that expressions are proper parts of emotions, he is on record equivocating on this point. See Goldie (2010).

satisfactorily account for what we ordinarily call emotions. Matthew Soteriou (2018a) has put forward the view that emotions are complexes. Rather than being committed to the claim that there are no essential features, the idea is the more modest one that an emotion can have constituent parts that are not essential to it. What matters is that the various features that do manifest interact in the right way. Rather than pick out a particular component as the essential feature of an emotion, Soteriou outlines how different states and events will be appropriate to different emotions and that what matters is that these result in a phenomenologically unified experience that we explain by adverting to states. The phenomenal occurrence that must take place for emotion to obtain plays a similar role to Goldie's narrative arc (Soteriou, 2018a). In this way, he can say that emotions will have several constituent parts comprising at least one state and one event and it is the phenomenological way the various state and event parts interact that leads to the subject *being* melancholy, resentful or anxious.

Smith (2018) has raised the worry that interactions between states and events lead to the dissolution of the state in the event.[8] If the state was dissolved then it could no longer be adverted to as a genuine explanation for the screaming, tears and spiteful quips.

This concern can be addressed using the example of simpler affective conditions, where states and events interact without this leading to dissolution of the state or the loss of its explanatory role, for instance, by thinking about what it is to be in pain (Soteriou, 2018).[9] Pain is not merely particular sorts of feeling grouped together as pain sensations. Rather, a complete account of pain takes notice of all the subjective facts about pain and one of the characteristic facts of pain is an unpleasant sensation for the subject who is in pain. To be in pain is to be the occupant of an unpleasant point of view and this involves more than just being the subject who is feeling pain: it involves that association of the feeling of pain in the right kind of way to the modifying motivational state of unpleasantness.[10] In a scenario where Ted smashes his toe and feels the toe

[8] "The following line of argument can be mounted against the part-whole view: if something is part of a static entity, it is itself static." (Smith, 2018:137)

[9] See (Soteriou, 2018:81-83)

[10] Nikola Grahek has identified cases where subjects are feeling pain yet are indifferent to the feeling. He calls the condition pain asymbolia. Patients with this condition do not care that they are feeling pain. They have in some

throbbing with chronic pain sensations yet fails to find the feeling unpleasant, we would say that a part of pain, for instance, the sensory discriminative components remain intact but other parts, the motivational-affective component is missing. As a result, the modifications that Ted should undergo fail to take place.

What matters here is that if being in pain was merely a state that disposed us to painful feelings in certain circumstances but these feelings when they manifested never modified us then there would be no grounds for attributing the state. So, states alone are not sufficient to make it true that Ted is in pain. Likewise, if the presence of painful feelings did not interact with the motivational states required to care about those painful feelings the condition of being in pain would *fail to obtain*. So, events alone are not sufficient to make it true that Ted is in pain. Mapping the simpler example back onto emotions, the suggestion is that when we talk of 'being hungry' or 'being melancholy' what we refer to is some phenomenological interplay between state parts and event parts that must pertain in order to manifest the (whole) affective condition.[11] This means that emotions can be complexes with hybrid components and while it is true that expressions are not essential parts of emotions, it is a mistake to think that in order to be a constituent of something, that thing has to be an essential constituent of it. So, we should not automatically preclude expressions from being part of emotions simply because they are non-essential parts.

1.1.2 Expressions as parts of the whole.

Having appealed to a notion of hybridity to argue for a part-whole characterisation of what an emotion is, it is still in order to ask is *expression* a proper part of emotion? That is, how do expressions of emotion relate to emotion? The first thing to say is that I am not going to settle that question here, nor do I have the space to give a comprehensive reply. What I want to do is disarm the strongest objection, given what has been said so far, to the possibility that expressions are proper parts of emotions.

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important sense lost the ability to instantiate the condition of being in pain. See Grahek (2007) and in particular *Pain Quality and Painfulness without Pain* for arguments that the pathology means patients are not in a state of pain.

[11] Whether or not any individual component may be essential to the pain state, the pain asymbolic case demonstrates that part of being in pain is the association of painful feelings to the aversive bodily responses.

The strongest objection can be made in two moves. The first move is as follows. If Emma can smile without being joyful (and fool Sophie into thinking she is joyful when in fact she is miserable), then it seems that someone can be in a certain emotional state (miserable) without expressing it (Emma overrode her miserable expression with a disingenuous joyful one). This means that expressions are not essential to the manifestation of emotion (Parrott, 2017).

However, this is not problematic for my view since on my view emotions can include non-essential parts. Furthermore, on my view an expression of joy can only be tokened when the expression is actually correctly connected to the emotion. The view says that there are two things: the part-whole complex in genuine cases and the simple expression in fake case. The view acknowledges how it is possible to confuse the two, e.g. when we are tricked. But that should not be used to hide the fact that these two things have very different ontological structures such that in the good case, even if we don't know it, we do see the actual emotion. This means that the disingenuous look of a smile is not, according to my view an expression of joy. So, it does not harm my view that Emma suppressed her expression of misery and it also does not harm my view that she insincerely produced a facial contortion that looks like a smile.

The first move, however, prompts a second more pernicious worry for a part-whole theory. This is that expressions only manifest in response to or as effects of the emotions they make public. The concern here is that while the hybrid model does not have essential features, it might still just be a set of causes and effects. If we think of causes and effects as independent entities, and it is right to say that emotions are the causes of expressions, then it cannot be right that we see the cause of the expression (the emotion) in the effect of it. This looks like bad news for the part-whole model unless it can give a satisfactory account of how emotions relate to expressions of emotions. So, a part-whole model has to show how the emotion retains a genuinely explanatory role in regard to the expression of emotion without creating a puzzle about effects being constituents of causes.

But, as I have argued in the previous section, there is a way to respect the genuine explanatory role that allows us to understand the smile. When Sophie is asked why she

doused Charlie with the water from the jug, it is in order for her to reply 'because I was really angry with her'.

This reply can seem inadequate because it can sound like Sophie is offering me a kind of causal or reason-giving explanation of her angry expressive *response*. To dispel this we need a more complete picture of how precisely expressions can instantiate the intimate metaphysical relation to the whole in a way that goes beyond a simple story about co-variance with the other parts. One way to do this is think about the relation that holds between the expression of a thought and the thought (Sellars, 1969). For example, the spontaneous utterance of the phrase 'This is the best cup of tea of the day' when one is presented with tea first thing in the morning, does more than express the thought that one really appreciates this tea. It reveals a state which is intimately linked to that expression the state of really appreciating this tea. Of course, I could be uttering a little white lie, or just playing a game with my daughter while drinking air from a plastic cup. But, in these cases as with the disingenuous smile cases, my utterance is of a different type to the cases we want to consider. In the cases we are interested in, only those public and perceptible facial contortions that instantiate a kind of necessary connection between the whole and the part are the objects we are investigating. This suggests a way to think about the emotion case. We can say an expression of emotion metaphysically depends on the occurrence of an emotion.

This can prompt the worry that my view is confused because I am now saying that there are essential features after all. That is, emotions are essential features of expressions because expressions are only really expressions when they are constituents of emotions.

A reply to this is that saying that expressions are essentially emotions does not violate the earlier claim that emotions have no essential parts. When expressions do manifest, we must mark a metaphysical distinction between genuine versions (which are essentially emotions) and fakes (which are mere visual duplicates). We can then think about the relation between expression and other constituent parts in a way that respects Soteriou's idea that emotion states can obtain only if relevant events are occurring (Soteriou, 2018:83). The joyous feeling may gradually come on, reach a peak and slowly fade, but the joyous feelings (or other occurrent parts) are required for the

state to obtain and hold. The proposal I am presenting here maintains this basic idea but flips around the 'in virtue of' relation. What I am suggesting is that expressions of emotion occur if and only if the state obtains while the expression unfurls. This disarms the accusation that expressions are mere effects or that whenever they manifest, they are distinct entities to the emotion states explaining them. It also retains the explanatory role of the state. While it is not, in itself a reason to be inclined to the part-whole view, I hope to have done enough in the previous sections in respect of that possibility.

It would be a mistake to think that a particular constituent must be present such that all and only emotions have that constituent. In joy I may suppress the smile, or just emit a joyous glow. It is how the feeling of joy is associated to the joyous movements I make (with my face or body) that matters here. In dismay I may well up with tears or not, or I may well up because of the stench from the open sewer. We can remain silent on the necessary conditions for any given emotion and instead say that the sufficiency conditions for an emotion involve a peculiar interdependency between standing states and occurrences. In this sense, the ontology of emotion is a bit like that of a cake which can be constituted by flour, or almonds, eggs or another binding agent, vanilla essence or cocoa. What is necessary for there to be cake varies, just as what is necessary for there to be an emotion varies, without varying what is sufficient for there to be cake. We do not have to accept the thought that expressions are mere effects of emotions. While this does not yet constitute a positive argument for immediately and directly seeing emotions, it clears the ground to make an argument for it.

1.2 Seeing Emotions

We habitually display sensitivity to the emotions of others. At breakfast, grouchy teens show us where they are at by grunting or preening. We clock the tense man and the delighted friends on their way to work. Later, we chivvy along the dejected colleague or marvel at our friend's nostalgic soliloquy. Whether with strangers or intimates we think we immediately see emotion in faces in virtue of seeing expressions.

So far, I have argued that expression and inner state can both be parts of the bigger whole that is, the emotion. But someone could still argue that the common-sense claim remains vulnerable to a further epistemological objection (Abell and Smith, 2016, Smith, 2015). That is, by seeing the part we do not thereby see the whole. So, this objection also needs to be defused. Before getting underway, it is worth emphasising that although visual perception is not the only way that we can acquaint ourselves with emotions, this is the only mode of perception considered here. Visual perception fundamentally and peculiarly involves a strict notion of a spatio-temporal perspective and this is central to the argument that I make (Hopkins, 1998).[12] It also connects the paradigm case to the aesthetics case, as we shall see. However, whether the case put forward here generalises to all perceptual modes would need to be considered separately.

1.2.1 Seeing common sense

When Sophie whispers to Chloe, "Wow! She's incandescent with rage" or Paola thinks "Oof, that guy's nervousness is making me uncomfortable" they seem to be drawing conclusions about the emotional condition of the other based on perceptual evidence alone. A phenomenological claim that emerges from these commonplace experiences is that we can immediately and directly perceive emotions in faces. In this sense, common sense assumes the presence of other minds and seeks to elucidate how we come to be in direct contact with them.

Against common sense, Smith argues that we must infer inner states from expressions. He says "A's perceiving B's screaming" allows A to *perceive* B screaming "this does *not* amount to her perceiving B's fear" (Smith, 2018:133). An inferentialist (like Smith) can allow that the expression is part of the emotion yet disagree that we can perceive the non-visible bits of the emotion by seeing the visible part.

The inferentialist's point is apposite. That is, it seems incontestable that there are parts of the emotion that we do not see when we claim to see emotions in faces. The point

[12] For more on the different structures of perspective see Martin (1992).

also generalises. When I look at a chair, or an apple, all I clap eyes on is the facing surface of these objects. It is right to say that whatever object I see there are lots of parts of the object I do not see. Any diagnosis of common-sense seeing should leave this claim in place. Yet, what we experience seeing is a whole object, a whole chair or a whole apple. At least that is what it is like to clap one's eyes on ordinary objects like chairs and apples. Mitchell Green (2010) makes a similar point,

> Normally when we see such an everyday object as an apple we are only physically affected by its facing surface: it is only this that light bounces off of to affect our retina. At the same time, it is natural to say that we see the apple, not (or not just) that we see its facing surface.
>
> (Green, 2010:48)

This generates a puzzle for common sense since it is committed to two claims that seem mutually incompatible. On the one hand, that all we see are the surfaces of objects (a claim that the inferentialist endorses). On the other, that we immediately see whole objects.

I will suggest that the two claims can be made compatible by elucidating the role that perspectives play in our seeing. I have drawn on existing analysis to develop the view (Clarke, 1965, Green, 2010, Martin, 2017).[13] The plan is to solve the puzzle and defuse the epistemic hurdle to common sense.

It is important to note that by alluding to 'expression', I will be referring to expressions that are parts of emotions.[14] Call these [Whole] cases. My argument concerns two competing accounts of good [Whole] cases of expression, namely common-sense and inferential. In order to avoid confusion with other debates, we need to bracket out a second and distinct kind of object that is sometimes mistaken for expression. This is an empty-expressive where the facing surface of the object is detached from the rest of the

[13] The proposal avoids detailed discussion of any specific metaphysics of perception since it aims to be neutral in regard to commitments one might have to a particular account Spaulding (2015), Newen et al (2015), Stout (2010), Green (2010), Sias and Bar-On (2016).

[14] Nothing I have said so far binds me to the view that expressions are essential parts of emotion, nor that all expressions are parts of emotion.

emotion. Call the [Fake] scenario a sceptical case.[15] There are a variety of ways to produce a [Fake] empty-expressive.[16] However, since this is not relevant to our puzzle, we can simply say that, [Fake]'s just are insincere 'bad' cases, for whatever reason and note that they are useful for presenting powerful sceptical arguments against the possibility of a good case. What matters is that [Fake] cases are different objects to [Whole] . For illustration purpose we can think of [Fake] as merely facing surfaces of faces.

[Fake]



Figure 3 BBC photo, Hyper realistic face masks produced by Real-f (Japan)

[Fake] expressions may fool us into thinking that they are connected in the right way to an emotion (an expression of stern-ness), but in fact if you 'look inside' there is nothing there.

[15] Specifically, the difference between [Fake] and [Whole] cases are as follows. The [Fake] empty-expressives are like fake-icebergs, fake-barns and fake-hands. [Fake] are cases where Sophie looks at something that is less than the object it appears to be. [Fake] cases can be misleading for this reason.

[16] In other words, there is not just one thing that is common to all [Fake] cases, just as there is not just one thing that is present in all [Whole] cases. [Fake] objects may arise due to, among other reasons, acting problems (the agent masks her actual emotions with a disingenuous look), unluckiness (the agent wears a scowl even when serene, also known as resting-bitch-face') or illness, such as the anxious look worn by those with early onset Graves disease. For a discussion of acting problems see Parrott (2017).

The reason for this clarification is to emphasise that the sceptic is not the same as the inferentialist. Sceptics seek to undermine our epistemic confidence in other minds whereas, the inferentialist aims, more modestly, to undermine our confidence in our ability to be *acquainted* with other minds. Hence, the inferentialist is committed to good cases of expression, but not to common-sense discovery of them. That is, the inferentialist thinks there are many good cases, but their account creates the structural certainty of sceptical scenarios.

Now that the empty-expressive cases have been put to one side, we need a more precise characterisation of the inferential and common-sense cases. Common-sense cases represent the putatively puzzling common-sense claim that Sophie sees the surface of Emma's face yet sees Emma's joy.[17] See illustration [Whole] which shows that Emma's joy is present (in the sense discussed) and Sophie is looking at her face.

[Whole]



Figure 4 Seeing the whole

Since the claim rests on the testimony of the seeing subject, it is a phenomenological claim about the experience of seeing.

A concern that can be raised here is that the epistemic evidence common sense relies on is the same as the inferentialist relies on. The inferentialist holds that Sophie sees the

[17] It should be noted that common-sense does not claim that Sophie can see Emma's ***thoughts*** by seeing Emma's joy. That is, what Emma's joy is about.

flat surface of Emma's face. Common sense does not deny this point. But the inferentialist takes it that this means the epistemic evidence for seeing an emotion in both cases is equivalent. We can however distinguish between the two visually indistinguishable cases, by referring to what the inferentialist is seeing as [Surface]. We will take it that in the [Surface] case the emotion *is* inferred because all Sophie claps eyes on is the surface of Emma's face.



Figure 5 Seeing the facing surface

Hence, [Surface] is seeing the surface and seeing it as a surface. In this way, although inferentialism is not scepticism it opens the door to it because in the good and bad case you use the same evidence to form your belief.

I am arguing that the character of [Surface] differs from the character of [Whole]. What justifies this move? I think that the inferentialist's claim that the visual *phenomenology* is of seeing a flat surface in both [Whole] and [Surface] scenarios is wrong. It is wrong because we can establish there is a difference when we compare [Whole] with a case where we know that all we are seeing is merely a flat surface, as I will argue. I anticipate that the inferentialist's response to this will be as follows: 'inference is normally tacit and unthinking so the strange phenomenology you highlight occurs just because it is now conscious'. After all, the inferentialist can accept that Sophie may not be conscious of the inference she makes. An inferentialist does not think to themselves 'I am only seeing the surface of this chair, apple or face'. Despite how things seem to us, they will

insist that inference is in fact occurring and that it is occurring all the time when we see objects. What characterises [Surface] for the inferentialist is that given that the facing surface is all that is seen and this facing surface with its observable properties can be manifested independently of the good case of expression, then merely seeing the facing surface does not amount to seeing the expression. This is what I will be replying to. But first, I need to set out the inferentialist's case in more detail.

A full description of the inferential case might well be more complicated than this simplification implies. For our purposes the gloss is sufficient to explain how the inferentialist arrives at the first premise in their argument against common sense:

Inference

(1) [Surface] is equivalent to [Whole]
(2) You do not see the emotion in [Surface]
(3) So, you do not see the emotion in [Whole]

Notice that the nature of the equivalence is not specific in premise 1. How may the inferentialist construe it? Firstly, they might say that what it is like for the subject to be in an [Whole] case is the same as what it is like to be in a [Surface] case. So, what it's like for Sophie to perceive that [Whole] is exactly what is like for her to perceive that [Surface] (and notice too, what it's like for her in [Fake]). In other words, the inferentialist takes visual equivalence to entail phenomenal equivalence.

Secondly, inferentialists say that Sophie, *in fact* just sees the part of the object. So, what she sees in [Whole] and [Surface] is the same. Namely the part. That means that her warrant in both cases is the same.

A problem for the inferentialist is that these arguments are naturally vulnerable to scepticism. Inference holds that the warrant you have in all good cases is no better than the warrant you have in the bad [Fake] empty-expressive cases. In the bad case the warrant does not include seeing the whole and since this is not your warrant in the good case either then if one accepts the first premise of the argument, one must also accept that [Surface] is equivalent to [Fake]. In this way the inferentialist view can slide into scepticism.

As I mentioned above, I intend for my proposal to be neutral on the metaphysics of seeing, but it may head-off potential confusion if I am more explicit about how my proposal differs from disjunctivism. Disjunctivism is a theory of visual experience invoked to show that good cases and bad cases of object-seeing involve different mental states. This difference holds even when the experience is visually and phenomenally indistinguishable for the subject. Paul Snowdon takes disjunctivism to involve the claim that:[18]

> the experience in a *genuinely perceptual case has a different nature to the experience involved in a non-perceptual case*. It is not exhausted, however, by the simple denial of a common nature, but involves also the characterisation of the difference between the perceptual and non-perceptual in terms of the different constituents of the experiences involved. *The experience in the perceptual case in its nature reaches out to and involves the perceived external object, not so the experience in other cases*.
>
> (my italics for emphasis Snowdon, 2005:136-7)

The disjunctive view would be useful in marking the difference between a *perceptual and non-perceptual experience*. That is, when I am related to two *fundamentally structurally different* kinds of things (that I cannot distinguish between visually or perceptually). However, disjunctivism cannot help in identifying the difference between [Surface] and [Whole] because the subject is not related to fundamentally structurally different objects. So it cannot be relied on to do any work in this particular case. The disjunctivist is interested in the difference between a veridical perception, i.e. [Whole] or [Surface], and illusions or hallucinations. When Snowdon refers to "*the experience in the perceptual case in its nature reaches out to and involves the perceived external object, not so the experience in other cases*" (ibid) he is comparing a perception to an hallucination. One can grant the contrast Snowdon draws but it will not resolve the seemingly incompatible claims that generate my puzzle, where the subject is related to structurally equivalent things.

My question concerns the difference between two veridical perceptions. Specifically, in what in fact is a veridical case, is it well construed as seeing the surface and correctly

[18] Snowdon provides version of disjunctivism coupled with naïve realism, but disjunctivism can be construed in various ways. For an introductory overview of the various position see Chapter Six, in Fish (2010).

inferring beyond that surface, or is it better construed as simply seeing the whole in virtue of seeing the part? I am not aiming to block the sceptic but to block the inference in a good case. In the two good cases [Whole] and [Surface] the fundamental structure of the objects is the same. My proposal needs to show that the inferential view is not implied by the incontestable claim that all we see is the surface of the object and this requires me to explain in what sense the subject is having phenomenally and epistemically non-equivalent experiences in [Whole] and [Surface]. Hence, I am not relying on disjunctivism here, i.e. in this specific part of my argument, against the inferentialist.

I want to show how it is possible to get rid of the inference. I oppose inferential theories by considering a case in which we are conscious of making an inference and pointing out how weird that would be. I argue the evidence the subject has in [Whole] is different to the evidence they have in [Surface] and that the inferentialist goes wrong by conflating visual and phenomenal equivalence when in fact they come apart. I will do this by using the notion of a perspective, which will show that what it is like for Sophie to experience [Whole] is not what it is like for her to experience [Surface]. Which means that premise 1 of Inference is false on at least one interpretation since [Surface] is not phenomenally equivalent to [Whole].

1.2.2 What a perspective is, and what a perspective is on.

For every case of seeing, there are parts of the object that are not seen. The part that is not seen will vary depending on the type of object being looked at. This means our experience of seeing objects involves having a perspective on the object. Further, all perspectives are partial.

All seeing is essentially perspectival. What is meant by 'perspectival'? The relevant notion is of a literal spatio-temporal vantage point or outlook from which objects are seen. So, a more precise specification of seeing builds in that *S has a visual perspective on a part-of-X*. The perspective we take on an object determines how much, what aspect or which bit of that object is most prominent or salient within the visual field, which itself restricts or constrains how much of the world is in evidence at any given point in time.

A perspective is partly characterised by what it is a perspective on since perspectives are contentless in themselves. We can think of them as tools for grabbing content. By shifting around we can change the angle from which we grab content which just means that the part of object our perspective is on has changed. We can also change how much of the object the perspective is on by moving close to it or further away from it and each change of perspective gives rise to a phenomenally distinct experience. Further, a subject who sees an object can shift their perspective on an object without shifting the angle or proximity on it. They can shift between,

[1] a partial perspective on part of the whole object
and
[2] a perspective on merely the facing surface part of the object.[19]

In the next section I use this distinction to specify the epistemic significance of perspectives in our experience of seeing.

1.2.3 Seeing a part and having an experience of a whole

The role perspectives play in ordinary object perception is often overlooked. Theorists have been more interested in whether our experience of seeing variously, apples, trees and hands are reliable ways of knowing.[20] G.E. Moore famously considered the question of how we come to know the world by perceiving it (Moore, 1903). In a well-known passage, Moore sets up an argument to block the sceptic (not the inferentialist). But I think it can be used to develop an argument to block the inferentialist.

The passage in question is the one in which Moore instructs his reader to,

> …look at his own right hand. If he does this, he will be able to pick out something … he will see …that that thing is identical, not, indeed, with his whole right hand, but with that part of its surface which he is actually seeing,
>
> (Moore, 1925:54-5)

[19] For emphasis [2] is a case of seeing the surface of X and seeing it only as a surface.
[20] This is referred to as the problem of perception.

How is this relevant?

It is relevant to a change in facts that occurs when a subject makes a transition from a [1] partial perspective on a whole to a [2] whole-perspective view on the mere facing surface part. What is meant by a change in facts? The change of facts pertains to the facts of *how much* of the object is seen.

According to Moore there is no way to sort out whether you are seeing in the common-sense way or the inferential way simply by analysing one's own experience.[21] But this does not seem quite right to me. Moore's argument rests on a subject being able to control at will *how much* of the object they see. If I follow Moore's instruction carefully, I start out by [1] seeing a whole object (the right hand). I then need to change how much of the object I see so that [2] I now merely see a part of the hand. This is directly relevant to our puzzle because,

> [1] maps onto [Whole]
> and
> [2] maps onto [Surface]

When Moore instructs the subject to see a hand, and then transition to see merely the facing part of a hand, he refers to two distinct relata. It is not clear that this is what he is doing, because the transition between them is elided by Moore in the passage and he pays no further attention to the distinction he has just made (Martin, 2017). But there is an epistemically significant transition for the subject who enacts his instructions to the letter.

Moore's elision is picked up by Thompson Clarke who pauses to consider the implications for it on Moore's own argument (Clarke, 1965). Clarke concludes that it is both non-trivial and harmless to Moore's overall case. Clarke is right insofar as the elision is not going to be decisive in the argument Moore then goes on to make in regard

[21] An extended discussion of this is found in Martin (2017).

to the problem of perception. But, in regard to my puzzle the elision has profound consequences. Based on Clarke's analysis we can identify the epistemic grounds of the two phenomenally distinct experiences of [Whole] and [Surface]. Clarke's suggestion is the subject can bring about a change in the psychological facts (how much of the object they relate to through seeing) because they are in control of what counts as the object of sight. That is, as I type these words, I naturally see my two hands typing. But, it is open to me to see my hands now as just hands, not mine, that are tapping away like two 'thing' members of *The Adams Family*. When I see the hands this way, I no longer see them as parts of me and if I can sustain this way of seeing them, then the psychological facts in terms of how much I see when I see my hands has changed.

It is this change in facts that Moore is relying on to stoke the intuitions of the reader. But what he does is tell the reader that the psychological "'how much' fact" relevant to [Surface] are warrant for seeing [Whole], overlooking that [Whole] has different 'how much' facts to [Surface]. Although the subject does not experience fundamentally structurally different objects, they do experience different aspects of the object by changing how much of the object they relate to. They do this by altering how much of the object falls within the purview of their phenomenal perspective.

How much of an object is seen, depends on whether the subject occupies a perspective on the whole, or a perspective on merely a part. So what explains the change in facts is the change in perspective. How does this relate to Sophie seeing Emma's joy? We start with a common-sensical assertion such as [Whole]: 'I'm looking at my hand' or 'I'm looking at Emma's joy'. Given that vision is perspectival we now know that the statement is an attenuation. In full the statement is 'I am occupying a visual perspective on my hand' or 'I'm occupying a perspective on Emma's joy'. This is a crucial part of the phenonemonology that is being overlooked. Because it is overlooked, the inferentialist is assuming that when we report that there are parts of x I do not see, this is sufficient to capture the experience. But what is being elided by this assumption is the thought that 'here is a hand that I do not see all of, so *there are parts that I know that I see'.* What is the difference? Merely thinking there are parts of x I do not see, can lead to the thought that all we can directly see is an object *which is the facing surface part of one's hand*. This in turn can lead one to think that all that is ever directly seen is a facing part of a hand

that my restricted perspective is related to. To put this in terms of Sophie and Emma, you start with a partial perspective on a whole (viz. looking at Emma's joy) and you end up with a perspectival relation to a whole that is merely the facing surface part (but which is in fact part of larger object) because this is all that is salient in your occurrent experience. But the suggestion that merely seeing parts exhausts the description of what it is to have common-sense experiences is wrong and further, it stems from fallacious reasoning. When Sophie sees Emma's joy, what she claps eyes on is the surface of Emma's face arranged in a particular way, but she can simultaneously be acquainted with Emma's joy by occupying a partial perspective on Emma's joy. Sophie's perspective enables or prevents her seeing the emotion. When Sophie merely sees a face with an upturned mouth and crinkly eyes, what she experiences is merely a part of Emma's joy. The facing surface part. This accounts for why there can be phenomenally distinguishable and visually *in*distinguishable experiences in a single seeing.

The purpose of this is to show that inference may be no better off in regard to explanations of what we see than common sense. However, the inferentialist may now reply that the phenomenal switch can be explained in terms of becoming aware of the inference, rather than in terms of perspectival changes. That is, they can repeat their claim that the subjective experience cannot show that inference is not in fact occurring all the time when we see objects, but just so quickly we do not realise it. In this way, they can say that the strange phenomenological transition I have highlighted occurs just because of what is now conscious to me, not because I have actually changed the relata by changing the perspective.

My reply here is that if all we had was the inferentialist story about how we see we end up with unacceptably strange accounts of what it is like to see. If the inferentialist is right, then theoretically, sufficiently slowing down Sophie's seeing (in a slow-motion machine of some sort) will eventually show a belief inference taking place at some point in her experience. However, this is unconvincing because of cases like Doctor P. who suffers from a very rare case of chronic visual agnosia (Sacks, 2011). This unusual form of visual agnosia means that Doctor P's visual experiences of the world remain unchanged (they are visually indistinguishable from how they were before the agnosia) but he loses his ability to experience seeing whole objects despite having healthy

binocular vision.[22] As a result, he has to infer what he is seeing from his restricted ability to see mere parts. The process is slow, requires huge effort and gives rise to multiple errors. Poignantly, Sacks says,

> it was not merely the cognition, the *gnosis*, at fault; there was something radically wrong with the whole way he proceeded. For he approached these faces – even those near and dear – as if they were abstract puzzles or tests. He did not relate to them, he did not behold. No face was familiar to him, seen as a 'thou', being just identified as a set of features, an 'it'[...] A face, to us, is a person looking out – we see, as it were, the person through his *persona*, his face. But for Dr. P. there was no persona in this sense – no outward *persona*, and no person within.
>
> (Sacks, 2011:14)

Doctor P seems to have lost his capacity to see whole objects. What he could see, he experienced as discontinuous parts of objects, which with tremendous concentration he could use to attempt to identify whole objects by conducting a sequence of conscious *inferences*. How does this relate to the distinction between [Whole] and [Surface]? It seems that Doctor P could only see qua [Surface]. When he clapped eyes on a face, he did not see it as a face, but as a surface with textures, dents and so on.

This suggests a further reason to think inferentialism cannot exhaust the ways that we see. If it is true that we have to infer objects from the parts of them we see, then we have no reason to think we even see Emma's smile. All we can say is that we see a surface of some sort, from which we have to infer 'smile' or 'face' and from there we have to infer again 'inner state' and only then do we arrive at 'emotion'. This is an unlikely way for the mind to operate. Our phenomenal experience weighs against it, and now that we have theorised the role played by perspectives, we have articulated a reason to resist it and to answer the delicate question about the change in 'part' facts when shifting between perspectives.

By pushing the common-sense possibility, I do not deny inferences can occur. All I deny is that our seeings must be wholly founded on an inference from surfaces (or overt

[22] Interestingly he can still experience hearing whole objects. For instance, he continues to hear his wife and musical compositions, so the structure of the auditory experience appeared to be unscathed by the damage to his visual perspective.

behaviours). But it seems to me that when we do fall back on inference, we are often still relying on our background of immediate seeings in which perspectives play a significant epistemic role by making whole objects available. Confidence in our practice of immediate seeing is bolstered by engaging with objects in other ways by touch or through dialogue that builds confidence in our interpretive knowledge and sharpens our skills by learning from the mistakes we do make.

The inferentialist who pushes the perspective explanation aside in preference for the awareness explanation (that we are always inferring but becoming aware that we are doing so is what makes it feel strange or weird) fails to take seriously how merely seeing the surfaces of *persons* would be a threat to our ability to enter into the kind of relationships we actually do enjoy with others in virtue of seeing them *as whole persons* directly. That is, inferentialism leads to a dystopian view of our normal interactions. A discussion of how this can arise without any sort of brain injury is found in Alasdair MacIntyre's *Dependent Rational Animals* (1999) in regard to what are called 'Natural Bitees'. Natural Bitees are those people who are frightened of dogs, and because of their fear merely see the surfaces (of the dog), blocking their relation to the whole (dog). This sets up a funny dynamic between dog and person. The dog is apt to be uneasy as they sense something has gone wrong with communications and the 'natural bitee' is flummoxed by the dog because their seeing is blighted by epistemology. MacIntyre says,

> [t]hey are those who hope to find premises from which they can infer how the dog will behave, to predict whether it will be apt to bite them or not. Contamination by epistemology prevents those affected – infected? – by it from entering into the only kinds of relationship with dogs, or with members of certain other species through which interpretive knowledge of their thoughts and feelings can be gained.
>
> (MacIntyre, 1999:17)

MacIntyre's Natural Bitees can of course be used by the inferentialist to show that we do in fact infer. But I readily acknowledge the possibility of making inferences. My argument is that the possibility of inference is not in itself a block to the possibility of common sense and that one should be open to arguments that explain our interpretive immediate seeings in a way commensurate with the actual ways we engage with one another.

1.2.4 Paradigm and aesthetic cases

In this final section, I would like to make a further claim about the extent to which we can have control over, or can choose, which perspective we occupy. Specifically, to what extent are our perceptual beliefs involuntary and irresistible (Quilty-Dunn, 2015)? Do we have to opt-out of seeing emotions when they are presented to us, rather than opt-in as the inferentialist seems to suggest?

I have argued that perspective plays an epistemic role in the immediate and direct identification of and acquaintance with objects. Shifting one's perspective can change how much of the object we perceptually attend to. This in effect changes how much of an object we can see. Furthermore, what we must not do to justify our common-sense claims is to base our epistemic warrant for seeing [Whole] on the evidence relevant to seeing [Surface].

Here is a further claim. There are circumstances in which we might find it difficult or even impossible to shift out of [Whole] and into [Surface]. That is to say, seeing [Whole] is automatic, involuntary and in some cases, irresistible. This casts suspicion on the idea that we frequently see [Surface] or that we can easily choose to see [Surface] as the opponent seems to suggest and so casts doubt on premise 2 of Surface.

I am arguing that for certain kinds of the intentional actions we perform, it is extremely difficult to *not* see them as intentional actions (Hume, 2003, Michotte et al., 1963). In other words, seeing [Surface]-ishly can be extremely difficult because it is not our natural way to see.[23] This is something we encounter beyond the realm of the visual. Think of the time you had to endure being told off. Any kid would have loved to turn that insufferable parent-splaining into the 'wah-wah' noise from the old Peanuts cartoon. But boring Mums cannot be so easily muted, or their speech acts reduced to

[23] An exception here is the atypical experience of autistic children. While they can be taught to infer at speed' they tend to find it more tiring than neurotypicals do to read faces' see Baron-Cohen (2009), Cohen et al (2016) and Baron-Cohen (2012).

babblings. If they were, then kids everywhere might more happily undertake to sit and listen to the infuriating lecture.

Furthermore, seeing intentional movements, emotions and the like is something we experience in a variety of situations. Watching a horror film, it is difficult not to see the victim *suffocating* and it is striking how frequently we see, for example, an old *man sagely smoking* a pipe in the clouds, and *figures poised serenely* in wood stains and even *toothbrushes falling in love* (see Figure 7). The empirical studies have recorded this natural urge to anthropomorphise in studies where viewers tend to see shapes *chasing each other* when they see two shapes moving about on screen (Milan et al., 2013a). This should lead us to think that although only some agents can occupy the perspective under which the emotions are visible, for those who can, there may be less choice than we might suppose in respect of which perspective, [Whole] or [Surface], they occupy.

In this chapter I have defended our common-sense intuitions that we can be made immediately aware of another's emotional condition. The inferentialist tries to have us give up the claim that I can savour the *joy in your smile* or am tickled by the *irritation in your eyes* by immediately and directly seeing it. In the first part of the chapter I showed that expressions can be constituents of emotions although nothing I said there committed me to the view that expressions were guarantees of emotions or could not be produced insincerely. This defused the ontological obstacle to common sense. In the second part, I examined a puzzle that was generated by holding two claims. The first was that we see the facing surfaces of objects, the second was that we see the whole object. The puzzle was resolved by showing that our experience of seeing whole objects comes about from occupying a perspective on a part of a whole object. This showed that while philosophers have the peculiar ability to make us seriously doubt that you can see an emotion in someone's face it has been demonstrated that the assumptions that get you into that kind of knot are not compulsory. As a result, chapter one provides a precedent case which can guide us in the development of the account of seeing emotions in paintings (J1).

Figure 6 © Brassey, photograph at Cradle of Humankind, Johannesburg, 2019

2 Painting

Binder and Pigment. Water and Plant. Oil and Stone. For the desperate, demented or attention-seeking there has also been urine, or blood. Somehow, these coloured fluids come to occupy the mind as paintings. But how? How did anonymous artists use them to preserve the surprised and delicately arched look of the ancient Fayem? How did devoted medieval clerics use them to delicately express their love of God?

This chapter introduces the claim that a painting may express an emotion. In the first section, I give an account of what a painting is. In the second section I set out what might be meant when we claim a painting expresses an emotion.

2.1 What makes a painting?

A painting can be associated with a variety of different mental, phenomenological and physical phenomena. We can look into Edward Hopper's *Nighthawks* and see flat abstract blocks of colour, or a building faded out against the piercing clarity of three clownish isolated figures. Peter Doig's vast canvases represent languid layers of suffused heat, populated by strange apocryphal bathers wrestling even stranger demonic forms. Paula Rego's paintings which speak to her life under the Salazar regime express anger, cruelty and violence.

Painted objects are found on cave walls, graffitied on treasured monuments, in nursery schools, therapy sessions, inked on the skin, splattered on the canvas and deftly applied to metal. But I am not interested in all painted objects. The paintings I am going to analyse require viewers attend to the marked surface as a record of activity. This distinguishes it firstly from other image formats like photographs, video paintings or cinematic images as well as painted furniture and fences (Currie, 2019). The significant difference between a work of photography, such as Nick Rutter's *Love Story* and paintings like *A Rake's Progress* is that the latter must have at least some of its content and meaning constituted by the way the surface is marked.

2.1.1 Necessary conditions

Following Jason Gaiger, we can say that there are four jointly necessary and sufficient conditions on something being a painting (Gaiger, 2008). These are (i) purposive mark making (ii) that modifies the surface onto which the marks are made (iii) achieved through direct bodily movement (iv) that results in a meaningful visual image (Gaiger, 2008:8-11). This last item is intended to distinguish painting from writing and to exclude non-artistic forms of painting, such as painting a wall or a chair where the goal is to protect the object and perhaps to make it more beautiful, but not to create a pattern of marks that has meaning.[24] Gaiger's four criteria do not restrict 'painting' to easel paintings. Although these have been in evidence since the time of ancient Egypt and are often centrally associated with painting, they do not exhaust the set to be analysed. Nor does he suggest mark-making must be achieved by brushwork. Fingers, sharpened feathers, pencil strokes, palette knifes, squeegees, drippings, splatters, sprays, and centrifugal spinners are all ways by which 'marks' have been applied and adhered to a flattish ground to produce a painting.

In addition to these, I argue that there are two further conditions that must hold between the viewer and the painting in order for pigment to be encountered as painting. These are (v) twofoldness and (vi) perspective.

Twofoldness is a term of art due to Wollheim (Wollheim, 1980, Wollheim, 1987). It is shorthand for the experience of at once being aware of the materiality of a painting (for example, thickness of the paint, brush mark, palette and so on) and the content of the painting (who or what appears in the painted world such as flowers, Charles I or a view of Delft). Wollheim's insight is that these two aspects, or folds, must permit simultaneous perception. He says,

> The seeing appropriate to representations permits simultaneous attention to what is represented and to the representation, to the object and to the medium, and therefore instantiates seeing-in rather than seeing-as, follows from a stronger thesis which is true of representations. The stronger thesis is that, if I look at a representation

[24] There might appear be grey areas here; for example, William Blake's illustrated books. However, these are works of art that incorporate both painting and words, rather than works that paint *with* words.

> as a representation, then it is not just permitted to, but required of, me that I attend simultaneously, to object and medium.
>
> (Wollheim, 1980:213)

Twofoldness goes against the claim that it is not possible to perceive what is represented and the medium of representation simultaneously (Gombrich, 2002). It is now widely adopted as the correct description of the kind of seeing appropriate to painting. So, I take twofoldness to be an uncontroversial aspect of the phenomenon I will go on to analyse in the thesis and one that is readily accepted by participants in the debate (Hopkins, 1995, Nanay, 2005, Wollheim and Hopkins, 2003, Benenti, 2017, Currie, 2019)

More controversially, I argue that perspective or point of view plays a crucial role in what makes a painting sad (or happy). It is not controversial that perspective plays a crucial role in seeing depictions (Hopkins, 1995). The claim that everything that is depicted is depicted from some point of view has been convincingly defended elsewhere (Greenberg, 2018, Hopkins, 1998, Hopkins, 2010b).[25] However, when it comes to what a work expresses the role of perspective drops out of the discussion. Robert Hopkins says, for example,

> How do pictures represent? … If a painting shows a seated woman, if she symbolizes Despair, and if the work expresses melancholy, we should not assume that the representational relations here are all the same…It seems more likely that our painting exhibits this distinctive form in representing a seated woman than in representing Despair.
>
> (Hopkins, 1995:425)

What Hopkin's means by the distinctive form of representation is visual perspective (Hopkins, 1995). I will argue that visual perspective is also implicated in the phenomenon of expression and so the concerns central to the philosophy of depiction extend to our perception of emotion in paintings.

[25] The literature on depiction revolves around how we can experience illusory three-dimensional space in two dimensions. For Illusion theory see Gombrich (2002). For Information Theory see Lopes (2005). For Resemblance theory see Hopkins (1995). For Seeing-In see Wollheim (1987).

Figure 7 © Nick Rutter, Love Story, (reproduced with the permission of the artist)

2.2 What makes a painting sad?

My central question is 'what makes a painting sad?'. This is of course a dummy question since we describe paintings as being happy, nostalgic, anxious, demented, joyful, melancholy and much more besides. Expressive works are a ubiquitous feature of our cultural lives and many of us are happy to accept the idea that some art just is emotional without giving it a second thought. But paintings are not sentient; they have no psychological life and therefore they cannot be sad. If paintings cannot be sad, at least not in the same way a person can be sad, then they cannot express sadness in the way a

person expresses sadness. However, if paintings are not expressing sadness, when we call them sad, then, what *are* we reporting? And why is philosophical wisdom so out of step with our ordinary ways of speaking about what we think we experience in paintings?

Here is an indication of the kind of paintings that are considered to be variously anxious, joyful, poignant, terrified or melancholy; *The Scream, The Sunflowers, The Lonely Tree, Guernica* and *No.5*.[26] These and many other paintings are typically discussed as examples that have emotional qualities and are commonly referred to as expressive paintings. Of course, there are plenty more pictures that lack such qualities. The drawings that arrive with flat-packed furniture, scientific illustrations depicting anatomy or a feat of engineering, maps and courtroom sketches. There are of course difficult or borderline cases like children's drawings, art therapy paintings, so-called anthropometries and monochromes, but I will just put these to one side for now.[27]

Paintings have no inner state of mind, so it is not clear how painterly expression compares with human expression. Are we saying pictures are like a 'boom tish' played on the drums, that can *conventionally* express humour, or like a funeral march that can be a *cultural* expression of sadness? In some cases, this might be what we are saying. But we also call objects like *Nighthawks* melancholy because melancholy is something we see *in* the picture.

2.2.1 The concept of pictorial expression

What does it mean to say we see x in a picture? We can see objects in pictures because some pictures have depictive meaning. Depictions refer to, pick out or represent objects that can be seen, or could if they existed, such as Sherlock Holmes. Many other kinds of things are seen in pictures. In *A Rake's Progress* we see a narrative, in Monet's *Water Lilies* we apprehend grace and harmony and *Nighthawks* and *The Scream* we see melancholy and despair. The term 'pictorial expression' refers to the expressive

[26] Edvard Munch *The Scream* 1893, Vincent van Gogh *Sunflowers1888*, Casper David Friedrich, *The Lonely Tree* 1822, Pablo Picasso *Guernica* 1937, Mark Rothko *No.5* 1950

[27] See http://www.yvesklein.com/en/oeuvres/serie/1/anthropometries/?of=6 (last accessed January 14 2010)

meanings, emotional outlooks or emotional attitudes we see pictures as manifesting. Both depictive and expressive meaning are sources of value but what makes something an expressive rather than a depictive feature is this connection to the emotions. So, an analysis of pictorial expression must show (1) how the picture connects to an emotion and (2) how the expressive meaning of the picture has value (Wollheim, 1987).

2.2.2 Who has analysed pictorial expression?

Philosophers began to take an interest in the phenomenon of seeing emotions in paintings relatively recently. This might seem surprising given that the caves of Chauvet and burial artefacts from Roman Egypt seem so expressive to us now. Yet discussion about the connection between paintings and emotions only took shape in the early 19th Century. This coincides with the emergence and development of our modern concept of emotions and away from talk of 'passions', 'moral sentiments', 'duties' and the like.[28] The new pre-occupation with questions about whether expressions are 'hard-wired', whether our emotions are public or private and so on spurred discussions about how this applies to our objects of aesthetic contemplation.

Compared to the analysis of musical expression, relatively little is published in the philosophical literature specifically on picture expression (Lopes, 2005:50).[29] Wollheim is an exception to this and both Dominic Lopes and Jenefer Robinson have recently produced work in this area (Wollheim, 1987, Wollheim, 1993b, Lopes, 2004, Lopes, 2005, Robinson, 2005, Robinson, 2017a). There may be parallels between an analysis of musical expression and pictorial expression. For instance, one may posit resemblances or metaphors as crucial explananda in both mediums or think that an expressive work can only really be understood through some kind of affective arousal and engagement (Matravers, 1998, Walton, 1999). However, there are issues that militate against a general theory, for example, the fact that music is dynamic (qua temporal procession) and pictures are not (Scruton, 1974). Moreover, pictorial cases face the hurdle of sorting out depictive meanings from expressive ones. Take 'depiction' to mean the referencing

[28] Charles Darwin who was instrumental in this movement, developed his views by taking a scientific approach which culminated in his seminal monograph Darwin (1872).

[29] The literature on musical expression is rich and relatively well defined across a range of musical types. For a concise overview of the main positions in the debate see Chapter 39 in Lopes (2001).

of an object (fictional or real) through pictures and 'expression' to pick out a subset of high-level affective qualities broadly those that represent emotions or moods. It seems prima facie, an image can reference a psychological kind without expressive content toilet signs, emoji's, stick figures and the like but it is not clear how we separate the psychological kind from the expressiveness when looking at, say, portraits. Although some argue that a general theory of expression is desirable, even though they express scepticism that it can be delivered (Levinson, 1996), others do not even desire it (Kivy, 2002, Matravers, 2010). These issues are best explored once the conceptual model for pictorial expression has been presented and argued for.

Historically, expression in the arts is associated with two grand so-called *expressivist* theories of art due to Tolstoy and Collingwood, in which it is held that art is fundamentally expression (Tolstoy and Maude, 1962, Collingwood, 1938). Since the advent of Dada and Readymades, Collingwood's view is no longer a widely accepted theory of what art *is,* although Robinson defends a version of it, and more modest claims about expression in art continue to be discussed although largely in relation to music (Robinson, 2005).[30] Wollheim's preoccupation with expression in paintings spanned his career and his output, whether explicitly or implicitly (Wollheim, 1974, Wollheim, 1984, Wollheim, 1999, Wollheim and Hopkins, 2003). But his view that pictorial expression rests on so-called projective properties which are retrieved by a special kind of perception remain obscure (Wollheim, 1987, Budd, 2001).

Despite the obscurity of his own view, Wollheim is largely responsible for shaping the questions that are now asked about the connection between painting and emotion. That is, what do we mean when we say that a painting is sad? What kind of properties or features should we discuss? How may we distinguish between normative and constitutive issues? What can we productively draw on from the philosophy of mind and perception?

[30] For more on expression in music see Levinson (1990, 1997), Davies (1994, 2001, 2003), Kivy (1908) and Gracyk (2011).

2.2.3 The persona theory of expression

An acceptable account of pictorial expression must relate the work to the expressive features in a way that makes the painting's role in expressing those features essential rather than incidental. My solution envisages pictorial expression as mandating personae who express. This thesis relies on two central claims: first, that whenever we see pictorial content what we see is mediated by an imagined perspective, and second, that adequately seeing emotions in the painting mandates imagining an experiential persona occupying that perspective. I develop an argument to show how these two claims weave together in order to explain what makes a painting sad. In slogan form, the answer is that in order to see emotions in paintings, viewers must represent an expressing persona.

This makes my view a persona theory. Persona theories are identified by a shared headline claim: viewers can and should see the emotion in the painting as someone's emotion-expression (Robinson, 2005, Levinson, 2006b, Vermazen, 1986, Cochrane, 2010b). In short, they think that adequate apprehension of expressiveness involves picking up on someone's mental states.[31] There is a range of ways to spell out what is denoted by 'someone's mental states' involving variously implied and hypothetical artists and empathising viewers (Robinson, 2005, Levinson, 2006b, Vermazen,1987). Robinson is the only proponent of a persona theory who also explicitly applies her view at some length to pictures and paintings. However, Robinson's account is normative and not constitutive in character. That is, she thinks viewers ought to see the painting from the point of view of the implied artist since this gives them the richest and most rewarding experience of the work.

Serious disagreement arises over the issue of attributing emotions to expressers in all cases of pictorial expression. For the purpose of motivating the two positions I want to set up an intuitive solution and then show why this intuitive view is unacceptable and how it leads to the more sophisticated views I go on to analyse.

[31] See Robinson (2007).

2.3 An intuitive solution

It was argued that if Emma feels sad, angry or nervous, Sophie might pick up on how she feels simply by looking at the expression on her face. It was said that as long as the expression was a constituent of the emotion, by seeing the expression Sophie could see the emotion. This was contrasted to a situation where Sophie looked at an empty or insincere expression. These were visually indistinguishable from genuine expressions seen in the same conditions and from the same viewpoint but were in fact an entirely different object constituted merely by the flat facing surface. It was said that when Emma produces a joyful looking smile insincerely, Sophie cannot see Emma's joy (although she may detect the insincerity).[32]

Can we map these distinctions onto pictures? An intuitively appealing solution that explains pictorial expression in terms of depicted expressers is as follows.

> (E1) P expresses E iff the picture depicts a canonical instance of emotional expression

E1 asserts that we can see depicted figures in the picture *as* expressing emotions. Lopes has dubbed such instances 'figure expression' or 'an expression that is wholly attributable to a depicted person or persons' (Lopes, 2005:52).

[32] I will continue to allude to emotion-expressions as expressions and empty-expressions as fake, insincere or empty expressives.

Figure 8 Honoré Daumier, Fatherly Discipline, 1851–2

A good example of what he means by this is Daumier's *Fatherly Discipline*, which shows a frustrated father wrangling with his child. Lopes does not claim that pictures present expressing faces as we would see them face-to-face; he thinks rather that expressing faces are presented in depiction-specific ways. He also holds that it is possible a depicted figure expresses an emotion in virtue of a conventional posture that has come to symbolise a certain attitude, such as bowing to indicate humility, tilting the head, clasping the hands in supplication and so on (Lopes, 2005). Depiction is still crucial in these cases because the figures *look* frustrated, imposing, confident or penitent. This neatly matches human expression to picture expression just as you *look* frustrated by furrowing your brow, so the figure *looks* frustrated by being depicted with a furrowed brow.

This suggests an overlap between (i) depiction, (ii) expression and (iii) personalism. Figure expressions are (i) *depictions* of (ii) emoting (iii) persons. Moreover, if true, E1 strongly endorses persona theory. This is because an E1 conflates the idea of a pleased

expression with a pleased face and takes it as necessary and sufficient for pictorial expression that the viewer sees a pleased face. Seeing the expression as *someone's* expression, whether or not that someone is a specific individual (Rego) or a type (a woman) meets the criteria for a persona theory.

The claim plays on the intuition that an expression (for example, of sadness) cannot be detached from the canonical thing that has that aspect (that is, a person's face). Thus, E1 presupposes that the viewer is experiencing what they see depicted in the picture as a genuinely sad face.

This is just to say that when I see the portrait of Rembrandt and attribute to the figure a certain psychological awareness, consciousness and inner emotional life, I can do so seemingly immediately, and this suggests that seeing the expression and seeing it as someone's expression cannot be prised apart. Budd points out why this is so (Budd, 1985). He says that to allow that the two can be prised apart simply does too much violence to the idea of an expression,

> to see something as having the same expressive aspect as a pleased face it is necessary to see it is as a face. If we see a pleased expression, we see a pleased facial expression
>
> (Budd, 1985:142)

In other words, one can't experience expressive aspects or qualities without seeing them as belonging to a face or body, implying they belong to *someone*. Budd then says that the phenomenology of depicted facial expressions shows up something that will be common to all our experiences of expressive properties that we cannot help but represent them as belonging to the canonical thing that has it (a person). For this reason, he thinks impersonalism *will always* be inconceivable (Budd, 1985:142).

However, this doesn't seem to be obviously true. I can see a depiction of a mask moulded to display a pleased expression and I can see depictions of artificial intelligences sporting pleased expressions which I see as mere facing parts of expressions. When seeing a sad-face mask in a picture I do not see the mask as

expressing its feelings although I do see it as a face (of sorts). Based on the idea that we can see depictions of figures sporting genuine expressions in paintings, the most we can say is that figure expressions sometimes require us to attribute the emotion to the expressing figure in order to adequately apprehend it.

So, as a solution to the phenomenon of expression, E1 is false. This is because many pictures depict scenes without depicting canonical expressers of emotion and yet represent qualities like sadness and joy. Furthermore, that a picture depicts something that expresses E is not sufficient for the picture to express E. For example, in De Chirico's *Mystery and Melancholy of a Street*, a young girl is depicted happily playing with a hoop. But the painting does not express happiness. Instead, it conveys a sense of unease or incompleteness. Furthermore, the qualities of Friedrich's *Lonely Tree* and Rothko's Chapel Series do not seem to me to be experienced as expressive because they are represented as the gait or face of an emoting *person*. So, depiction is neither necessary nor sufficient for *pictorial* expression. For these reasons, we must look for a more nuanced way of understanding the relationship between depicted content and expressive meaning.[33]

I am going to regiment the terminology in the following way. I will use 'impersonalism' or 'impersonalist' to refer to a theory that rejects the claim that the adequate apprehension of an expression of emotion in a painting mandates representing or arousing **someone's** emotion. I will use 'personalism' or 'personalist' to refer to any theory that makes central reference to someone's expression of emotion when explaining adequate apprehension. Adequate apprehension involves representing emotionally valenced properties. I unpack and discuss this notion of valence throughout the thesis. A theory of expression cannot be both impersonalist and personalist since one cannot coherently say that artistic expression both mandates and does not mandate an expresser.

[33] In Bruegel's painting *The Fall of Icarus* (c.1560) we take it that Icarus has just fallen from the sky, and it is said this implicitly enters an informed viewer's experience of the work, even though the fall is not depicted in the picture (Abell, 2013). While the picture arguably conveys indifference to Icarus' fall, the meaning is generated by the narrative or implicit content given by the title. The emotion content is detached in some important way from the pictorial content and so it seems incorrect to describe the indifference as arising through *pictorial expression*.

Personalism is a broad category encompassing a group of related theories. I will call a narrow selection that falls within this cluster 'persona theories' and bunch these together based on a further and more specific requirement about representing an expressing persona. This condition, I argue, separates the persona theory from a second cluster which I will refer to as 'evocation theories'. Roughly, evocation theorists hold that the painting is sad because it makes the viewer feel sad (or a sympathetic emotion such as pity).[34] In other words, evocation theory analyses the expressive properties of the painting in terms of the emotional feelings aroused by attending to the picture. This empathetic or sympathetic arousal of the viewer is considered to be crucial to either adequate comprehension of the work or to be constitutive of the emotion in the work. Given the headline account of what personalism is expressiveness involves picking up on someone's emotion confusion may arise from thinking that a persona theory and an evocation theory are insufficiently distinguished.[35] But, an account of expression of emotion in painting is a persona theory if and only if adequate apprehension requires the viewer to represent a pictorial expressing persona. Hence, the viewer merely picking up on their own emotion while attending to the picture is not a persona theory. I will reserve 'persona theory' to refer to models which insist that an expressing persona is required to fully account for the phenomenon of expression (and expressive

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[34] Evocation theories are also referred to in the literature as 'arousal theories'.

[35] A crude evocation theory which is easier to differentiate from a persona theory is one where, for example, I just feel a bit down because I am adequately engaging with the sad picture. But the crude evocation theory attracts the following objection: the emotion is now in the viewer, not in the work of art. To counter this objection, sophisticated evocation theories have been developed to say that the emotion is projected back into the work (Matravers, 1994,Walton, 1999). This is less easy to differentiate from a persona theory because one might be tempted to interpret 'projection' as 'postulation of a pictorial expresser'. However, this would be a mistaken interpretation since there is a difference between projecting an emotion and postulating an emoting persona. Matravers considers the 'persona' to be an incongruous concept. He argues that it is metaphysically dubious and deems it phenomenologically superfluous to an account of expression (Matravers, 2011). Walton suggests viewers simulate the emotion and project it onto the picture - the picture is then experienced as having an air of nervousness (Walton, 1999:413). He is actively hostile to the claim that viewers must, as part of their simulating, also imagine being in a situation that is occupied by a person (Walton, 1999:428).

properties). By regimenting the terminology I hope to make it clearer how persona and evocation theories come apart. When I want to talk about the broad group that is, any theory which holds that someone's emotion must be involved- I will use the term personalism. When I want to talk about the narrow group that is, any theory which holds that a persona must be postulated or represented in order to satisfactorily explain the phenomenology - I will use the term persona theory.[36]

In the next two chapters I turn to consider a series of alternative positions, which I will collectively allude to as impersonalist views. These can be roughly grouped into two clusters as follows,

Firstly, contour theories which hold that viewers can immediately perceive expressive properties, cashing this out by appeal to expression looks, construed robustly in terms of experienced or sensory resemblance, or minimally where this condition is given up (Davies, 1994, Lopes, 2005, Green, 2007, Kivy, 1989).

Secondly, metaphorical and gestalt views which hold that audiences immediately perceive expressive properties, variously construed in terms of visual or perceptual metaphor (Langer, 1957, Davies, 1994, Wollheim, 1993c, Peacocke, 2009, Carroll, 2001).

The family of evocation views hold that the spectator's aroused emotions stand for the expressive properties of the work or complete the viewer's adequate comprehension of them (Robinson, 2005, Matravers, 1998). Evocation views are therefore not impersonalist since they claim that someone's emotions are implicated in pictorial expression namely, the viewer's. Although this family of theorists endorse the necessity of empathetic or sympathetic engagement with the painting by the viewer, they do not need to be committed to a persona theory either. However some experienced resemblance and persona theories include an evocation condition (the viewer must empathise with the work to fully understand it) (Green, 2007, Robinson, 2017b). But a persona theory need not entail an evocation condition and my view does not imply it.

[36] I am introducing the key differences here to guide the reader. I will give a more detailed account of how my view is distinguished within the persona theory cluster in Chapter Six, as well as giving a preliminary account of its productive credentials with specific contrast to evocation theories in Chapter Seven

The different alternative views give different answers to the question of what expressive properties are supposed to be as well as how we can be acquainted with them (the phenomenon of expression). Apart from persona theorists, participants in the debate deny that it is necessary to experience the emotion as someone's emotion. This should not be confused with a denial about the possibility or relevance of *sometimes* seeing an expression in a picture as someone's emotion-expression. In fact, none of the theorists would reject the idea that there are occasions where the viewer takes themselves to readily, immediately and naturally see a person in the picture expressing an emotion.[37]

In this chapter I identified necessary conditions on a painted object being a painting and I introduced the puzzle of expression by asking 'what makes a painting sad?'. I considered a straightforward answer to the question. That is, it is a depiction of a person manifesting an emotion-expression. I showed that this is inadequate and used it to motivate impersonalism. In the next chapter I examine the first family of impersonalist views; so-called 'contour theories'.

[37] This was the sense of [Whole] in Chapter One



Figure 9 JMW Turner, Snow Storm Steam-Boat off a Harbour's Mouth, c.1842

3 The 'Air' of Paintings

I have argued that expressions can be constituent parts of emotions and that when they are, we can see the emotion itself. I then introduced a puzzle from aesthetics. The puzzle concerned how we come to see emotions in pictures. I proposed and rebutted an intuitive solution to the phenomenon of expression in order to set out the disagreement over expressers. The intuitive solution held that a picture expresses by depicting something that expresses. The problem identified with this straightforward solution was that often pictures do not depict something expressing yet are nonetheless expressive. So, it seemed that depiction could not be the right tool with which to analyse expression. This exercise showed how the existing literature could be divided into two camps. In the first camp were persona theorists. Persona views are identified by a shared headline claim: a hypothetical persona or implied artist's mental states are necessarily implicated in expressive properties (Robinson, 2005, Levinson, 2006b, Vermazen, 1986, Cochrane, 2010b). In short, they think that adequate apprehension of expressiveness involves picking up on someone's emotion.[38] In the second camp were impersonalist theorists who oppose this. In this chapter I begin to examine and evaluate the extent to which the impersonalist camp can contribute to solving the puzzle of expression by considering a family of impersonalist theories loosely grouped under the heading 'contour' views.

I will proceed as follows. In the first section I introduce two views that give an answer to the question 'what makes a painting sad?' in terms inspired by Stephen Davies (Davies, 1994). Davies' experienced resemblance model covers a range of artwork types but primarily accounts for emotion expression in musical compositions. I note some limitations on that model in (3.2) and then turn to examine applications that focus on pictorial expression specifically. I suggest the best starting place, in (3.3), is found in Lopes (2005) because this addresses the divide between persona and impersonalist theorists head on, and because it has been influential in shaping the debate overall. After discussing Lopes' radically deflationary account in (3.4), I note some reasons to

[38] Persona theory is not to be confused with an evocation theory as we have seen that the latter does not meet with the requirements for the former cluster as given in Chapter Two.

reject the model in its current form. In the final section, (3.5) I consider a novel alternative due to Mitchell Green (2007) which has hitherto been overlooked in the contemporary literature. Despite the appeal of Green's hypothesis there are reasons to be cautious about adopting it, primarily in regard to the role empathy is supposed to play.

3.1 Impersonalist contour theories

In this section I introduce the first cluster of impersonalist theories. The father of these views is Stephen Davies' experienced resemblance model (Davies, 1994).[39] Davies' account is intended to explain musical expression, but it has been generalised to pictures by several theorists (Benenti and Meini, 2017, Benenti and Fazzuoli, 2018, Noordhof, 2008). The brief introduction to Davies provides some context to situate the two subsequent views which will be examined in more detail.

3.2 Expressiveness as experienced resemblance

Consider,

(J1) *Nighthawks* is melancholy
(J2) Hopper is melancholy

Superficially these two judgements seem alike. But *Nighthawks* is not a person. So, in what sense can *Nighthawks* be ascribed the property of melancholy? Do we mean that *Nighthawks* looks like Hopper looks when he is melancholy? According to Davies the answer is a qualified yes. He explains the phenomenon of expression by an appeal to an experienced resemblance between the painting and the characteristic movements made when emotional (Bouwsma, 1950, Davies, 1994, Davies, 2005).[40] What is meant by *emotion* characteristics? From the orchestrated Mexican wave to the spontaneous

[39] Peter Kivy also published a view at the same time as Davies that is also best construed as an experienced resemblance view. See Kivy (1980).
[40] The idea of expressiveness as a quality of the work itself does not originate in Davies. Popularisation of that idea can be traced back to Bouwsma (1950) from whom it took root in Anglo-American aesthetics.

startle response we talk of bodies exhibiting emotion behaviours and appearances. A Mexican wave conveys joy without conveying the joy of any particular person. Charlie can convey shock by acting startled. Moreover, there are some occasions when we use emotion words without intending to refer to emotions at all. For instance, a happy friend can merely be prone to answering the phone with a despondent sounding greeting. It is this kind of use of emotion words that inspires Davies' account.

Briefly, and paraphrased, his view is that,

> (E2) P expresses E, if and only if P is experienced as resembling E-ish behaviours, comportments or physiognomies by an ideal observer. [41]
>
> (Davies, 1994)

In other words, the contented pedestrian looks or appears dejected if his gait is moping or dejected-looking. For this reason, Davies' resemblance view is sometimes described as 'literalist' in order to distinguish it from rival metaphoricist accounts (Ravasio, 2017).[42] In other words, it literally ascribes emotion characteristics in appearance to the music. How does this relate to the discussion about *seeing* emotion from Chapter One? Davies' view sidesteps that debate because he is not arguing that viewers are perceiving *emotions* or fake-expressives*.* Rather, they readily and directly perceive *emotion-characteristics-in-appearance*. This can be compared to readily and directly perceiving a synthetic flavour. For example, prawn flavoured crisps taste like prawn even though there is no prawn in the ingredients. Nonetheless, the way the crisps taste is enough for the crisp eater to say they literally taste of prawn. The music case operates in a similar way. There is no emotion like there is no prawn the appearance of emotion (prawn) is enough for the literal use of the term (but not to literally ascribe an emotion).

If *Nighthawks* has the appearance of an expressive-look of melancholy, then *Nighthawks* expresses melancholy. In Davies' words "the emotions expressed in [pictures] differ

[41] Davies goes on to change this to action in his later writing. I will be discussing this later in the section.

[42] I review metaphorical accounts in the next chapter.

from the emotions felt by people in that they are unfelt, necessarily publicly displayed, and lack emotional objects." (Davies, 2011:135).

Davies' literalism is defended by saying that emotion words are polysemic (Ravasio, 2017:20). What the emotion words that feature in our aesthetic judgements mean bear a close relation to the what they mean in paradigmatic judgements (like J2). They are used in their primary sense in (J2) and secondary sense in (J1). The relation between the primary and secondary meaning is close enough for the ascriptions to be literal, but not so close that meaning is continuous across both judgements. So, when we attribute expressions of sadness or joy to artworks, we are using emotion terms in a secondary sense where the "appearances may be socially appropriate or inappropriate to a context, but they are not appropriate or inappropriate to an object." (Davies, 2011:136)

3.2.1 Evaluation of 'experienced resemblance'

I will consider three criticisms of the view. The first is that the account is not sufficiently richly described to pick out (and illuminate) the experience of expression in particular. The second concerns the determinacy of the emotion characteristics, and the third concerns whether experienced resemblance is both necessary and sufficient.

The first and strongest criticism of this view has been made by Jerrold Levinson (Levinson, 2006b). His objection is directed at Davies' perceptual claim that we hear the music as resembling appearance and behaviour. Levinson thinks this leaves the model under-characterised and therefore uninformative. He argues that it is revealing that this cannot be corrected by spelling out the contents of perception. Think back to the prawn-flavoured crisps. Chloe can look at the list of ingredients to see the contents of the flavouring but knowing the E-numbers will not explain why she is disposed to experience this compound as *prawniness*. Levinson thinks that this reveals how Davies' would need it to be the case that "for sad musical sound, there [is] some possible specification or profile, however schematic, of what sort of sound that is, other than 'sound that invites hearing-as-sad'. But there isn't." (Levinson, 2006b:99).

However, Levinson's objection can be seen to rest on a mischaracterisation of Davies' core claim, which is constitutive and not as he seems to suggest causal. Levinson's

objection is that Davies' elaboration on why the resemblance *causes and is the object of* the phenomenon of expression is insufficient. However, if Davies' claim is constitutive then this objection is not decisive. Davies says that what it is to hear music as expressive is to hear it as resembling a passage of human action. This sounds constitutive, not causal. For this reason, Levinson's complaint seems unfair, and misses the subtle account of characterisation that Davies *is* giving, e.g., when he talks of bodies and movement. The experience resemblance view may thus still be viable, and we should continue to consider Davies' attempts to provide a richer description. Particularly, the way a drooping or dejected-looking figure resembling sadness involves not just seeing sad-lookingness, but seeing the figure's depicted movement as purposeful. This is intended to avoid the need to advert to expressers by instead enriching the phenomenal description of what is seen. Davies says,

> Musical movement is invested with humanity not merely because the music is created and performed by humans but because it provides a sense of unity and purpose.
>
> (Davies, 1994:229)[43]

This makes the resemblance in the pictorial case hold between the artwork and some 'purposeful and unified' looking action.

However, this seems prima facie problematic. It suggests we must experience the resemblance as holding with something purposeful (like an agent), and this in turn suggests the notion of an agent expressing.[44] Accordingly, this notion of a purposeful or goal-directed action seems to be in tension with Davies' impersonalist commitments. Levinson may be right to point out that if you say that "X is sad because it has a sad gait", you are referencing *someone's* gait, and thus you are (obliquely) referencing an expresser. Davies' answer here is that we do not *perceive* the intentional movement but cognise what we see as intention-like (Davies, 1994:140). The main problem this re-description faces is that purposefulness or intentionality has to be present before the relevant resemblance is experienced. Thus, regardless of whether the resemblance is

[43] For an explicit rejection of persona theory by Davies (1999)

[44] See Cochrane (2010a) p.365 for a similar point.

perceptual or not, it is carrying the connection between image and emotion, and so the tension remains unresolved.

The second problem concerns the determinacy of so-called emotion characteristics. The complaint seems to rest on the possibility that some configurations that are put to use with expressive effects are under-determined or ambiguous in respect to what they may resemble (Ravasio, 2019). A glissando is an ambiguous sound played on an instrument or generated by the voice sliding from one note to another. Composers have used glissandos to convey jazzy liberation (Gershwin), loss (Simone), wartime destruction (Tubin), otherworldly realms (Zemlinsky), and primitive rituals (Bartok), among other things.[45] Given this variety of expressive uses, it is unlikely that we can account for the respect in which the glissando's expressive properties are experienced as *resembling a particular emotion characteristic*. This problem carries over into visual media. To return to the Rothko painting, there is nothing obviously resembling melancholy in the shapes and colours on the canvas. I do not turn blue when sad, nor do I appear rectangular. And since paintings do not unfold temporally, it is difficult to see how any of its qualities could resemble emotion *behaviours* in Davies' sense.

A reply that Davies can give here is that he can very well acknowledge that some presentations are not determinatively expressive, but if the source property (for example, the glissando) and its emotional appearance are both expressively ambiguous then nothing conclusive follows with respect to the contour account. After all, the account need not be committed to the claim that something is emotionally expressive only if it can be seen to present the behavioural correlate of a single emotion. Further, this is not something we demand of our paradigmatic expressions.

The third objection is aimed at the scope of Davies' model. Davies has cashed out experience resemblance in terms of purposive action. However, one might think that many of the interesting cases of expression are going to be spontaneous (rather than

[45] For examples see https://www.newyorker.com/culture/alex-ross/top-ten-glissandos

purposeful). Distraught at hearing a piece of shocking news, my emotional unravelling, which may involve my legs giving way, will not be *purposeful*. Even a pathetic looking stumble does not look purposeful, and when I betray my hidden feelings of love by blushing, or deep sense of rejection by accidentally welling up with tears, my expressions can hardly be described as goal directed. This is not a killer objection to Davies account, but it shows that accepting it does not have cost-free consequences. Davies may be prepared to accept the restrictions. However, to my mind it is going to leave too many interesting cases out of the explanation.

An immediate problem with Davies' proposal, then, is that it will not suffice to explain a range of cases. It works well for bodily or figure expressions, but it is implausible as an account of those paintings the experience of which are not clearly those of resemblance such as Rothko's. However, the former are well handled by the depiction account presented in Chapter Two. Hence, experienced resemblance is not progressing our investigation.

While these criticisms leave Davies' view standing, they demonstrate that his account will not smoothly extend to pictures. It does, however, provide background context for the two views that speak specifically to pictorial expression. With a preliminary idea of experienced resemblance in place, I now turn to examine these two views in detail.

3.3 Expressive looks that indicate emotions

In this section I continue to explore the idea that expressive qualities in pictures do not depend on expressers. Lopes (2005) holds the orthodox mainstream view on this and therefore one needs to engage with his account to understand the current debate (Lopes, 2005). I will begin by introducing his three expressive categories, demonstrating how he uses them to characterise the motivation for the persona view. I then examine Lopes' solution to the puzzle of pictorial expression before raising some objections. I conclude that more needs to be said about the phenomenology of the seeing appropriate to expression and about the value of expression.

3.3.1 The categories of expression

In *The Raft of the Medusa*, Théodore Géricault presents the viewer with the aftermath of a devastating shipwreck. Rendered in a linear painterly style, the depicted figures appear twisted as they strive to get the attention of a ship on the horizon.

Figure 10 Théodore Géricault, The Raft of the Medusa, 1818–19

In addition to depicting a starving crew the painting has an air of hopelessness or fatality. In his chapter 'The 'Air' of Pictures' Lopes says that,

> The shipwrecked, figures aboard Delacroix's *Raft of the Medusa* express despair; the roiling sea in which they are set adrift expresses dumb, haughty malignance; and the tiny ship on the horizon that might signify safe harbour instead expresses blind indifference. What is expressed by the depicted figures and by the depicted scene fails to correspond.
>
> (Lopes, 2005:53)

Lopes uses this example to introduce and address a concern that we previously encountered in Hopkins (1995). That is, that we should not assume that the representational relations that hold between straightforward depictions of despair and expressions of despair are the same. Lopes argues that the classic accounts of expression (that is, expressivist models) do assume this, because they privilege a particular mode of expression (figure expression). As a result, they overlook other explanatorily significant modes (Lopes, 2005:50-53). Although he notes that they are used in combination resulting in complex expressive works such as *The Raft*, he takes each of his three categories to be individually sufficient for expression, sorting them based on the properties that are responsible in each mode for what gets expressed (Kulvicki, 2008). His first category is 'figure expression' which is a depiction of an expressing human figure. This of course cannot explain why pictures of scenes (landscapes, cityscapes, interiors) are expressive although expressive meaning is still attributable to depiction (Lopes, 2005:52). For example, Friedrich's *Solitary Tree* depicts a landscape with a tattered tree that is isolated from the other healthier looking shrubbery. He calls this category 'scene expression'. In addition, there is one further category, 'design expression'. Lopes says that design expression, "is wholly attributable to the picture's surface design and not to any figure or scene it depicts" (Lopes, 2005:57). He points out that some pictures instantiate a combination of figure, scene and design expression in order to create a picture world with complex emotional qualities. For example, Daumier has used "coiled lines" to "express a tension and anxiety" and Munch used "the clashing navy blue and tangerine orange… to render the seascape in *The Scream* [and] enhance what the scene expresses" (Lopes, 2005:57). Design expression explains Mondrian's complaint that curves are "too emotional" by revealing that "the trouble is with the curves themselves, not with anything that they depict." (Lopes, 2005:57).

3.3.2 The missing person enquiry

In this section I explain how Lopes uses the categories to identify what he takes to be the motivation for the persona view and to persuade his audience to prefer his form of impersonalism. Although we do not have to accept Lopes' genealogy of persona views, it

is appropriate to consider it here since it explains what he thinks he is confronting when developing his own view, and also introduces the categories that have been taken up in the literature and so remain relevant to the debate (Robinson, 2017).

Persona theorists, he argues, mistakenly privilege figure expression as the primary mode of pictorial expression and then seek to explain scene and design expression in terms of it. The problem with this, he thinks, is that figure expression is instantiated by depicting a figure expressing whereas scene and design expression are not (Lopes, 2005:56). The persona theorist who extends figure expression to explain the other categories wrongly assumes that *attributions* of emotion are required for expression. Lopes says,

> In scene expression, by definition, no person is depicted as the bearer of the emotion expressed. Scene expression raises *a missing person problem*. Unless there can be expression in the absence of a being to whom the expressed emotion is attributable, then either there is no scene expression or the being in question is one not depicted.
>
> (my italics for emphasis Lopes, 2005:58)

Lopes takes it that persona views frame the solution to pictorial expression in terms of a missing person problem. Persona views are motivated to find a 'missing person' as they hold that, without such a person, no emotion could be expressed. Lopes rejects this motivation. He says that unless there are good independent reasons to "attribute the emotion that is putatively expressed by a scene to some person who is not depicted" (Lopes, 2005:59), the philosopher must accept, "that expression of emotion does not require that there be anyone to whom the emotion expressed is attributable." (Lopes, 2005:59). He reviews various personalist arguments including those that cite (1) the creator as expresser (Wollheim, 1980, Robinson, 2005) (2) a hypothetical persona as expresser (Levinson, 1990) and (3) the viewer as expresser (Matravers, 1998). Each of these personalist formulations, he says, *assume* the need for an expresser, they do not secure that premise through argumentation (Lopes, 2005:70). They assume it because they are attempting to sustain the figure expression concept without the depicted figure featuring in the content. He concludes that,

> We need no longer worry that in one case some person is depicted as having the emotion expressed whereas in the other case nobody is so depicted. Freed from this worry, we may adopt an impersonal theory … a dog can smile when it is not happy (and so can zombies).
>
> (Lopes, 2005:70)

Lopes accepts that one way we can connect depicted figures to emotions is through attribution, so seeing depicted expressers is sufficient for seeing an instance of pictorial expression. Seeing Bruegel's peasants "as smiling is to see them as revealing, by the way they arrange their faces, how they feel" (Lopes, 2005:58). But he thinks there is no *insistent* reason for thinking that expressions must be attributed to emoting figures (Lopes, 2005:82).

3.3.3 Indicating and not attributing

Lopes has already provided us with some preliminary structuring ahead of giving us his view. This includes the three expressive categories and the idea that depiction can cue our visual recognition of an expressed emotion. Depictions contribute to expressiveness by providing the means to create an 'expression-look' that viewers can appreciate as conveying an emotion, just as a smile can convey happiness. But of course the purpose of Lopes' account is to take us beyond these figure expression cases and provide the means to explain the sad tree case. So how does he do this?

Lopes argues for an indication model inspired by the robust contour theories from the literature on musical expression (Davies, 2011, Kivy, 2002, Kivy, 1989). As we have seen, the contour theorist contends an artwork is expressive of an emotion just in case a pictorial design, a depicted figure, or a depicted scene is an expression-look that resembles a natural expression-look of E (Lopes, 2005:70). He finds contour views appealing insofar as they account for the emotion connection in an immediate way. But he thinks resemblance is one of several explanatory mechanisms (Lopes, 2005:84). So, he adjusts the view as he transposes it from music to pictures. The crucial move is to give up the notion that the marks in the picture gain expressive meaning only through

an experienced resemblance with human expression.[46] This is because he thinks resemblance is unable to do any systematic work at the theoretical level because, as he notes, depictions of expressing figures are not facsimiles of actual (that is, non-depicted) expression. Even 'realistic' looking depictions are abstractions that have to accommodate the static nature of the medium (Lopes, 2005:70-71). Further, naturalistic depictions of expressions are not going to explain the hard cases like sad trees and exuberant abstract works. As we have discussed I do not turn rectangular or blue when sad, yet this is the look of the sad Rothko painting. Two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions will explain pictorial expressiveness, according to Lopes; the painting must have (1) an expression-look, and this must (2) have the function, in the circumstances, of indicating E (Lopes, 2005:73). The first condition is that expressive paintings must instantiate expression-looks.

But what *is* an 'expression-look'?



Figure 11 Mark Rothko, Chapel Painting, 1964

[46] This echoes his rejection of a resemblance account for depiction. For more on Lopes positive account of depiction see Lopes (1996).

Lopes himself gives non-pictorial and pictorial examples. In familiar ordinary non-pictorial settings, an expression-look is a natural sign, "Jimmy's smile looks to express happiness, Julia's lipped lick looks to express gustatory delight, George's scratch of the head looks to express bewilderment" (Lopes, 2005:72). Further, sporting these looks does not entail that the person sporting them is feeling the relevant emotion. So we can take it that for Lopes expression-looks are equivalent to fake or empty expressives, as discussed in Chapter One, that merely refer to the surface qualities. Pictures too can instantiate expression-looks, and his example is "the look of the sea in *The Raft of the Medusa*" which is "haughtily malignant" (Lopes, 2005:71). A look like *that* cannot be explained by resemblances

In this section I want to examine the idea of an expression-looks being natural signs, a notion that originates in H.P. Grice (Grice, 1957).[47] Grice argues that meaning arises from the relation between meaning-makers and interpreters. There are two kinds of meaning-makers; natural and non-natural. An example of natural meaning is the relation between the number of tree-rings a tree has and the age of the tree. Interpreters take the tree rings to indicate the age (in years) of the tree.

Kulvicki interprets Lopes to be taking human expression-looks to "function like Gricean natural signs of people's mental states" (Kulvicki, 2008:85). A feature or configuration can be taken to be an expression-look when it is the kind of thing others can notice and use as a sign of some inner state. But we are also able to identify these expression-looks on their own terms, independently of any function they may have to indicate an emotion. But what exactly identifying 'on their own terms' amounts to remains unclear. Kulvicki claims that Lopes "helpfully" groups natural signs into "expression-looks" but I find this summary of Lopes position misleading. It is not clear that "Lopes limits expression to natural expression" quite as Kulvicki suggests (Kulvicki, 2008:87).

I think Lopes is appealing to non-natural meaning (spanning events, signs and symbols). An example of a non-natural meaning maker is language since words usually have no causal or necessary connection to the things they pick out in the world. For instance, a dog is picked out by the word 'dog' in English, 'chien' in French and 'kelev' in Hebrew.

[47] Lopes cites Dretske (1981).

Non-natural meaning-makers function to indicate a connection between two naturally unconnected things: an object and a referring expression but the principle can be applied beyond words to include uniforms, washroom signs and petrol gauges.[48] Since paintings cannot actually instantiate emotions and so ever *be* sad, it does not make sense to think of their expression-looks as being natural signs of being sad. Lopes is suggesting that elements of a picture (figure, scene or design features) function to indicate emotions, like other non-natural meaning makers (Lopes, 2005:72).

Lopes also appears to push back on Kulvicki's way of interpreting his meaning of expression-look. He says "[s]omething can be learned from these natural expression-looks about their pictorial kin, not only in figure expression but in scene and design expression too" (Lopes, 2005:69). But whatever can be learned has to accommodate the obvious disanalogy between paintings with expression-looks and persons with expression-looks. A painting's expression-look cannot be caused by an inner state like a person's can. Accordingly, their features cannot *be* natural signs of being happy, delighted or bewildered (Lopes, 2005:71). Nor are expression-looks explained by Goodman-style convention (Goodman, 1969). But this leaves the explanation vague; a problem also raised by others (Bantinaki, 2006).

Lopes does tell us that the bases of what makes X an expression look are many and various. For a painting to have an expression-look we have to identify the feature as the kind of thing that could be used to signal our emotions to each other. We use convention, association, narrative, socio-cultural symbols and so on. In other words, "a smorgasbord of factors" (Lopes, 2005:81) that culminate in an expression-look. And importantly this outstrips the concept of resemblance. Lopes' smorgasbord view in respect of the mechanisms of expression explains why he argues that,

> a poignant panel from Art Spiegelman's *Maus* (Fig. 10) expresses a sense of pervasive foreboding as much by how it depicts the world (as a crossroads that is a swastika) as through its formal features. Here scene expression is a matter of representation.
>
> (Lopes, 2005:53)

[48] For instance, "a figure can express dignity because the conventions of her dress have the function of indicating dignity" (Lopes, 2005:80)

The expression in the *Maus* panel, is explained by the picture *looking* foreboding (Lopes, 2005:65).



Figure 12 © Art Spiegelman, Panel from Maus I 'My Father Bleeds History', 1973

What makes it *look* foreboding is a combination of the swastika road fork, a symbol now conventionally associated with evil and destruction, the leafless knobbly trees on the roadside, the actual historical facts about the mass crematoriums represented by the distant industrial building with active chimneys and the trusting sweet mice-characters innocently holding hands on their way toward it. But none of these features need to be theoretically privileged, "[w]hat the scene depicted in the panel from Maus expresses depends on its place in a story that it also helps to tell. Scene expression may advance a narrative purpose or depend upon a narrative framework" (Lopes, 2005:55).[49]

Can this survive application to other paintings? For instance, does *Nighthawks* look melancholy because (a) it has got a sad lonely looking man drinking alone and two

[49] Lopes also clarifies that "It makes little sense to say that the scene expresses Spiegelman's emotion, though many emotions are likely to have come into play in his conception of the panel. Rather, the scene serves a narrative end—in an especially compelling way" (Lopes, 2005:62).

people drinking side by side without interacting (b) the people are brightly lit and rendered with slightly clownish features which is jarring and exposing (c) compared to the dimly lit street and calm twilight bathed building and (d) broad flat expanses of purplish blue backdrop. Lopes will claim that these all add up to an expression-look of melancholy (Lopes, 2005:80). I will argue below that there is a gap between the claim to different mechanisms and the claim that there is a single expression-look

The second condition is that the expression-look must function to indicate an emotion. This criterion is given in terms of what the expression-looks *do*. According to Lopes what expression (in faces) and expression-looks both *do*, paradigmatically, is indicate emotions (in faces) and emotion concepts (in paintings). The final formulation (which I shall call 'E3') is,

> the physical configuration of a picture's design or the figure or scene a picture depicts expresses E iff
>
> i) it is an expression-look that[50]
>
> ii) has the function in the circumstances of indicating E
>
> (Lopes, 2005:78)

These are the two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions on pictorial expression (Lopes, 2005:57). Lopes rules out the connection between expression looks and emotions being made in virtue of the affective kind of response the picture elicits (Lopes, 2005:88). We have already been told that what makes it the case that a figure, scene or formal design feature functions in the circumstances as an indicator of emotion will vary between cases and may include a resemblance to or depiction of a face or body as it expresses the emotion, but it need not. Hence, one might as well simply focus on the feature of the expression look that causes (and justifies) the attribution of the emotion and allow that the aroused state drops out as redundant (see Lopes 2005:67). Meanwhile, since expression is expressive only if it is "an expression-look that the figure is depicted as wearing and that has the function, in the circumstances, of indicating E" (Lopes, 2005:75) the psychological qualities are not underpinned by an expresser.

[50] This is Lopes' phrase. However, it might be preferable to speak of *bearing* an expression-look since depictions cannot strictly speaking *be* such a look

Because the categories of expression may cohere or conflict within one pictorial narrative one cannot pick out a single mechanism that will explain "why that look has the function of indicating sadness" (Lopes, 2005:84).

Lopes makes an interesting claim that pictures can manifest expressive qualities by various means just as water irrigates by being distributed through several pipelines, so sadness can be indicated depictively, inferentially, iconically and so on. He says,

> What is it for a physical arrangement to have the function of indicating an emotion? Many answers to this question will do, and the theory implies no one of them.
>
> (Lopes, 2005:74)

What is significant, in his view, is that there are expression looks that do function to this effect and that this accords with the wider observation that real expressions are functions. Their function is to indicate an emotion.

We are told by Lopes that just what the indicating function refers to is determined by our real world "knowledge of which expressions are licensed and which are proscribed in a given situation" (Lopes, 2005:77). But the looks function contingently. Even smiles are only contingently indicators of happiness.[51] This means that some physical configurations we would ordinarily associate with certain emotions can, from time to time, fail to realise their function, for example when they are insincere, and so "are not always emotion indicators" (Lopes, 2005:73). More specifically, "attributing an expression-look to a person does not require attributing an emotion to the person. Sometimes we describe a person as 'happy-looking', and we do not mean to imply that we take the person to be happy" (Lopes, 2005:72). Expression looks on their own are insufficient for expression. Sufficiency is conferred by that expression look indicating an emotion. Since, according to Lopes, we do not have to imagine a person is expressing to

[51] Lopes says "there is nothing about smiles that fits them to have the function of indicating happiness. The smile could have had the function of indicating disgust, and the extruded tongue that of indicating happiness. Links between looks and emotions are contingent and not specially constrained" (Lopes, 2005:76).

see an expression look, as long we see the expression look as indicating an emotion, the phenomenon of expression obtains.[52]

In the next section, I consider whether Lopes' theory, which hinges on this concept of the expression-look, needs reframing to make his two conditions more distinct before interrogating the model.

3.4 Evaluation of 'looks that function to indicate'

There are four problems with Lopes' account. Three are connected to Lopes' model in particular and the fourth is a general concern that can be levied at all impersonalist accounts. They are as follows. First, a problem with the independence of the conditions. A repair is suggested. Second, a problem of specificity Lopes does not spell out how a particular emotion is specified in the work. Third, a problem of scope the concept of indication as used by Lopes is too broad. Fourth, an intuition that Lopes mischaracterises pictorial value owing to his commitment to strong impersonalism. The recommended course of action is to inflate the account.

3.4.1 Two independent conditions?

Lopes' account of pictorial expression involves two conjuncts: (i) an expression look that (ii) indicates an emotion.

It is not clear what the second condition adds. If you ask me to tell you what a picture of a dog is, and I tell you it is a doggie-looking picture that indicates a dog, the second part of that explanation sounds redundant. Similarly, seeing a dog with a miserable-look or sad-look presupposes a connection between the look and either misery or sadness. The problem is that attempts to really pin down what an expression-look amounts to have been unproductive. Yet by recognising something as an 'expression-look' it seems I

[52] A factor shared between natural expression-looks (seen on humans) and pictorial expression-looks is that connection to emotions can be understood in both cases as indication. Jimmy's smile of delight is genuinely expressive of his happiness if it indicates his happiness, just as the number of rings a tree has indicates its age, or thunder indicates lightning. He allows that these expression-looks are fallible evidence of emotions. But he finds they are good enough to be used as evidence in our ordinary interactions.

already exercise the emotion concept. This makes it very difficult to keep a clear sense of what the expression-look is meant to be, and then consider a case when it expresses (by indicating E) or fails to (by not indicating E).

Lopes must mean for the two conditions to come apart. This seems to be the best way to interpret him since he tacitly acknowledges cases of pretence and deception and these "actually rely on the fact that the 'expression-looks' they use do indicate emotions, although misleadingly in these cases" (ibid). So, we should take it that "there might be expression-looks that do not have the function, in the circumstances, of indicating an emotion" (Robinson, 2017a:252).

Robinson has suggested that the worry about independence can be repaired by replacing 'expression-look' with 'physical configuration' in the formulation (ibid). The replacement makes the move between seeing a surface and seeing a whole more explicit. This brings out the difference between looking at an upturned semicircle line and seeing it variously as (1) a depicted semi-circle (2) a symbol denoting a smile or (3) as a look of happiness. According to Lopes to see (3) requires that one sees the mark as indicating happiness.

This still leaves questions to be answered. For instance, why when I look at the Rothko, do I slip from seeing some satisfying rich application of Prussian blue glazes with glimpses of purplish underlayers to seeing melancholy? In the next section, I consider this worry.

3.4.2 Specificity

Lopes tells us that the viewer must identify the emotion that the marks function to indicate. It is not clear whether this means the marks are intentionally placed. If they are not, it is not clear who or what decides the standard of 'correct', 'know', 'relevant' here? This is what I refer to as 'the specificity problem'. Lopes tells us that some physical configurations function to indicate emotion. He also states that his account will not provide an answer as to why "the swirling, multi-coloured clouds in *The Scream* express *psychological turmoil*" (my italics for emphasis Lopes, 2005:83). In other words,

why any particular configuration expresses any particular emotion. Moreover, he thinks that this is also true of expression-emotions, which only contingently connect a facial configuration to an emotion.

However, unless there is a standard of correctness in respect to which emotion is indicated, how might viewers come to know what the picture expresses? In other words, what grounds a relevant as opposed to an idiosyncratic experience? Unless the experience is relevant, that is, unless it is of the emotion that the marks function to indicate, there is no way to know whether they are having an experience of whatever it is that the *picture* expresses.

Lopes' reply to this is as follows,

> to see an expression *as an expression*, and not merely as a physical configuration, is at least to see it as something *designed* to indicate the emotion
>
> (my italics for emphasis, Lopes, 2005:74)

This sounds like the viewer needs to see the configuration as purposeful (designed) in order to see it as expressive. That is, the viewer needs to see the configuration as something intended to indicate the emotion. However, it is not clear what determines the intention. It is unclear how (if at all) 'being designed to indicate' relates to the artist's intentions. Robinson has interpreted Lopes as suggesting that expression-looks indicate the emotion that genuinely caused it (Robinson, 2017a:252). On this view, expression-looks would be natural signs and could be determined by causal facts. However, this does not seem like a faithful interpretation of Lopes, given his staunch impersonalism and his denial that expression-looks are natural signs.

Assuming that Lopes is thinking that expression-looks are non-natural signs, one might suppose that whether or not *this* look was designed to indicate *that* emotion would be a matter of various conventions (Lopes, 2005:81). Lopes suggests a long list of conventions that may specify an expression, from "ritualized, conventional gestures" (e.g., Renaissance hand and arm positions) to "conventions of depictions" (e.g., conventions of style found in the graphic novel to convey anger). Lopes does not

privilege any particular option and hence it is not clear what a picture with two diverging and incompatible expressive conventions would mean. For instance, a comic strip that incorporated the Renaissance sign for affirmation and "multiple superimpositions of an angry figure" (Lopes, 2005:80). It seems natural to seek out some convention or aspect of the design that will have authority over the various other aspects in order to make sense of the way everything is supposed to be unified under the gestalt effect. For instance Michael Baxandall, whom Lopes cites, privileges what we might call 'the perspective of the intended audience' (Baxandall, 1988). Specifically, he discusses the perspective of the Quattrocento man who would have been held firmly in mind as part of artist's intentional brief (Baxandall, 1985).

All this shows is that a gap opens up between the suggestion that the phenomenology of expression involves a sense of the picture having been designed to indicate something in particular, and the interpretive authority that can be wrought from an hypothetical designing persona (Lopes 2005:77). Unless this gap is resolved, the question of whether or not a picture is expressive of E is at risk of falling into it.

3.4.3 Scope

Francisca Carreño points out that as things stand Lopes' model will let in more than just *pictorial* expressions (Carreño, 2013a). She says,

> Merely indicating the emotion does not suffice for the picture to have an expressive pictorial meaning. A Vanitas, for instance, may represent a bouquet of flowers, and symbolize the fugacity of life (See, for example, Rachel Ruysch's *Still-Life with Bouquet of Flowers and Plums*, 1704). The former representational meaning is pictorial to the extent that a bunch of flowers, some of them withering, are to be seen in the picture. But the latter symbolic component is not a pictorial meaning even if it is part of the content of the picture, basically because life's fugacity is conventionally associated with flowers, and is a conventional meaning of still-life, but even though life's fugacity is not a perceptual content of the painting
>
> (Carreño, 2013b)

Carreño's complaint is that the use of convention to indicate fragility in the Vanitas does not qualify as a *pictorial* connection between what is seen and the emotion despite the fact that it functions to indicate an emotion. She thinks the emotion is not something

that penetrates perception (qua expression looks). It is inferred. Hence, Lopes' account unintentionally conflates symbols that *denote* meaning and meanings that are *pictorially expressive* in one model.

Lopes could claim that the Vanitas example is not an example of an expression-look. However, to do so he would have to rely on our having an intuitive grasp of what is or is not an expressive look. But, as I have argued, we do not have an independent grasp of this, nor do we have a prior grip on expression that would permit Lopes to disallow the Vanitas case.

Alternatively, Lopes may reply that the Vanitas is an example of an expression look because it is a configuration that indicates the emotion and there is no reason to be prejudiced in respect of how the viewer comes to know this. That is, we can accept that the representational relations involved in the picture expressing melancholy and symbolising melancholy are different but agree that they are both pictorially expressive. While the issue will not be resolved here, it is a point against Lopes' view that it does not provide us with reasons to narrow down whether he takes expression to be a perceptual or an inferential matter. Lopes could of course say that what makes a painting sad is what it is like to see the look of sadness in it. But without an explanation of what expression-looks amount to, the attempt is a trivialising move. Even if it was the case that the Vanitas which includes the skull was rendered with an expression-look, it might still be the case that Lopes' scope is too wide. As long as there is at least one object that is not *pictorially* expressive and is captured by Lopes' formulation, Carreño's point stands.

3.4.4. Value

The final concern I will raise against Lopes' model concerns expressive *value*. This challenge can be levied at all impersonalist accounts. It concerns how impersonalists confront the intuition that marks or actions have to be seen as *someone's* expression of emotion in order to explain the significance of the pictorial expression of emotion. I consider if we can satisfy the intuition by accommodating the concept of expression of emotion *from a perspective* while falling short of entailing an expresser.

In a passage where Lopes discusses a difference between seeing a pictorial expression *richly* and seeing it *poorly*, he suggests that the only adequate experiences of pictorial expressions of emotion are ones where the emotion concept penetrates the perception of the picture (that is, richly) (Lopes, 2005:87). He describes poorly seeing as impoverished because it does not connect the expression-look to the emotion in the right way. Lopes' distinction is between seeing a picture *as* expressive and seeing-*that* it is expressive. This distinction opens up an interesting pathway for analysis but remains under-explored in the chapter. Because we have neither an intuitive grasp of 'expression-look' nor a theoretical explanation of it from Lopes, we cannot get a precise and unified account of how the emotion concept enters perception along with the phenomenal character of that experience.

I think this calls attention to a more general problem with Lopes' model; namely, the way it characterises the nature of the value. The problem is that merely seeing something as having an expression look will not account for the valenced experience. The rich experience only requires that the marks be seen as functioning to indicate an emotion. But this does not connect what is seen to the emotion in quite the right way. I can look sad in repose, that is, I can wear a sad expression look without expressing sadness. The look is not valenced in the way sincere sad expressions are. In repose, my sad look is not a weighty matter. Whereas if my sadness is caused by my feeling sad, that is a weighty matter that can be picked up in perception.

How does this insight carry over, in a problematic way for Lopes, to *pictorial* expression? Recall Lopes' argument that expression looks are not constituted by resemblances (experienced or actual) to expressive bodies, posture or faces. Lopes needs to give some account of why rich expressions weigh with us in the way that sincere human expressions do. To defend his impersonalist view he must explain away the intuition that an expression look can only have weight (valence) if it is experienced as being the expression look of a *felt* emotion, that is, *someone's felt* emotion. Otherwise, it is not clear why it should ever matter to us that a picture expresses melancholy (Budd,1985:144). But Lopes rejects the idea that the emotions of the actual, implied or

hypothetical artists or viewer must contribute to the meaning-maker. My concern is that this over-intellectualises something that is fundamentally hedonic.

Impersonalist theories have to explain how a person-possessive concept like the expression of an emotion can be detached from the idea that it is being expressed from a perspective or that it is making salient the subject's point of view. In ordinary life, we talk of emotion inflecting our point of view on the world (Robinson, 2007). One may talk of emotion colouring the world, in the sense that in frustration I see the world as thwarting me and in triumph I experience the world as welcoming. If *seeing the world thwartingly* is a perspective from which emotions such as anxiety and vulnerability are expressed and encapsulated in objectified appearances, then there is a way to link expression-looks with valence. They represent the world as emotionally coloured and that is a weighty matter. Lopes could then argue, against the intuition that we see the marks as someone's expression of emotion, that we see what is in the picture world from an anxious or vulnerable or sad perspective. In other words, as emotionally coloured. There are ways to construe this that does not commit to a subject. Just as a cube has a particular actual outline shape if viewed from position x, so the picture world may be depicted as, say, rosier, to resemble the appearance of worlds from the perspective of 'happy mood outlooks', or in the idiom of the cartoon, with tweetie birds and stars circling the vision of Tom or Jerry.

Of course, the persona theorist can refuse to grant Lopes the intuition necessary to get the idea of an emotionally coloured world off the ground. That is, they may deny that seeing the world thwartingly can be objectified in the sense suggested. So, one would have to motivate the claim that we represent affective aesthetic properties in perceptual experience.

There is no reason to suppose this route would appeal to Lopes. One thing that seems clear is that he has low expectations in respect of a persona model advancing the debate. He says "persona theory is in the worst predicament" in respect of explaining why the landscape has a sad look since "[o]rdinary mortals cannot reveal their sadness by changing the look of the planet" (Lopes, 2005:85).

What I take Lopes to mean here is that I cannot change how the landscape looks *to you* as part of *my* expression *of my sadness*. I do not contest this. But there is a sense in which the planet's appearance *is* altered by our emotional expression. We seem to alter its appearance *to ourselves*. In triumph the world can seem friendly, validating or happier. In despondency it can appear hostile, obstructive or harsh. That is, our overall emotional perspective or attitude can influence how the world appears and this points to a further way in which expressive value can be realised. In addition to figure, scene and design expression which can account for meaning inside a picture, there is also a meaning that is derived from the perspective on the pictorial world that is, on the picture as a whole. Lopes' model does not speak to this additional overall emotion perspective.

In this section I discussed Lopes' model for pictorial expression. It was argued that the argument for the expression look was unsuccessful because the concept of functioning to indicate was under-analysed and that the account overall did not adequately address the issue of pictorially expressive value. It was noted that a successful model would need to show how expressions could appear to emanate from the perspective of particular figures in the picture and from a perspective on the picture as a whole, whether or not that perspective was occupied by someone emoting. Despite raising some objections I hope I have done justice to Lopes' central accomplishment. That is setting in place the structural and theoretical lens through which the currency of artistic expression should be explored.

3.5 Expressiveness as sensory resemblance

In the last section it was said that impersonalists must account for the emotional perspectives or attitudes that we cannot attribute to figure, scene and design expression. While each mode appeared to capture an important aspect of painterly expression, these were also said to work together to produce an emotional perspective on the composition overall. But how they did this remained unclear. Since Lopes is impersonalist whatever could unify and organise the various expressions in the work (something we might otherwise call a narrator) remains mysterious. The categories did not explain, for example what *The Raft of the Medusa* as a whole expressively conveys,

which we may articulate as horror and indignation for the plight of the shipwrecked crew. These are expressed emotional attitudes that it seems fitting to attribute to the picture rather than merely to the viewer of the picture. Robinson has suggested that this kind of emotional perspective on the situation as a whole should be identified with the *artist's perspective* on the situation (Robinson, 2017, Robinson 2017b). Her suggestion is that tethering this overall perspective to a particular person provides an explanation for why the picture weighs with us in the way that sincere human expressions do. The viewer comes to empathise with Géricault (Robinson, 2017b). Expressive pictures are valuable because they "exercise and enhance our empathic skills, namely, by giving us practice in taking the emotional perspective of another person" (Robinson, 2017b:350).

Green argues that there is no need to invoke the artist's emotions to explain how viewers can empathise with pictures (and so realise their expressive value) (Green, 2007, Green, 2008). His view can be paraphrased and glossed as per 'E4'

> (E4) In addition to showing us how an expression looks, pictures can also show us expression-feels. They can convey feeling because the phenomenal character of some colours just feels like the phenomenal character of some emotions.

A picture can feel hot because it uses a strong palette of reds and pinks (e.g. Hockney) or cold when it uses whites and blue-greys (e.g. Lowry). Similarly, a picture can feel exuberant because of the yellows (e.g. Van Gogh's *Sunflowers*) or calm because of the rosy pinks (e.g. Morandi's *Still Life*). We do not have to personify the picture to realise these feels from it. The phenomenal character arises from some brute correspondence between the visual mode and the affective mode. The similarity to Davies' impersonalism is apparent here,

> We react to the musical work as if it were autonomous and organic; we expect to find sufficient reason for the work's progressing as it does within the context set solely by its style, form, and content.
>
> (Davies, 1994:367)

The value of expressive paintings is found in how they exercise or enhance our "knowledge of how a certain emotion, mood, or experience feels without its needing to

be an emotion, mood, or experience being felt by anyone" (Green, 2007:178). Hence, the emotion we see in a painting is *artefact* expression rather than persona expression. A picture can be expressive of an emotion in some general sense. They can show us a type of emotional feeling without having to show us someone tokening the type. As a result, no expresser is required to convey the feeling. Accordingly, "expression and expressiveness should be kept firmly distinct" (Green, 2007:34).

Further, although showing how something or someone *looks* may contribute to the expressiveness overall it is not sufficient for expressiveness. Green does not appeal to Lopes or the notion of expression-looks, but he could take advantage of it (although his theory is not dependent on it). For a painting to be expressive it must instantiate expression-*feels*. This is how the look is valenced in the way sincere sad expressions are. The sad look is not a weighty matter, but when the sad look conveys the feeling of sadness that is a weighty matter that can be picked up in perception. This combination of looks and feels is how the *Lonely Tree* shows us what a sense of social isolation feels like. The painting enables the viewer to imagine what it would feel like to be ostracised, even if one had never in fact felt ostracised in the past.

Green says that expressive pictures have properties that act "as a kind of prop on the basis of which to imagine being in [the pictorial] situation" (Green, 2007:190). Green thinks that *understanding* the expressive object feels the way *understanding* an expressing person feels. But that this does not mean that we think the painting and the person have some ontological similarity. We do not see the expression in the picture as part of the actual artist's psychology. The picture (qua artefact) has the internal resources to produce a judgement in us that is like the judgement we make when seeing an emotion in someone's face. Green thinks persona theorists mistake the phenomenon of expression for an appreciation of an actual expression by a person, when it is in fact the judgements that are analogous not that which is judged.

What makes Green's view novel, and therefore worth evaluating, is this putative property of expression-feels. There is clearly some overlap here between expression-feels and what we have been calling design expression. But we will have to dig into the detail of Green's view to clarify the differences. But, as a crude first pass, we can say that

pigment, palette or brush mark stir up feelings in us ('exciting yellow!') and enable us to empathise with the picture. Moreover, Green thinks the picture is qualified to improve empathic skill since empathy crucially involves simulating what it is like to feel what the target of empathy feels. This makes it an appropriate response to being shown how emotions look and also how emotions *feel*. Green thinks that viewers empathise with the picture and in empathising come to understand (know) what the picture expresses. This skill is valuable because it is transferable to real life. By practising empathy (on pictures) we can become better empathisers to our emoting friends (Green, 2007:195-6).

So, expression-feel properties play the evidential role in the phenomenon of expression that expressions play in seeing emotions. This means there is a two-step process in the phenomenon of expression, (1) the pictorial properties must convey feelings and (2) the viewer must empathise with the picture by feeling 'with' it. When both parts are in play, the phenomenon of expression is manifested. In the next section I examine the detail of the view.

I'll proceed by (3.5.1) giving a gloss on Green's view to situate it in relation to Lopes. Then in (3.5.2) I will examine the novel property of congruence and how it is discoverable empathetically. Next, (3.5.3) this will be applied to examples, before I turn in 3.6 to evaluate the view. The evaluation falls into two main parts, (3.6.1) criticisms in respect of congruency and (3.6.2) concerns in regard to role played by empathy.

3.5.1 Expressions and expressiveness

Green owes us an account of the feeling properties and I am going to examine it shortly. Ahead of that it is helpful to clear up a few differences between Green and Lopes. Green holds a different view to Lopes in respect of what paradigmatic expressions do, and this leads him to reject the idea that expression-looks or feels *indicate* emotions. Paradigmatic expressions are signals that make perceptible an emotional state.[53] Painterly expressiveness in contrast merely conveys the look and feeling aspects of

[53] Green as we have discussed in Chapter One holds that we can see emotions in the face directly and immediately by seeing expressions which are proper parts of emotions.

emotions (Green, 2008). Since conveying the phenomenal character of the emotion is an essential part of what expressions do, the test for whether something expresses will be different to the test for whether something indicates (Green, 2008:104).[54] In both cases an evidential relation holds between A and B, such that "A's presence increases the probability of B's occurrence" (Green, 2008:104). But indication will admit cases that are not expressive. For example, when I get extremely nervous or when I have just finished jogging my breathing is faster and deeper and I thereby emit more CO_2 than when I am calm. While the increase in CO_2 indicates my nervousness (in the sense that it is evidence of it) it seems wrong to say it expresses my nervousness. Firstly, because it can also indicate other conditions (such as anger, or recovery after a sprint) and secondly because this evidential relation does nothing to show *how it feels* to be nervous. So, a feature of the picture may indicate an emotion (by showing us a symbol) without expressing it (by failing to convey feeling). In this way, indication cannot play the right epistemic role in an account of expression because we cannot use indication to *know how it feels to be* nervous.

How does Sophie come to know how Emma's joy *feels*? She must do more than perceive the joy. She must empathise with Emma. Can Sophie empathise with a painting? Green thinks she can only if the paintings conveys "knowledge of how an emotion or mood feels" (Green, 2008:95). Clearly paintings cannot show us actual feelings, but they can instantiate other properties that can act as epistemic surrogates for feelings. These properties operate like "a scratch-and-sniff picture of a skunk. You won't thereby smell any skunk, but if your nose is functioning properly, you will learn how skunks smell" (Green, 2008:96). It follows that these properties must have some kind of epistemic power. The painting can be used to come to know how the emotion feels, by arousing sensations in us that are somehow homologous to the mental state produced by actual expressions.

3.5.2 Congruence and Empathy

[54] Green clarifies that showing does not entail knowing (Green, 2008:104)

In this section I will examine Green's claim that (1) the significant property is a sense-affect congruence, and that (2) the viewer must empathise with the congruent property to realise the expressiveness.

Green thinks that because of a mix of biological factors, cultural associations and idiosyncratic associative learning we experience individual sensations as congruent or commensurate with other sensations. Putrid odours pair biologically with nauseating disgust and spiky shapes pair to 'k' sounds.[55] Europeans are acculturated to pairing vanilla with sweetness; and, a childhood event can idiosyncratically pair an acrid smell of sweat and rust with bittersweet nostalgia. Such pairings are relevant to "the well-documented phenomenon of cross-modal congruence" according to Green, most typically associated with the pronounced atypical neurological conditions such as synaesthesia, but also prevalent in neurotypicals (Milan et al., 2013b).

On this basis Green's argument takes the following shape. If (1) cross-modal affinities are ubiquitous and intersubjectively shareable, then there must be (2) a hypothetical qualitative grid into which sensation-sensation pairings can be mapped, and, (3) given that affect is also describable in the same qualitative terms it is plausible that (4) sensation-affect congruences are also mapped into this qualitative grid.

Let us take each of these steps in turn. (1) cross-modal affinities are ubiquitous and intersubjectively shareable. Green's first premise is based on empirical evidence.[56] These affinities are supposed to be either hardwired or to come about as the result of associative perceptual learning (one can presume through repeated cultural exposure or one-off traumatic events). While a few pairings may be idiosyncratic the majority are supposed to be intersubjectively shareable since they are either hardwired or learned through acculturation.[57]

[55] See also Gombrich's observation that what we see can be baptised in a two-word language ping' and pong' in terms of their visual aptness for each and with widespread convergence Gombrich (1962).

[56] A broad historical overview is provided in Winner (2019).

[57] For a range of taste pairings see Spence and Blumenthal (2017).

The possibility of such pairings leads Green to postulate (2) a hypothetical qualitative grid describable in terms that are non-sense specific. The hypothesis is that sensations from different modalities are commensurate in terms of some more fundamental qualitative property. This disposes us to developing certain pairings (Green, 2007:179). The hypothetical three-space grid is constructed out of the following intersecting axes,

(i) intense-mild
(ii) pleasant-unpleasant
(iii) dynamic-static

How is this grid supposed to work? [58] Let's agree yellow is intense, pleasant and dynamic. In this case, it will be profiled somewhere in the light-pleasant-dynamic quadrant of this qualitative three-space. This pairs it with other intense, pleasant, dynamic sensations that have been mapped into three-space, such as the sound of piccolos. Crucially, once fixed these pairings are robust enough to enable one sensation from the pair to act as a qualitative surrogate for the other. Thus, he claims that

> I could show you something of how my taste of vanilla feels by playing a smooth, sweet chord on the piano.
>
> (Green, 2007:185)

The warrant for this particular claim appears to be drawn from anecdotal experience. The next claim is (3) that affect is also describable in these qualitative terms. He says,

> anger is intense, slightly unpleasant, and dynamic. Sadness is intense, unpleasant, and static, although sadness veering on anguish is intense, unpleasant, and dynamic. Disgust is intense, highly unpleasant, and dynamic but less dynamic than anger or anguish.
>
> (Green, 2007:179)

Green's warrant for these qualitative descriptions is based on introspection. His final step is (4) there are sensation-affect congruences too in this hypothetical grid.[59] The

[58] The hypothesis should survive a change to the three dimensions mentioned.

[59] Green omits a discussion concerning the effects of compositionality, for example how colours appear different under different light sources or when placed next to other colours (for example, the phenomenon of metamerism).

descriptions we can give of anger, sadness and disgust enable these experiences too to be mapped into three-space. Thus, affinities can arise between a sense and an affect. He says "[t]he color yellow is congruent with exuberance, for both are intense, pleasant, and dynamic" (Green, 2007:183). Ignoring the problems of cultural variation and issues of compositionality, for instance how yellow may be jaunty or creepy depending on what surrounds it, he summarises that,

> Yellow is a happy color. That, however, is not because it looks the way happiness looks; happy people are not in the habit of turning yellow, and there is no obvious affinity between this color and the way happy people are wont to behave. Rather, yellow is happy because it *shows how happiness feels*. Brown on the other hand shows how sadness feels.
>
> (Green, 2008:111)

Let us grant Green (for now) his detailed explanation of the first step in the phenomenon of expression, that is (1) the significant property is a sense-affect congruence and let us turn to consider the detailed explanation of the second step. That is, (2) the viewer must empathise with the congruent property to realise the expressiveness. It is no good if I look at *Nighthawks* and restrict myself to the properties sight provides access to. I must get myself into some imaginative or simulative state using the information I see in order to encounter the picture anew, with a sort of fellow-feeling. The pigment, mark and shape, we have been told, make available some kind of special knowledge which can be supplemented by depictive and narrative cues found in the painting. When we look at *Nighthawks,* we see it as a sad-looking scene by applying a narrative to what we see. It could even help Green to co-operate with Lopes here in respect of expression-looks. But feeling the mild social dislocation and melancholy in the picture is triggered by seeing some combination of Prussian blue, tungsten yellow, thin gauzes of oil and turps, and, heavy clownish brush marks that make up the depicted figures. These features 'infect' you with empathetic feeling which you use as a prop to imagine your way into the melancholy street (Green, 2007:190). The feeling prop makes our "imaginings more vivid" by "lend[ing] power and immediacy to our imaginative lives" (Green, 2007:36).[60] It is this layering in imagination of depicted and affective objects that explains just what "brings the figurative thing up on to the nervous system more violently and more poignantly" (Sylvester and Bacon, 1980).[6]

60 Green is referencing Walton (1990).
61 Francis Bacon in interview according to Sylvester (1980:11).

3.5.3 Applying the view to examples

How do these affect surrogates work in practice? From what we have been told, the idea seems to be that looking at a certain tone of scarlet is to know what it is like to have the feeling of anxiety. Many will be sceptical that there is any merit to this view. However, when one asks a child what makes a painting sad, they will often reply that it is the colours. For this reason, one might be more inclined to think that this has some merit in respect of painting *qua* artwork. In this section, I will examine some examples.

Figure 13 Detail of Edvard Munch's, Cabbage Field, 1915

Karl Ove Knausgaard has formulated a more sophisticated version of the child's intuition,

> I can stand in front of a painting and become filled with emotions and thoughts, evidently transmitted by the painting, and yet it is impossible to trace those emotions and thoughts back to it and say, for example, that the sorrow came from the colours, or that the longing came from the brushstrokes, or that the sudden insight that life will end lay in the motif…but this picture is magical. It is so charged with meaning, looking at it I feel as if something is bursting within me. And yet it is just a field of cabbages.

(Knausgaard and Burkey, 2019:1)

Knausgaard acknowledges how weird it is to ascribe sorrow to colours or longing to the brushstrokes while at the same time suggesting that this is where he thinks the sorrow and longing is coming from. Green's proposal is supposed to demystify the experience Knausgaard describes, by explaining in some detail how it is that "knowledge of how something feels is facilitated by affinities between sensations on the one hand, and emotions and moods on the other"(Green, 2007:172).

Green's own examples are unhelpful in respect of precisely delineating what work he thinks 'affinities' are doing. He splits pictures into representational and non-representational kinds. The first kind will include expression looks as well as expression-feels. The second will only have expression-feels. It would have been helpful if he had discussed non-representational examples to clarify how the mapping between colours, other sensations and affect is supposed to work. But he doesn't. Instead he analyses a photograph from Rodchenko, called *Pioneer Girl*.



Figure 14 Alexander Rodchenko, Pioneer Girl,1930

Let us agree that the Rodchenko photograph *Pioneer Girl* expresses admiration. Green thinks this picture "enables us to know how admiration feels" (Green, 2007:199). How? According to Green, "you're looking at her from below, and so it is natural to see her as large and strong. Yet the classical cut of her nose and upper lip suggest nobility" and for this reason he "can't but *admire* the Pioneer Girl" which means that he is "empathising with the admiration that Rodchenko felt for her, or at least the admiration that the persona that his work embodies felt"(Green, 2007:210) see also (Green, 2008:116).

This example does not support his hypothesis that the picture has special properties that can show us how expression *feels*. All the qualities we already know about and discussed are playing a role in conveying how admiration feels. That is, the perspective on the subject (looming over us), the depictive meaning (pretty fresh faced and noble looking) and an artistic persona (Rodchenko's persona). His example entirely neglects the exploitation of sensation-affect affinities that were the cornerstone of his thesis.

For this reason, I propose supplementing this with my own examples.; examples that I think do better justice to Green's potential contribution. We can start with the Rothko Chapel Series and a passage from Art Historian James Elkins,

> They were almost fifteen feet tall, dark and empty like the open doorways of some colossal temple. As her eyes got used to the half-light, she began to see their surfaces—dull, blank, nearly black. She walked up to one. It was tar black, veiled with washes of deep maroon. The paint was not flat like a wall: you could look into it, and it had a kind of watery motion. As she stared, the matte canvas moved, and flowered into shifting planes of darkness. It was entrancing, and perplexing.
>
> (Elkins, 2001:2)

This looks useful to Green because the painting is conveying sensory qualities that static objects do not instantiate (such as watery motion and shifting planes). Here is another report of a Rothko colourfield by curator Jane Dillenberger,

> "I felt as if my eyes had fingertips," she wrote in her journal the next morning, "moving across the brushed textures of the canvases."[...] It was a moment… of "very strange feelings," but mostly of relief, of perfect ease, of pure peacefulness and joy.
>
> (Elkins, 2001:2)

On the face of it, her phrase, 'my eyes had fingertips' looks useful to Green because of the strong suggestion of a congruence (affinity) between sight and touch. Also, because Dillenberger directs a kind of fellow-feeling toward the work (rather than a person). Here is one further example. This example is also a portrait, yet the appreciator takes themselves to be empathising with (what we have been calling) expression-feels. Thus, it is more illustrative of his theory than Green's *Pioneer Girl* account. In fact, the appreciator thinks the depicted figure is a red herring in terms of the source of expressiveness.



Figure 15 Vincent van Gogh, Self-Portrait, 1888

The description is extracted from a paper by Kendall Walton which contains a competitor view to that of Green (Walton, 1999). We do not need to discuss that view here. I am only using the example to help us come to grips with Green's view. In this extract Walton is exploring what he thinks produces the picture's air of nervousness and unease. He thinks the painting feels nervous and uncertain because is it inciting these feelings in him by way of some brute congruence between the visual qualities

(brush marks) and affect (nervousness). He is aroused to feeling which he attributes to the picture. It is the "features of the work itself, considered non-representationally" which are doing "the job" of expressiveness (Walton, 1999:430). His analysis of his experience then proceeds as follows,

> Something about this painting makes me feel, if not nervous, at least somewhat uneasy or tense. On reflection, it seems to me that it is not, primarily, aspects of the sitter's (depicted) facial expression or bearing or anything else about him that has this effect, but rather features of the paint on the canvas: the busy brush work in the background and on the jacket, the choppiness of the strokes on the face and beard.
>
> (Walton, 1999:431)

Although Walton says he takes himself to empathise with the sitter in this case because the figure is an easy target onto which he can project his empathetic feelings, things might have been otherwise. Were the sitter eliminated from the picture, Walton seems to think he would still be infected with nervousness. He says that it is not the sitter's stern look that is doing the work of conveying nervousness but some brute congruence between the busy brush work and choppiness of the strokes. It is precisely these infections that Green alludes to as affinities or congruences in the first step of his two-step model. And it is precisely this empathetic response that he alludes to in the second step of his model.

We now have an intuitive grasp of what Green means by showing and knowing how the painting feels. In the next section I explore his theory about the affinities between sensations and between sensation and affect in more detail before turning to evaluate the model.

3.6 Evaluation of 'sensory resemblance'

I group the discussion of Green's account under the following headings. First, I examine his hypothesis that there is a qualitative grid that underpins expressiveness. Second, I consider some epistemic concerns about the intersubjectivity of such grids. Third, I question the move from sense-sense congruency to sense-affect congruency and the claim that we can pick up on these congruent properties empathetically.

3.6.1 Literal Biological Congruence?

In this section I will evaluate how plausible the concept of a non sense-specific qualitative 'three-space' is. Green argues that the senses differ in respect to information processing and in how they present the world around us yet there are important and fixed qualitative links between them.

How might we make sense of this fundamental claim? In our everyday and scientific talk of senses, we tend to distinguish each mode in terms of their specific epistemic power to acquaint us with worldly objects. This leads many to argue that sense should be considered to be a system, or a piece of equipment that processes the world for us. But taken this way sense seems to be mode-specific, producing perceptual experiences without being affected by one another (Macpherson 2011).

3.6.1.1 Sense-sense congruence

There is however abundant evidence for the pervasiveness of sensory integration (Martin, 1992, Isaac, 2013, Lycan, 2018, Spence and Blumenthal, 2017, Milan et al., 2013b). This makes it uncontroversial that the senses interact. I can perceive the freshly brewed cup of coffee by seeing and smelling it. Or perceive the explosion by hearing the bang and seeing the flash of light. Because our senses do interact in this way, some theorists argue that sense is a capacity rather than a system. Louise Richardson for example argues that sense is the capacity for experiences with a certain phenomenal and representational character (Richardson, 2014). This places some philosophical weight behind empirical investigations that track participants systematically connecting the phenomenal character of sounds, spatial movement and shapes at a sub-personal level.[62] For example, the widespread tendency to name a spiky shape "kiki" and a roundish shape "bouba" (Milan et al., 2013b). One can appeal to these kinds of investigation to postulate that there is a fundamental and shared subset of phenomenal qualities through which the senses are networked. Conceived of as a capacity, the idea of a specialist single sensing mode falls away and instead, individuation of experiences

[62] Simner (2005) holds that within any population, standard biases are discoverable in regard to the associations between letters and colours. Meanwhile Matthen (2015) endorses the view that the senses, while different from one another in terms of information processing, share communicative channels.

can be thought of as built up from the 'outside in'. What matters is the type of conscious perceptual episodes the sense is the capacity for having. This makes room for the idea of a universal, deep-wired qualitative grid or network which the capacities share (Marks et al., 1987).[63]

Green claims that (a) there is widespread social agreement on pairings and (b) that the cause of this is biological (Green, 2007:178-182). I take it that Green thinks that in an untampered-with environment congruences would be biologically determined.[64] This would explain his confidence in the claim that yellow maps to joy, without offering any further warrant (beyond widespread social agreement that they do). However, I am going to deny (b).

I think it is more likely that congruences are soft-wired culturally, apart from perhaps a few basic hardwired pairings (foul smells and repulsion). This would explain our susceptibility to manipulation on these pairings, making anything more than biological proclivity unlikely.[65] For instance, I may grow up pairing vanilla with sweet flavours, but after living in Japan for some time come to pair it with umami flavours. Or I may experience red as unpleasant and alarming while my neighbour experiences it as pleasant and celebratory. Further, our tendency to link upwards scaling sounds, with upward movements and dark to light colour hues is not obviously fixed biologically. At least, it is easy to imagine a culture in which the association was reversed. Despite being wrong about the biology, this criticism does not sink Green's theory because, in fact, cultural association can play the same role. It is reasonable to anticipate that normal intermodal associations howsoever they develop, will, once fixed, apply comprehensively. Even though conventional association is weaker than a biological congruence, it is enough to secure the plausibility of the idea of a literal congruence or pairing. This results in a weaker version of (a). A weaker version of this claim is convincing as the stronger version suggests natural congruences would be impervious

[63] Marks et al. (1987) argue that "perceptual knowledge about objects and events is represented in terms of locations in a multidimensional space; cross-modal similarities imply that the space is also multimodal. Verbal processes later gain access to this graded perceptual knowledge, thus permitting the interpretation of synesthetic metaphors according to the rules of cross-modal perception"

[64] By untampered' I mean an environment free of deliberately manipulated pairings.

[65] See Thaler (2009).

to reshaping through social practice. The weakened version of (a) is still strong enough to make Green interesting. Whether or not we need Green's entire grid architecture and whether or not this congruence can be explained entirely non-biologically (for instance through metaphor) remains to be seen.[66]

3.6.1.2 Sense-affect congruence

How should we think about the sense-affect relation? If congruence holds at all, then it is most likely to hold between two senses. For instance, between flavour-flavour, or flavour-odour pairings. These pairings are usually identified by the way two sensings can interact to enhance sensitivity overall. For example, how eating dessert off dark plates makes the food taste sweeter and drinking hot chocolate out of an orange mug enhances the chocolatey flavours (Spence and Blumenthal, 2017). This can bring to mind an air of harmony, but it is not clear that this is due to congruence.[67] It might be that these combinations are pleasing when put together. Once the flavour-colour pairing is fixed, one might be triggered to imagined chocolatey flavours as congruent with orange, but it is not clear that this rests on the kind of similarity Green is relying on in the sense-affect case.

As we have seen in Chapter One emotions are comprised of occurrences interacting with explanatory states. We also saw that there were no privileged components involved in emotions. Feelings therefore are neither necessary nor sufficient for an emotion. This makes basing the weighty expressive property on feelings suspect. When seeing anticipation hope or delight in the painting viewers must be experiencing something much richer than mere feeling so Green's explanation in respect of sense-affect pairing is incomplete.

3.6.2 Epistemic concerns

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[66] I consider the question of metaphor in Chapter Four.

[67] These pairings do not necessarily demonstrate qualitative *congruence* in Green's sense since it could be that dark' is congruent with sour and eating something sweet' from a plate with sour taste' would make the taste of ice cream all the sweeter. However, it could still feel like dark plates and sweet tastes go together' like ping goes with triangles. This just goes to show that the complexities of the sense-sense relation will be different to the ones we might posit of the sense-affect relation.

Assume that we each have a qualitative grid, or some way of linking between senses based on harmonious qualitative character. Are these links relatively settled inter-subjectively? That is, how does the grid play an epistemically significant role in imparting knowledge of how feeling-x *feels*?

Joseph Moore (2010) has pressed this criticism in respect of the fine-grainedness or levels of discrimination possible within the grid. How can we ascertain what kind of granularity or generality maps sensings to the same spot? The question can be asked in two ways, only one of which is relevant to the epistemic question. First, given a range of colours, music and so on which will people pick out as dynamic? This is an empirical question. Second, when people use 'dynamic' to refer to works in different modalities, are they referring to the same thing? This is the epistemic question.

Green would reply, I suspect, that fine-grainedness can be satisfied by ensuring that the terms 'intense' and 'dynamic' pick out the same thing when said of experiences of yellow, trilling piccolos and exuberance. Further, that the philosopher need only acknowledge that qualifying the lexical semantics is important, because the model needs it to be the case that words like 'dynamic' mean roughly the same in all domains 'colour', 'sounds' and 'introspecting states'. But it does not require the philosopher to provide evidence that they do. A still life painted in a harmonious palette whose colours all fall into a quadrant of intense-pleasant-dynamic qualitative space will arouse feelings in us that are more homologous to the mental state produced by seeing joy rather than sadness in faces. This explains why my experience of *Sunflowers* in which I see warm yellows, a patterned texture, round, fleshy forms and dashes of sap green incline me to say the picture is joyful or uplifting or positively charged. It does not require me to provide a fine-grained description of joy, a joyous episode or arouse in me specific feelings of joyousness.

Lopes has noted the following limitation on Green's account. Congruences appear to be intersubjective inasmuch as there is agreement as to which shapes 'ping' and 'pong' pair up with and so on (Lopes, 2011).[68] But the number of congruences that have been

[68] The original discussion from Gombrich (1962).

discovered suggest the overall scope of them is limited. It may well be that yellow pairs with optimism but "no colors show how embarrassment or optimism feel" (Lopes, 2011:128). Therefore "if showing how emotions feel relies on congruence effects, then pictures can engage only a limited range of empathic responses" (Lopes, 2011:128).

Green could reply that this is no reason to abandon his view. After all Budd has intimated that the range of emotions an artwork can express is laughably small (Budd, 1995). But if it is the case that our grids are plastic (sensitive to tampering or nudging through associative perceptual learning) and only partially intersubjective, then they do not seem to offer the kind of reliability required to determine what the *picture* expresses.[69] It could provide an explanation in respect of why I imagine the taste of vanilla when hearing the piccolo solo (if indeed I do) and why I find the Rothko *pleasing*. But there would be no way of saying whether experiences of how the picture feels were accurate unless there was some independent standard that my personal grid was measured against. As long as I felt something when I looked at the blue blobs expressiveness would pertain. Green cannot intend for the connections between the channels to be intermittent or idiosyncratic because he is citing them as evidence of expressive *communication*. But he has not done enough to explain why my report that *Sunflowers* is joyful expresses a judgement rather than a sentiment.

3.6.3 From congruency to empathising.

This takes us to the most troubling aspect of the account. For Green, the route from showing to knowing involves empathy. His understanding of empathy is as follows. Viewers empathise with the picture and in empathising come to understand (know) what the picture expresses. This is puzzling since it is not clear what empathising with an object amounts to. Some 19th century theorists, notably Theodore Lipps, pressed the obscure idea that aesthetic appreciation involved projecting one's feelings onto an artefact (Lipps, 1903). However, the contemporary literature no longer speaks to this view, although recent empirical work has generated interest in revising it (Currie,

[69] See Bayne (2015) for a discussion of perceptual plasticity.

2011a).[70] This leaves us with the standard models of empathy in which theorists talk of an empathising subject and a target with whom the subject shares an emotional state by simulating it for the purposes of acquiring knowledge (Maibom, 2014, Matravers and Waldow, 2018, Matravers, 2018).

How, then, may we pin down what Green intends by empathy?[71] It is clearly important that Green's notion of empathy in the pictorial case be compatible with how we think empathy works in real life cases. Primarily because he claims that the pictorial version hones a *transferable* empathetic skill. He says,

> When what has been made available is how an emotion or experience feels, such observers are then in a position to employ their imagination in such a way as to empathise with others. While expressiveness in the service of empathy is not the exclusive domain of art, and while a great deal of art aims at nothing of the kind, it nevertheless seems fair to say that *one* central function of artforms as disparate as painting, music, literature, film, and photography is that they show how emotion and experience feel in such a way as to equip us to achieve a greater rapport with others.
>
> (Green, 2007:211)

Green is here suggesting that sense-affect pairings make the feeling available, and that viewers use this feeling to empathise with the picture. Both of these suggestions are problematic. First, his claim about sense-*affect* pairings rests on little to no evidence. Second, it is still unclear who is the subject and the object of the putative empathising, and how they relate to each other. In addition, one might be troubled by the claim that responses to sense-affect pairings develop and hone an empathic response appropriate for empathising with people.[72] How might Green resolve these worries? His example *Pioneer Girl* is, as I have argued, unhelpful.[73] We can instead consult the passage in which he proposes that the congruent properties are used by the viewer as "a kind of

[70] Theodor Lipps is credited with moving the original notion of *Einfühlung* from niche discussions on aesthetics into mainstream philosophy of the social and human sciences. See Chapter One in Matravers (2017).

[71] The definition of empathy is controversial. Characterisations are numerous and often incompatible. For an overview see Coplan (2004, 2011).

[72] Lopes makes a similar claim about empathy for pictures carrying-over to life beyond pictures in Lopes (2011).

[73] In this example, Green says that he empathises with the creator of the photograph, by imagining the emotional perspective of Rodchenko. But this is too far from his official position to be informative.

prop on the basis of which to imagine [feeling the appropriate emotion]" (Green, 2007:190).

We can evaluate this proposal by supposing that Bonnard is the subject and the painting (*Sunflowers*) is the target object. In a scenario where Bonnard is adequately apprehending *Sunflowers*, he will use the painting to call into consciousness his experience of φ feeling. Green's position must be that Bonnard here identifies, through the proxy (colour or shape), some feeling that occupies the same place on the grid and then he imagines *that.* The viewer then uses their imagination in conjunction with the feeling to tap into their empathetic response through the picture (Green, 2007:187-192). In this way, the perception of congruency *precedes* the viewer imagining the feeling and the imagined feeling precedes the empathising. This means that Green's model works in the reverse order to the standard models of empathy (Coplan and Goldie, 2011). What it means to imagine a feeling without being aroused occurrently to that feeling is something like remembering an earlier emotion. But on this story, it seems that Bonnard's empathetic target is feeling-x and not the picture.

There are other problems too. As we have discussed, merely being aware of a feeling is not going to provide sufficient information to determine which emotion should be imagined. Emotions involve components that cannot map onto three-space, in particular, their aboutness or intentional content. A 'yuk' feeling and a 'fear' feeling will occupy similar if not the same places on the grid since both could be highly unpleasant, dynamic, and intense. This makes it unclear what work is being done by congruence and what work is being done by empathy. Another question concerns how the viewer distinguishes this from more basic affects like pain and hunger that might share similar physiological traits. How, in calling up feeling-x, do we know what we are feeling?

The question can then be asked in this way if we accept congruency, is empathy the correct way to make sense of Bonnard's experience? While there is nothing particularly implausible about perceptual interaction, nor anything prima facie implausible about the suggestion that we engage with pictures empathically, there is something odd about the way Green is fitting these two together. That is, he is not fitting them together in a plausible way. Three-space is a theoretical construct, whereas empathy aims at sentient

emoting beings.

Green might reply that the congruent feeling is just one prop and that the viewer can also rely on narrative and depictive cues to stoke their imaginations and empathise with the picture. Earlier, it was suggested that this might be the case with *Nighthawks*. But this seems to smuggle in the notion of a narrator or characters, and this opens up further questions about imaginative identification. It also leaves the abstract expressionism case unaccounted for, since there are no narrative or depictive cues here, unless we invoke hypothetical narrators or extra-pictorial artists. Without the persona "there is no obvious way that responding with empathic sadness or happiness because you see yellow or brown in a picture increases any empathic skill that might be useful to you in ordinary life." (Robinson, 2017b:352) In other words, Green's problem seems to be that he has given us arguments for thinking that there are distinctively pictorial means of expression, that differ from the way we express emotions face to face, and arguments for thinking that the value of this is found in the way it improves our ability to know how other people feel (and so come to each other's aid). However, it appears he cannot make these two claims work together.[74]

It seems from this that Green's account equivocates between impersonalism in respect of expression-feels, and *persona*lism in respect of the retrieval and value of expressive properties. It is therefore tempting to offer the following reconstruction of his account: I attend to the picture and determine that I am going to imagine what it feels like to be in S's situation and then cast about for some props to help me along in that enterprise. Not only does this reverse the order he gave us, but it would also make his theory a persona theory.

Given the slipperiness of the concept of empathy, it might be shoe-horned into something that either fights Green or helps him out. But this will not overcome the need to identify a persona to imaginatively identify with. The idea that our sensings and our feelings literally share a common qualitative sub-structure that we exploit in paintings is intriguing. But this can only partly contribute to the phenomenon of expression. For

[74] Lopes (2011) offers a solution to this which I will discuss in Chapter Five.

this reason, it will require significant reconstruction to cohere with congruency. Crucially, it looks as though something like an overlooked perspective has crept in by default since empathy requires a target, whose emotional condition the viewer simulates. If empathy is necessary for the phenomenon to occur, then it suggests viewers imagine their way into the emotional states of other (imagined) persons, not conceptual constructs. This looks like prima facie evidence that Green implicitly relies on a persona perspective but whether or not this is actually required can only be spelled out by thinking more deeply about perspectives. That is not work that Green undertakes.

Conclusion

In this chapter I discussed a cluster of views that appeal to resemblances to explain pictorial expression and I argued that these impersonalist models insufficiently account for the connection between the configurations seen in paintings and the emotion. Each of the models seems to assume a different understanding of what is involved in 'richly' seeing the emotions in the paint. Sometimes it is a matter of directly and immediately being aware of an attributable emotion (to a depicted figure), in others the viewer should readily pick up on an emotion connection or enrich their experience with an affective empathetic feeling. While these seem to offer us interesting insights into the way the depictive meanings and surface qualities of the object engage the viewer (by using one, several or a combination of these features) it is not sufficient to explain the phenomenology. I argued that what was being overlooked in all these accounts was how emotional pictorial perspectives play their role in the experience. In the next chapter I consider whether this can be answered by an appeal to metaphor.



Figure 16 Titian, Flaying of Marsyas, 1570-76

4 The 'Heir' of Paintings

Njideka Akunyili Crosby's paintings are of banal interiors, everyday scenes and social gatherings. Her monumental canvases variously express nostalgia, the urge to hoard and even arguably, the Ilfak emotion of *fago*.[75] The paintings are made by layering vibrantly patterned photo-collages, including snapshots from the artist's personal archive, and incorporating these into a figurative painting. On Crosby's website it says, "these elements present a compelling *visual metaphor* for the layers of personal memory and cultural history that inform and heighten the experience of the present" (my italics for emphasis).[76] In this case, the metaphor which could be summarised as "memory is collage" seems to fit quite neatly with a linguistic practice. But what else might the phrase 'visual metaphor' refer to? Can the metaphorical mapping together of two distinct domains, a physical image and an emotion, explain the production of a third novel thing, namely expressiveness?



Figure 17 © Njideka Akunyili Crosby, Nwantiti, 2012

[75] Fago is a blend of love, compassion and sadness according to emotion historian Tiffany Watt Smith (2016).
[76] See https://www.victoria-miro.com/artists/185-njideka-akunyili-crosby/ (Last accessed 22 January 2019).

The categories of painterly expression advanced in the previous chapter show that viewers use more than one mode to relate to a painting's emotional content. In some cases, as with instances of figure expression, the viewer's attribution of emotional states to a depicted figure seems, prima facie, continuous with their experiences of real-world seeing discussed in Chapter One. Yet the difference between figure and scene and design expression makes it clear that viewers do not need to see a depicted expresser to see emotions in paintings. This weighed against the idea that the phenomenology of seeing emotions in paint is continuous with seeing emotions in faces. Several alternative explanations were examined which appealed to expression looks or experienced sensation-affect congruency. Many contributions were made by these models to our understanding of expressiveness. But it remained unclear how viewers consolidated the expressive elements of a picture into an overarching unified emotional meaning.

In this chapter I examine various ways to construe the claim that the phenomenon of expression can be explained by appeal to metaphor. I am interested in whether metaphor obviates the need for expressers while offering a comprehensive answer to the problem of expression. I begin by situating the idea of a visual metaphor. I then turn to evaluate two specific arguments. First, I discuss in (4.1) a causal argument involving iconic metaphors (Carroll, 2001). Second, in (4.2) I examine a constitutive argument involving perceptual metaphor, due to Christopher Peacocke (Peacocke, 2009). The models pursue the idea that we immediately 'see' the expression by mapping or fusing two distinct objects in experience. In this sense, they play on the idea that viewers experientially or emotionally frame-up the contents in the picture. In (4.3), I consider whether Peacocke's account of seeing metaphorically-as can be simplified to account for the unified emotional perspective that frames what the picture expresses overall (Wollheim, 1987, Camp, 2017). I conclude, in (4.4), that in order to advance the debate we need to theorise the role played by pictorial perspectives in the phenomenon of expression.

***

The definition of a metaphor in the *Oxford English Dictionary* is 'a figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to an object or action to which it is not literally

applicable'. But metaphor need not be linguistic (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, Kennedy, 1982, Forceville, 1996). For example, Picasso's *Baboon and Young* (1951) is sometimes said to metaphorically map '*baboon's head* is *toy car*' and Magritte's *Le Viol* maps *'woman's torso to woman's face'.* The general consensus is that verbal metaphors assert something strictly false (Goodman, 1969, Scruton, 1997, Peacocke, 2009, Davidson, 1978, Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). This is compatible with the possibility that metaphor can also trade on natural associations. For example, when saying "life is a bowl of cherries" we trade on the idea that life is full of good, sweet, visually delightful things. Using metaphor to explain expressiveness, involves showing why, despite its literal falsity, it is still meaningful, or at least normatively correct, to assert (J1) *Nighthawks* is melancholy. One answer is that metaphorical accounts envision the expressive property of a painting as the heir of some more basic, non-expressive, meaning in the painting. This makes it right to say (J1) is literally false (since paintings do not possess mental states nor sentience) but conveys some metaphorical content. In order to refrain from committing myself as to whether this content is true, warranted, or merely appropriate, I shall, for the sake of brevity, speak of 'metaphorical truth' (Peacocke, 2009, Wollheim, 1993c).

An idea familiar from O.K. Bouwsma is that our use of emotion words to describe a painting must be continuous with the paradigm use. Yet Bouwsma was also committed to impersonalism and argued that it was right to give up the expressivist pretensions found in Collingwood (Bouwsma, 1950). The natural step for many theorists who followed Bouwsma was to see the phenomenon of expression as a special case of metaphor to which it superficially bears a structural similarity. The similarity is as follows. There is an asymmetrical relation holding between the primary use of a word and its metaphorical application. This asymmetry is then taken to hold between the primary statement (J2) Emma is melancholy and its metaphorical application in expressive judgments (J1). The challenge to the philosopher is to work out what justifies the extension of the term (in both cases). This has in turn led some to think that the problem of expressive judgments is a special case of a more general problem about metaphor. But as Derek Matravers has pointed out even if expressive judgments are thought of as a subclass of metaphors "they present particular problems which the

usual solutions to the problem of metaphor are not adequate to solve" (Matravers, 1998:103). The particular problem is that what it is like to see emotions in painting is not what it is like to grasp the meaning of a metaphor. This is because in many expressive cases there is no sense of surprise, novelty or revelation which accompanies getting a metaphor. The phenomenology is much more like a straightforward seeing of an object, albeit valenced in a peculiar way.

This is one reason to be dissatisfied with the classic account of expression as metaphor applied to expressive properties in pictures as found in Nelson Goodman (Goodman, 1969). According to Goodman, expressive meaning should be identified with the difference in logical character that holds between (a) seeing the café in *Nighthawks* and (b) seeing the melancholy in *Nighthawks*. The difference is as follows. While *Nighthawks* literally possesses the depictive meanings (the café, the people, the street), it possesses the melancholy metaphorically. Further, *Nighthawks* expresses melancholy if and only if it possesses melancholy and refers to melancholy. These criteria are supposed to preclude other metaphorical attributions which are not meant expressively. For example, the *Salvator Mundi* was a money-spinner for Christies, yet it does not express goldmine-ish properties even though it is apt to say the painting is a goldmine (or was). According to Goodman, *Salvator Mundi* does not possess or refer to the property of "being a goldmine" metaphorically and so it is not exemplifying the property and hence there is no expressive attribution here.[77]

There are several worries raised about the adequacy of Goodman's model (Cooper, 1986, Kennedy, 1982, Forceville, 1996). Why should we think this predicate is *metaphorically* used, as opposed to simply ambiguously applied? Alternatively, why not think this is a polysemous use of an emotion word, as we saw in Davies (1994)? The most crucial concern is, what does it mean for *Nighthawks* to possess a metaphorical property? Goodman says that metaphorical possession is warranted when the central use precedes and informs the second metaphorical use, and that the phrase picks out common features between the paradigmatic case and the pictorial case (derivatively).[78] Matravers has criticised this answer for being too vague (Matravers, 1998:107-110). It

[77] See (Matravers,1998:105) for a similar point.
[78] (Goodman, 1976:71) quoted in (Matravers 1998:106).

is not clear for example, why, when familiar with the central use of 'clog', applying it to any platform shoe that only covers the toes should not qualify as a metaphorical use. In other words, if the peculiarity of the expressive use of the term is to be explained away by the concept of metaphor, then Goodman's explanation of metaphor must do more than repeat that it is a novel use of the central term. As Matravers points out "there is a wide circle here with no explanatory bite" (Matravers,1998:107). We need to know in what sense the word is used in a novel way and Goodman has not narrowed this down from a broad list of polysemous, ambiguous or metaphorical applications. One test for metaphorical use is whether we can paraphrase the claim that "*Nighthawks* is *Melancholy*" in such a way that we can demonstrate how the metaphorical utterance works. That is, through an explicit statement of similarity. But we cannot (at least using Goodman's approach) and so his claim lacks the requisite justification.

But there are other accounts that could meet these demands for greater explanatory richness. In the following sections I consider three. First, (4.1) an account of pictorial content as metaphorically expressive, second, (4.2) a constitutive account of perceiving metaphorically-as, and third, (4.3) a more obscure idea of metaphorising understood as experiencing the picture as a body. Each option has different problems and consequences for a theory of expression. The causal account does not advance us further than the three categories. The perceptual metaphor leads us back to the problem of impersonal emotional perspectives and the metaphorising view (which turns out not to be a metaphorical account after all) emphasises the significance of imagined persona perspectives.

4.1 Expressiveness as visual metaphor

Noël Carroll has applied the classic idea of metaphor to pictures (Carroll, 2001). Drawing heavily on the work of Alfred Rothenberg, Virgil Aldrich and Carl Hausman, Carroll claims that visual metaphors arise from properties found in the picture (Rothenberg, 1976, Aldrich, 1968, Aldrich, 1971, Hausman, 1989). Carroll's examples of visual metaphors include Man Ray's *Violin d'Ingres* (1924) and Magritte's *La Viol* (1934). In both cases, appreciating the picture adequately involves seeing one thing illuminatingly in terms of another. In Man Ray's picture, a single image (an odalisque

featuring violin f-holes) brings together in one experience, two distinct conceptual categories ('*body* is *violin'*). It is important that the two mapped iconic domains can still be seen as discrete particulars while also experienced as overlapping. In *La Viol* the visual metaphor triggers the experience of '*face* is *torso'* being co-presented in "one single, spatially homogenous entity" (Carroll, 2001:194).[79] Carroll's hypothesis is that unlike our standard conception of metaphor, there is no fixed direction of mapping in iconic cases. Pictorial metaphors, unlike verbal ones, are unproblematically symmetrical.[80] For example, '*body* is *violin'* can be swapped around for '*violin* is *body*' with no change to the metaphorical meaning. So, in addition to holding that visual metaphors are spatially homogenous visual hybrids, he thinks that this also brings with it a symmetry not found in standard metaphors.

Briefly, on this account visual metaphors have the following features (call this model 'E5'). First, they substitute the 'is' of metaphorical identity in linguistic use with composite imaging. The composite imaging is of a peculiar sort. It involves superimposing the second image over the first but in a way that allows the viewer to 'read' the image either as primary secondary domain or secondary-primary domain. In other words, as '*body* is *violin'* or '*violin* is *body'*. Thus, the visual metaphor is symmetrical. Second, Carroll stipulates that the visual metaphor must be "composed of elements that are not generally physically compossible" (Carroll, 2001:196). This means that the composite image should not appear to be just some alien or unusual straightforward object, such as the odd kinds of human hybrids we can see in an episode of Star Trek or Doctor Who. It should be evident that one is looking at something that has been intentionally superimposed in order to trigger some further insight. Carroll says it is a necessary condition that "discernible elements in the unified entity presented by the figure must be physically non-compossible" (Carroll, 2001:199).

This non-compossible image is referred to as an *homospatial* image. Homospatiality is the mechanism that replaces the 'is' found in linguistic metaphors. Since visual metaphors are not propositions (according to Carroll) they cannot be true or false.

[79] The concept is originally found in Rothenberg (1976).

[80] This symmetrical feature is also argued for at length in Hausman (1989).

Homospatiality therefore is an analogue for the metaphorical 'is' of identity and this is why the image must be non-compossible as opposed to simply unusual or alien.

4.1.1 Evaluation of visual metaphor

I am going to consider two criticisms levelled against this notion of visual metaphor. The first concerns the claim about symmetry. Visual metaphors, Carroll claims, typically are symmetrical contra linguist kinds, where the target and source can be reversed without loss of meaning. This goes against a central tenet in respect of verbal metaphors, where the mapping is typically unidirectional (for example, '*life* is a *journey*'). Charles Forceville has noted that while symmetry is common to visual metaphors in Surrealist paintings, these are atypical examples.[81] It just so happens that these are the ones Carroll chooses to focus on in his analysis (Forceville, 2002). There are many more examples one can draw on from film and advertising that can only be appreciated if the mapping is unidirectional as it is in standard metaphors. For example, Bosch's '*priest* is *pig',* which conveys the metaphorical and anticlerical insight that some priests at the time had piggish qualities, can only be appreciated unidirectionally.[82]

Figure 18 Hieronymus Bosch, (detail) Temptation of St. Anthony, 1501

[81] This commitment is endorsed by Lakoff (1980).

[82] See Figure 18.

This should make us suspicious that Carroll is right to foreground the symmetry. In other words, even if there are visual metaphors then they typically follow linguistic metaphors in having a primary and secondary domain that fit together in an asymmetrical order.

The second point is not really a criticism of Carroll as such, since his stipulation in respect of non-compossibles make it inapplicable to deal with a wide array of expressive cases. But it would be a problem for an extension of this visual metaphor account to *Nighthawks* and other paintings. The problem is as follows. We have been told that the "terms of the metaphor are perceptually co-present at once" (Carroll, 2001:194). This means mapping together two physically distinct objects (or categories of objects). However, this precludes the possibility of an inner state (the invisible bit of the emotion) being mapped together into a homospatial unit. The difficulty is that unlike the Man Ray case, the relevant relata in expressive visual metaphor would have to be between the café scene in *Nighthawks* and the invisible part of a melancholy emotion. If the target relatum is invisible, then there is no physical representation of it that can be non-compossibly mapped onto the primary target. So, it cannot be this kind of visual metaphor that explains how *Nighthawks* metaphorically expresses melancholy (if indeed it does). This means that what would have to be mapped in is the visible part of an emotion namely, the expression. But then homogeneous figures will be straightforward figure expressions. Figure expression cannot be a visual metaphor because seeing a figure expressing is not going to look anomalous, and appearing anomalous is as we have seen, a condition on non-compossibility. [83]

While Carroll is happy to say '*baboon* is *car*' is a metaphor, he would not be happy to say '*Nighthawks* is *melancholy*' is a metaphor. In particular, Carroll thinks the treatment of materials (handling, facture and so on) is a critically important factor in pictorial expression (Carroll, 2001:207). But material handling is not, his view, the kind of thing that can be an interacting concept or category, and so it cannot be the second concept

[83] Visual metaphor is more common in the sphere of advertising (Forceville,1996: 137-38). In adverts the position of the target object (person, product or whatever) is typically shown next to or nearby the source object (featuring qualities that are to be mapped over to the target). For numerous examples see Chapter 6 Pictorial metaphor in advertisements and billboards: Case studies in (Forceville, 1996).

that the subject matter of the picture maps to. Furthermore, he seems quite happy to be taking himself out of dealing with the whole business of expression (Carroll, 2001:207). But it is worth noting why his account of visual metaphor will not extend to deal with expressive cases, especially since Aldrich, who Carroll bases his model on, claims otherwise (Aldrich, 1968).

Just because there are issues with Carroll's model, we do not have to conclude that metaphor cannot explain expression. In the next section, we will examine an account from Christopher Peacocke (2009) who thinks metaphor can explain it.

4.2 Expressiveness as Perceptual Metaphor



Figure 19 Howard Hodgkin, Mr and Mrs E.J.P.,1969–73

Howard Hodgkin's portrait paintings are memorials for friends and acquaintances. The paintings are supposed to be meditations on the absence of actual persons, countering

that absence with a corresponding physical presence of a metaphorical kind. Paul Moorhouse has described Howard Hodgkin's painting 'Mr. and Mrs E.J.P' as,

> Combining literal description with metaphor, the situation is not immediately recognisable…The painting is a significant milestone for in an echo of Marvell's 'green thought', the image makes an entirely incorporeal experience visible.
>
> (Moorhouse, 'Absent Friends' catalogue 2017)

The experience Moorhouse alludes to is the envy of Mr. E.J.P. that Hodgkin thought caused him to dominate conversations lest his interlocutor realised his wife was more interesting than him. The green egg shape is said to represent Mr E.J.P.'s physical and emotional control over the space. It is this more subtle use of metaphor that is analysed by Peacocke. Peacocke argues that the phenomenon of expression is accounted for by a special kind of expressive perception (Peacocke, 2009). His aim is to "give a literal description of an experience with metaphorical content" (Peacocke, 2009:263). Seeing emotions in paintings, he takes it, is significantly different to seeing emotions in the face and the difference justifies the rejection of a persona theory.

His account is motivated by two questions: (1) how does the emotion concept enter the perceptual experience and (2) does this throw some light on pictorial expression as a source of value? Answering to (1) Peacocke says,

> When a piece of music is heard as expressing some property F, some feature of the music is heard metaphorically-as F. The metaphor is exploited in the perception, rather than being represented (Peacocke, 2009:257)

The feature, which is possibly relational, is a property that enters the content of our perception, can manifest across a variety of art mediums and is not limited to emotion states. The basic claim is,

> Whenever there is metaphorical representation, whether in thought, imagination, or experience, there is some kind of isomorphism between two domains.
>
> (Peacocke, 2009:260)

This is used to develop an account of a specific type of metaphor, primarily intended to explain music but also operational in pictorial expression. The account is given through answering three questions:

(a) What is the phenomenal character of an exploited metaphor?
(b) Is there an etiological claim that backs up the phenomenal story?
(c) What are the normative claims that fall out of this proposal?

Peacocke argues that the phenomenological character of an exploited metaphor is seeing pictorial contents as mapped onto extra-pictorial contents. In other words, the exploiting happens sub-personally, before the metaphor enters the intentional content of the seeing experience. This means that, in contrast to the account of *visual* metaphor discussed in the previous section, *perceptual* metaphors only have one pictorially present term.

Figure 20 Caspar David Friedrich, Lonely Tree, 1822

What precedes and enables this experience is a kind of subpersonal processing, which lies outside the realm of conscious attention. As an introductory and paraphrased gloss, we can say that

> (E6) When a painting is seen as expressing the property P, then some feature of the painting, possibly some relational feature, is seen metaphorically-as P. Metaphor describes *what* we see, when we see emotions in paint.[84]

In his description of *The Lonely Tree* Peacocke says,

> When we specify further the content of the metaphor, we reach that further content (e.g. that our unhappy subject is distant from others who are not so unhappy, and who are close to one another) only via the first term of the metaphor, the landscape as given in the picture.
>
> (Peacocke, 2009:274)[85]

Seeing the tree as lonely depends on seeing the relations that the tree stands to the rest of the landscape and then mapping this to relations experienced by an unseen lonely person who feels emotionally isolated and distanced from a community of people.

Figure 21 Franciso de Zurbarán, Still Life with Vessels, c.1650

[84] This is an amended amalgam of Peacocke's description of the music case on p.260 and an encapsulation of the basic thought on which he develops his theory.
[85] See Figure 20.

It is not only emotions that are expressed in this metaphorical way. As long as the content is exploited in the subpersonal domain, this peculiar form of perception is said to arise. For example, Zurbarán's *Still Life with Vessels* is a painting depicting pots which can simultaneously be seen as a group of women (Peacocke, 2009).[86] The domain of people inflects the depicted elements: seeing the pots as people does not eradicate my experience of the painting as a depiction of several pieces of pottery. Therefore, the isomorphism "enters the content of experience" not as "representational content" nor as "a depiction" (Peacocke, 2009: 258).[87] The isomorphism is *exploited*, rather than *represented*, metaphorical correspondence.[88] In this way the perceptual metaphor has only one explicit aspect of the two mapped domains in the painting. The painting instantiates whatever serves as the first term domain whereas the target domain lies beyond pictorial space. Seeing the pots as women does not compete with seeing the pots as pots which indicates the representational domain remains intact I see an F at the same time I take F to be matched to something that lies outside the picture: women (Peacocke, 2009:260). The content is manifested for the subject simply by attending to the object and where the metaphorising is appropriate to the object (in ways to be defined), the object can correctly be said to possess the property of being E metaphorically (Budd, 2009).[89]

Furthermore, Peacocke says that when perceiving metaphorically-as the subject does not have to be aware or conscious of the process of mapping although of course we can assume they must be aware of the outcome. In fact, awareness is quite difficult to achieve since the metaphor is exploited in a sub-personal domain. This is contrary to standard metaphor where one might represent the poetic metaphor '*hope* is *bird*' in thought or represent that atoms are planets with orbiting moons and stars in imagination.

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[86] See Figure 21.

[87] There are two points to mention here. (1) Seeing metaphorically-as is not limited to depictions, as we shall see. (2) The term represent' is used to prescind from any distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual content although I recognise this is too indiscriminate to deal with any serious discussion of the perceptual experience of expression. I showed this topic more sensitivity in Chapter One and return to consider it again in Chapter Six.

[88] Peacocke's account is developed and deployed to address problems of expressive music, specifically Wagner's point that the emotions expressed need not be those of a particular person on a particular occasion.

[89] See Budd (2009) for a critical summary and further elaboration of these virtues.

I am not going to get into a debate about the efficacy of Peacocke's account per se, but only in regard to how it helps or hinders the issue of expressiveness. Like Lopes, Peacocke questions the role of depiction in scene or design expression.[90] Depiction here is used to denote the representation of the kinds of things that could be seen face to face in the painting.[91] He says,

> When life is thought of as a journey, or a tree in the shade is perceived as an unhappy person, the thought does not have to be of a particular journey (such as the journey from Paris to Pisa), or of a particular unhappy person. The content of the metaphor can just concern a property, or a system of relations, or both, rather than these as instantiated in a particular individual.
>
> (Peacocke, 2009:273)

Peacocke's impersonalist claim is that there can be expressive meaning without appeal to a particular expressing subject (Peacocke, 2009:263). So, how does this cash out for a hard case of design expression, such as Rothko's *Chapel Paintings*? Since Peacocke's interest is primarily in the music, the comparative case is found in Peacocke's discussion of the minor triad.

> A minor chord, sounded by itself, outside any other context sounds sad… On the present account, however, there is a relatively straightforward account (sic) explanation of how the chord can express sadness. The relation of the perceived minor to its (unheard) major is perceived metaphorically-as an instance of the relation an emotion of sadness, a subdued emotion experienced from the inside, bears to a non-sad ordinary state of mind that is not subdued. The isomorphism in question is a mapping from the domain of moods (a normal non-sad mood, and sadness in this case) to the modes of major.
>
> (Peacocke, 2009:262-3)

We could expand Peacocke's original theory to suggest a way to deal with the Rothko case. Applying this to my chosen example *Chapel Painting*, we can say that the subject must have an awareness of a relation between sadness and a normal mood and this is

[90] Peacocke does not think an expressing subject is a necessary condition upon there being metaphorical pictorial expression but he thinks that there are other kinds of musical expression which are essentially mimetic and require us to acknowledge a subject (Peacocke, 2009:270).

[91] Including particulars, general kinds and fictional objects only if they would be visible.

mapped to the subdued colours X which are perceived in relation to (non-subdued) unseen colours Y. The emotion concept enters the content of the metaphor which helps specify the content of the visual perception of colours X. This means that the logical structure of metaphorical perception is considerably more complex than previous models which, using *Nighthawks* as an example, had an image (the diner) and an emotion (melancholy). Now there are the colours and *two* emotions the sad mood and the normal mood. Interesting as this proposal may be, there are several aspects to the account that need disentangling and which I consider in the next section.

4.2.1 Evaluation of the Perceptual Metaphor model

I have three objections to Peacocke. Firstly, crucial aspects of the model are insufficiently analysed. Secondly, there are additional complexities that arise when transposing the model from sounds to a range of pictorial (visual) cases. Since it is no more productive than other models, this leaves it worse off with regard to competitor literalist explanations. Thirdly, it fails to solve the valence problem. As a result, perceiving metaphorically is neither necessary nor sufficient for expression.

4.2.1.1 Under-analysed mechanism

The first objection concerns Peacocke's unusual and innovative claim, extrapolated and developed here to analyse the Rothko case, that (1) there is an isomorphism between (a) an unheard and heard sound and (b) absent unfelt and felt emotions. He offers no further justification of how this odd relation arises, whether it is *sui generis* or whether it relies on ingrained associations, for example, hearing 'Tweedledee' in relation to a silent 'Tweedledum'. Peacocke's apparatus is supposed to deal with precisely this issue but this part of the mapping is not well explained.

A second worry is that, in his discussion of the Friedrich and the Zurbarán paintings, he tells us that the tree *looks* like a lonely person and the pots *look* like sassy women. But this sidesteps dealing with the crucial aspect of mapping one (visible) kind of look to another (invisible) kind. Instead he tells us that the outline shape of the pot handles maps onto the outline shape of a hand on hips posture, and he uses this to argue that the

relations hold between a depicted (visible) pot and absent (invisible) sass. As a result, we perceive the pot as a sassy woman. But to suggest that the psychological element is smuggled in with the resemblance to an extended shape (a posture) is to beg the question.[92] The isomorphism between pots and women does not add up to an isomorphism between pots and sassiness. This aspect of Peacocke's account is under-analysed and it therefore fails to carry explanatory weight.

4.2.1.2 Complex mapped relations

The second objection is related to, and develops out of, the first. Peacocke argues that perceiving a "tree in the shade" as "an unhappy person" will involve the same "property, or…system of relations" cited in the minor chord case (Peacocke, 2009:273). However, if it is the case that 'depicted pot' maps onto 'sassy woman', then the important relation here seems to be resemblance due to outline shape, and there are more parsimonious explanations of this on offer (cf. Hopkins, 1995). Why, then, should we take on board the complex logical structure of the perceptual metaphor? The complexity is supposed to deal with the considerable difference between seeing the pots as women (resemblance due to outline shape) and seeing them as sassy (mapping a depicted visible to an absent invisible). In the minor chord case this seemed to work quite neatly. The relations were said to hold between perceived audibilia (which I take to mean mere sounds bearing timbre, pitch, and loudness but not spatial location or images) and absent audibilia (Scruton, 2009).[93] The simplicity of these mappings is secured by Peacocke stipulating that the chord is heard "by itself, outside of any other context". As a result, one's intuition is to suppose the minor chord sound to exist somewhere nonspecific or maybe notionally 'between the ears'. While these mappings did appear to extend to the Rothko colourfield painting, the suggestion of easy generalisation is misleading. The comparison to the Rothko masked additional complexities that creep into pictorial cases and other examples (such as *Nighthawks*) appear to provide counterevidence to the idea that these relations do hold in pictorial cases. The problem is that the Rothko

[92] Peacocke may reply that some women striking some poses look sassy. It is the sassy woman pose that enters into the experience as metaphorical content and hence you get the sassiness for free. But if this is right then this is more easily explained by figure expression where the emotion is attributed to a person – the sassy woman.

[93] For an argument that it is not necessary for sounds to be experienced in a particular spatial relation to us see (Hopkins, 1998:181). I take it most will not deny that sounds can be experienced in a spatial relation to us. My point here is that we cannot assume this has a similar structure to how we see objects.

colourfield can be seen to mirror the simplicity of the minor chord case in that the contents can be interpreted as depictions of pure colour ephemera. But philosophers nowadays tend not to think there is just one kind of thing that is the bearer of visible sensory qualities like colour. When we think of 'red', we might think of red pillar boxes, or the shiny red skin of an apple, but also red liquids, vapours, flashes, reflections, holograms, and other ephemeral manifestations of red. Further, we cannot help but perceive of these as embedded in perspectival structures (from viewpoints, implying spatial separateness, involving distances between objects in space). Hence, the logical structure of Peacocke's metaphor as it transposes from sounds to most pictures will require recalibration if it is to account for these additional mapped relations.

The transposition from auditory to visual cases will lead to exponential increase in the mappings. Since the only crucial relation that needs explaining is the one that holds between pot (visible) and sassiness (invisible) the transposed account will be unnecessarily convoluted. For example, when perceiving the Zurbarán metaphorically-as, we would need to account for mappings between the depicted material object (pot) and an absent material object (woman), and depicted visibilia (appearance of sassiness) and an absent emotion (sassiness). In the visual case (but not in the auditory case) one would need to acknowledge the various depicted material objects (facing surfaces of pots), unseen parts of depicted objects (unseen surfaces of pots), ephemera (highlights, shadows, kitchen vapours), invisible kinds (feelings) and unseen objects (women). All this seems to place extraordinary and implausible demands on the attentive viewer and recalls the general background worry about whether any account of expression will generalise across the sense modalities. In Chapter Two, it was said that one of the issues that militates against a general theory is that music is dynamic (qua temporal procession) and pictures are not (Scruton, 1974). We should also not assume that the same relations can be perceived between colours and sounds. In particular, visual perspective plays a significant epistemic role in both paradigmatic and as we shall see expressive pictorial cases. Expressly, the point is not that the Rothko case relies on something that is cross-modal, but to sound a general warning about taking cases from one format to another.

4.2.1.4 Impersonal perspectives

The third objection concerns Peacocke's explanation of the difference between seeing the pots as women, which we do not talk about in terms of valence, and seeing the pots as sassy, which requires us to say something about the valenced character of the expressive quality. So, in what sense might perceiving a system of structures account for the valenced character of the expressive quality? One might think that metaphors have a character that inflects experience with the right evaluative or valenced spin. In speech, this seems plausible. By saying 'life is a bowl of cherries' it seems the speaker infuses what is said with a positive attitude to life. Does our perception of the painted colourfield infuse what is seen with a felt melancholy (experienced in relation to unfelt equanimity)? I think we have reason to be suspicious that metaphors exploited in thought and metaphors exploited perceptually do operate in the same way in this regard. Metaphors occurring in thought are valenced when we understand *why* (a) is relevantly like (b). The realisation begets the pleasure and value. This is the force of a striking or poetic metaphor such as Dickinson's description of "hope the thing with feathers" which likens hope to a bird, perched and wordlessly singing in the soul. Such aphoristic language is meaningless unless the metaphor is understood and articulated in thought. But according to Peacocke, exploited metaphors remain opaque to us and are evaluated without articulation. In these cases, what carries the weight is an experience with a certain kind of complexity. This is emphasised by the untranslatability condition on exploited metaphors their meaning cannot be reproduced in thought, but only extended and remarked upon (Peacocke, 2009:275). As a result, the isomorphic account does not, on this analysis, provide the impersonalist with a way to account for how the weightiness or valence gets into the expressive perception.

Peacocke can reply that the experience is valenced at the point at which it enters perception, by the viewer recollecting an experience of the relevant emotion. He says,

> The perception of the chord as expressing sadness is possible only for someone who has some idea of what sadness is like from the inside. (Peacocke, 2009:263)

Once again, this works nicely in the Rothko case because the expression is valenced from the first-person point of view. But the Rothko case might again be misleading here. It obscures the differences between the seeing appropriate to the Zurbarán, the Hopper, and the Rothko. The difference that has been obscured arises from changes in regard to the perspective. Peacocke's discussion elides this change in perspective as he moves from the 'simple' case of seeing a pot-woman to the 'hard' case of hearing a sad sound. As a result, we do not have an opportunity to consider how the differences in perspective contribute to the expression of the emotion. We do however glean that these changes occur, since Peacocke describes our experience of the Friedrich and the Zurbarán tree in terms of how they look from the outside to us the tree we are told looks like a person and the pots look like women yet we map them to a feeling which involves how things feel from the inside. While there is some sense in which we might think of the tree or the pot as feeling the emotion (as figure expression), this does not go far enough to establish or explain how 'external' appearances connect to or get embedded within 'internal' feelings. In other words, there seem to be several important ways that perspectives are combining to manifest expression in these cases, and it is not clear that we have any apparatus to understand how this aspect of expression comes about. As a result, it is difficult to make sense of a holistic pictorial perspective, or how we can explain the combination and interaction of the various mapped basic elements that were analysed in the Rothko case.

It seems from this that metaphorical perception will be neither necessary nor sufficient for pictorial expression. If it applies at all, we might think of it as a way of infusing mood or ambience into a picture, and that more fine-grained specificity about what the picture expresses will depend on the narrative (figure and scene) depicted content. In this way, Peacocke might hold that *Nighthawks* 'as a whole' maps onto a vague sense of stillness and separateness but is given more specificity by the café and patrons situated in a well of light on a dark street, which expresses melancholy and detachment in 1950s Americana.

However, this does not resolve the question of how to make sense of the combination of figure and metaphorical expressions of emotion.



Figure 22 Akunyili Crosby, Ike ya, 2016

Peacocke contributes to our theorising about the kind of process that the viewer undertakes, which may be opaque to introspection. But the view does not explain the precise aspect of the account we wanted to know about. That is, we need to know why visible objects should stand in a metaphorical relation to non-visible objects when we are looking at paintings. In addition, the account neglects how the perspective from which an expression issues is factored into the experience.

4.3 Metaphorising

In Chapter Six of *Painting as and Art*, Wollheim introduces a highly idiosyncratic account of pictorial metaphor (Wollheim, 1987). According to Wollheim, the painting as a whole is a metaphor, in which '*painting* is *body*' (Wollheim, 1993c). Two of his examples, Titian's *Flaying of Marsyas* and De Kooning's *Woman I*, are used to show how the textured brushwork of a painting's surface stands in for and transforms our

experience of the skin, and soul, of a person it depicts. He uses the term of art 'metaphorising' as shorthand for the transformative experience. Through metaphorising pictures can be experienced as the kind of thing that has psychological and affective attributes.

This putatively unusual way of seeing the picture interacts with but stands apart from Wollheim's better known theory of 'seeing-in'. According to that theory, when having an experience of pictorial space, the viewer simultaneously maintains awareness of the facture, brushwork or *painterly texture* of the surface.

Figure 23 Van Gogh, Still Life with a Plate of Onions, 1889

So, for example when looking at *Still Life with a Plate of Onions* the viewer has a twofold experience.[94] They see a bottle or onions in the first fold, and thickly applied ridges of luminous paint on the other fold. These are aspects of a single perceptual experience and account for the phenomenology of seeing objects in pictorial space.

How does metaphorising go beyond the concept of seeing-in? When the viewer metaphorises the painting the form of the paint (the way it has dried and moulded itself

[94] See Figure 23.

to the canvas) acquires additional meaning. The meaning is tied to the volumetric properties combined with colour and luminosity of individual marks. The viewer now does more than "see some planes of colour in front of other planes", or, "see something in [the picture's] surface" (Wollheim 1987:62). In twofoldness, the viewer is required to sustain seeing the brushstrokes *as brushstrokes*, while at once having a sense of the pictorial depth they create. In doing so, they take themselves be experiencing the picture as a picture. Whereas, in metaphorising the viewer is no longer seeing the dried brushstrokes as the trace, or index of the movement of the *painter's* brush. That is, they no longer see them *as brushstrokes*. The paint acquires immanent meaning. We experience the blobs of paint as flesh, or skin, or body or something other than brushstroke. In this way, the viewer's experience of the picture is transformed into an experience of something corporeal. The viewer is now able to see the kinds of inner states in paint that they can see in the face (or body).

The shift is from seeing-in the surface to the subject matter to seeing the surface as the subject matter. Importantly, we cannot access the metaphorising experience unless seeing-in. So metaphorising overlays our basic experience of paintings and moderates it. In a discussion of Bellini's *St. Jerome with St. Christopher and St. Louise of Toulouse* c.1513, Wollheim suggests that "the expressive value of the picture is unmistakeable" because in addition to seeing-in depictive kinds, our sense of the "equivalence for the body" is found in "the picture as a whole. Which eases itself forward" (Wollheim, 1987:354). That is the viewer who apprehends by engaging with these metaphorical attributes interacts with something that puts them in a dynamic relationship with the work. Applying this idea to the Rothko, the viewer would first see the pictorial planes of colour as in front or behind, and second the lugubrious sensations of boundless recession.

Less abstractly, dried pigment can appear to take on the textual qualities of flesh. As Philip Sohm puts it "not only did Titian represent Marsyas' flayed body, he enacted it across the painting's surface. Paint no longer represents things, it embodies them as well" (Sohm, 2007:97).[95] Wollheim thinks there is a philosophically interesting event

[95] Quoted in Currie (2019).

taking place here, that is painting *is metaphorically transformed into* a body.[96] This transformation is phenomenological. Wollheim says,

> When the way of metaphor works, what is paired with the object metaphorized is the picture as a whole.
>
> (Wollheim, 1987:307)

Wollheim tells us that "the aim both of linguistic and of pictorial metaphor is to set what is metaphorized in a new light" (Wollheim 1987:307). But what is the logical structure of metaphorising? According to Wollheim, unlike linguistic metaphor, pictorial metaphors use as their primary term the entirety of the painting. He says,

> Linguistic metaphor illuminates what it metaphorizes by pairing it with something else[...] This is the essential metaphoric strategy, which pictorial metaphor follows to the extent of pairing the object metaphorized with something other than that object. But—and this is the crucial point—in the case of painting this something is the picture itself. It is not—as linguistic metaphor might suggest—something that the picture picks out: even though the picture, at any rate normally, has to pick out something, indeed has to represent something, in order to fit itself to be a metaphor. When the way of metaphor works, what is paired with the object metaphorized is the picture as a whole.
>
> (Wollheim 1987:307).

In this way, we can see that Wollheim thinks there are two terms of the metaphor. The first term is the image. The second term is a body (or something corporeal). Once mapped these produce an heir, the psychological subject matter, which can vary from painting to painting. In the case of the Titian it is agony, in the case of the de Kooning it is a primitive emotional disposition, in the case of the Rothko, we might suppose it is going to be melancholy. Thus, metaphorising affords dual and simultaneous experiences of paintings. First, as a depiction and second, as a body in the grip of affective and psychological experiences.

4.3.1 Evaluation of Metaphorising

[96] This is distinct from the theory of expression found in (Wollheim, 1993b) which I do not evaluate in this thesis.

I will raise two objections against metaphorising. The first, that the model fails on its own terms. The second, and linked to the first point, that despite Wollheim's insistence that what he is explicating is a pictorial metaphor, the use of 'metaphor' here seems entirely inappropriate.

Forceville points out that the logical structure of metaphorising is problematic. A particular concern is that Wollheim's insistence on the order of the primary and second terms is confused. In his book, Wollheim stipulates that painting is the primary term and body the non-pictorially present second term. But in his discussions the primary term is given as body. This is corroborated by the passage where he says, "The aim of both linguistic and of pictorial metaphor is to set what is metaphorized in a new light. Juliet, religion, the body we see whatever it is afresh" (Wollheim, 1987:307). Forceville says,

> The thing metaphorized' is obviously *the body,* and it is apperceived in terms of 'something other than that object, [and] in the case of painting this something is the picture itself. In terms derived from Black, the primary subject of the metaphor is BODY, and its secondary subject PAINTING, yielding the metaphor BODY is PAINTING.
>
> (Forceville, 1996: 39)

As the chapter progresses, Wollheim continues to reverse the order of the primary and secondary terms. Why does this matter? Primarily because the meaning of the metaphor changes when the order is reversed. For instance, when I reverse Life is Journey, and say Journey is Life, I communicate something entirely different. Since Wollheim does not intend for metaphorising to be symmetrical (unlike Carroll), we conclude this is an oversight.

This leads to a second objection. It is not made clear why Wollheim thinks metaphor is required to make the connection between painting and body. Specifically, the phenomenon he is analysing lends itself to a much more literal interpretation. So, why all of this needs the theoretical underpinning of metaphor is not clear at all. I propose therefore that we drop the confusing notion of metaphorising out of what is an interesting insight worth keeping.

It seems right to say that Titian's novel manipulation of texture enhances expression, Raphael's smooth translucent strokes enhance the feeling of order and calm and, Pollock's splatters and drips convey frenzied liveliness. But we do not need a new philosophical concept to explain it. As Hopkins has said, "[s]ometimes, what is seen in a surface includes properties a full characterization of which needs to make reference to that surface's design (conceived as such)" (Hopkins, 2010a:158). The phenomenon Hopkins thinks can explain this is inflection (Lopes, 2005). Inflection does not have the sophisticated conceptual structure of a metaphor. It appeals to the idea that vision is sensitive to outline shape, colour and volumetric form so that each of these can play a role in the depiction of the subject matter.

Figure 24 Paola Veronese, Unfaithfulness, c.1575

The idea also has historical support from Michael Podro who finds the phenomenon present in Veronese's oeuvre (Podro, 1998). Specifically, he discusses Veronese's *Unfaithfulness* which depicts a woman secretly passing an illicit love letter while caught in a love triangle. Podro points out that the visible canvas texture is central to seeing the

woman's back as appearing *immanently* sensuously fleshy (Podro, 1998). The phenomenon is also famously in evidence in Lucien Freud's contemporary scrumbled used of kremintz white where the rough pigment texture enhances the appearance of meatiness in the flesh.

The idea that depictions can be sensoralised through inflection seems to me to be a simpler and more expedient explanation than metaphorising. It seems better suited to capture the literalism of the experience. What I mean by this is that we do not see the flayed, cracked or aging flesh as *metaphorically* representing the body. Rather the paint texture seems to *literally appear flesh-like*. Inflection is also more economical conceptually. It is part of depictive meaning and on this basis can be understood as a contributor to figure expression. In this sense, what Wollheim describes is an example of make-believing rather than metaphor. We see the painting surface as blood like, flesh like or bodily like and we are happy to play along with the pretence since we can incorporate it into our wider understanding of what the painting means. Finally, it is hard to see how such a model could be applied broadly. For instance, it seems unlikely that the application, or facture is going to play a similarly central role in explaining the melancholy seen in *Nighthawks.*

4.4 A better theorisation of perspectives

So far, we have been discussing three aspects of the debate: (1) the distinction between a) expressive meaning and b) depictive meaning; (2) how the literature on pictorial expression has developed; and (3) the controversy over the expresser. I have argued that both clusters of impersonalist models, contour and metaphor views, have neglected a crucial aspect of the phenomenon of expression. That is, how pictorial expression is relevantly *like* paradigmatic expression. In Figure 25 we can see the existing model of the debate.



Figure 25 The existing model of the debate

In the model, 'EX' denotes expressers and 'Not-EX' denotes the putative impersonalist expressions we have been discussing. I am arguing that attempts to analyse expression without taking on board some of the concerns central to our understanding of depiction has led to insufficient attention being paid to the way 'expression of emotion' must be used. In order to address this issue, I propose a new model which identifies *two perspectives* from which our use of 'expression of emotion' must be understood. Historically these have been referred to as from *'within'* or from '*without*'. This terminology, first introduced by R.K. Elliot, has dropped out of the debate which is unfortunate since the extra dimension can help discriminate between different meanings of 'expression of an emotion' and 'emotion concept' (Elliott, 1966).

This difference between a *without* and *within* perspective in respect of expression of emotion can be grasped by thinking about the difference between throwing a tantrum and seeing a child throw a tantrum.[97] While it is clear what experiencing the painterly expression *from without* amounts to (you see the depiction of a child expressing their frustration) it is not clear what experiencing painterly expression *from within* amounts to, unless one collapses into implausible arousal views.

I suggest that it is something like this: the picture provides a visual experience that is an analogue of or is continuous in some way with 'undergoing an emotion'. For example,

[97] In Elliot (1966), the claims from Expression Theory about reproducing the creative activity of the artist in the audience are challenged and a more modest claim that some works of art are capable of being experienced as if they were a human expression is argued for using the notion of within' and without'. This kind of distinction is mentioned in Budd (2009) as part of his critical evaluation of Peacocke (2009). Budd notes but does not develop, the distinction.

seeing stars when you receive a firm knock to the head or being highly sensitised to the sharp stone in your shoe when you are tired.[98] Another way to put this is *from within,* 'melancholy' can pick out affects congruent with first person subjective experiences of the world when undergoing emotion. *From without* 'melancholy' refers to shapes, postures, sounds and so on that are typically realised by bodies expressing melancholy (Levinson, 2006a, Davies, 1994, Kivy, 1989, Lopes, 2005, Noordhof, 2008). As we have seen, adopting the *within* and *without* distinction, does not automatically privilege a persona theory over an impersonalist one or vice versa. This is because 'the way the world appears' to a subject can be represented without depicting a subject in the picture.

How then is this distinction between *within* and *without* relevant to the analysis of pictorial expression? Let us return to the familiar experience discussed in Chapter Two of looking at a picture and seeing someone in it as having a certain emotion *from without*. In the Daumier picture we see the irritated father, the frustrated toddler and the weary mother because we attribute these mental states to those figures respectively and this is partly in virtue of the depictive cues. We then paid attention to the puzzling cases where expressiveness arises even when there are no figures in the picture, for example in landscape or abstract paintings. Since some paintings were expressive without having figures depicted in them, we needed to account for expression without presupposing that there is someone to whom we must attribute the emotion. We considered several explanations in regard to the element that could be 'doing the work'. However, once we have the distinction between within and without in place we can reconsider and slightly reframe our starting point for the puzzle. We can begin by paying attention to how we experience some expressive pictures as harbouring several different within and without expressions at once and how this makes sense or appears salient to us because of the relationship these have to each other. While I do not want to draw a straightforward analogy with novels, we can grip the basic idea by thinking of similar cases we are all familiar with where a character in a novel is cheerful, the broader narratorial viewpoint is unpleasant and our own reaction to this dynamic which need not be the same as either of those. This sets the puzzle up by starting out

[98] For some further interesting correlations see Lee and Shnall (2014).

with a more complex emotional space a space we are familiar with from novels where there are several emotions in play. Within this more complex space it can often be unclear which perspective has priority, or how it attains priority. Yet this fits nicely with pictorial cases where expressiveness can seem to arise from the interaction and layering of multiple without and within perspectives.

As I will argue in Chapters Six and Seven, we can advance our understanding of pictorial expression by making sense of this complex interplay of emotions using emotional personae. This will provide a way to comprehend how several layers of emotion are blended in different ways, and how they can in addition involve the viewer's reaction to the work. In this model the emotion concept is shown to be sensitive to how the 'from which perspective' rider is filled in. From a *within* perspective, the emotion concept will include internal changes, such as feelings and "the structure of a developing mood… and even the modifications of perception through which the emotion manifests itself" (Elliot, 1966:117).[99] By contrast, what is noteworthy for *without* perspective expressions are external changes, such as shouting, stamping one's feet or crying angrily when throwing a tantrum. Both kinds can feed into a single ongoing expressive episode. For example, snapping at my teenage daughter I can at once experience my expression of irritation from *within* as exasperation, and experience it *from without*, as a faintly absurd-looking display of churlishness. This layering of perspectives is manifest in some expressive pictures. It can help explain how pictures can convey episodic emotions (a naïve expression of an unfolding emotion state and one where the affective content seems internal or from *within*), and an external, ironic response to that earlier emotional event. For example, in Daumier's *Fatherly Discipline* we can see a frustrated father who we take to understandably but foolishly lose his temper with his unwitting toddler. The expressive content therefore includes both (a) the ironic emotional response now, *from without,* which is being appreciated from a wry *within perspective* on what the picture expresses overall. It is clear that we are meant to find the family meltdown funny rather than dangerous or frightening. This sort of additional expressive meaning that seems to arise from our impression of the kind of person who is executing the picture is bound up with the question of, whose or what

[99] Elliot provides this as an analysis of Donne's *The Sunne Rising,* but I have used it here to talk about pictures.

perspective overall in this instance is the one the picture prescribes the viewer to take on it as a whole. I will contend that the concept of a pictorial persona can provide some answers.

What I have been trying to show in the preceding chapters is that there is reason not only to acknowledge these perspectives, but also to think there is going to be a persona at the end of each one. In working through each cluster of impersonalist theories, my aim has been to highlight the ineliminable role of emotional perspectives in expressiveness in order to set up the further discussion about what must be required for them to be instantiated.

By acknowledging and understanding the *within perspective* expression and working out how this relates to the *without perspective* expressions to convey rich, complex and ironically layered emotional qualities, something new will be added to the literature. And, as I hope to have shown, existing theoretical accounts of pictorial expression that lack this nuance could be modulated to include it. The interrogation of the established positions is therefore not intended to repudiate them outright but to develop a more robust account that incorporates the theorisation of perspectives.

Several dimensions to the debate have now been mentioned, and a new framework for analysing the problem recommended. The various fine-grained accounts of pictorial expression share key themes and areas of exploration. Table 1 summarises the spectrum of positions.

The table simplifies the debate. It shows (a) that theories are either persona-theories or impersonalist and that (b) the notion of depiction is often relied upon even though the relationship between what is depicted and what is expressed is not cleanly defined.

Table 1 Review of the Debate So Far [100]

Author	**Personalist or Impersonalist?**	**Within/Without person perspective**	**How is the emotion connection met?**	**Which medium does the account primarily explore?**
Davies (1994)	Impersonalist	Without	Experienced resemblance	Music
Lopes (2005)	Impersonalist	Without	Indication	Pictures
Green (2007)	Impersonalist	Without	Congruence	Pictures and Music
Peacocke (2009)	Impersonalist	Within and Without	Metaphorical seeing	Music
Matravers (1998)	Impersonalist	Without	Compassionate Arousal (Evocation)	Music
Levinson (1990)	Persona theorist	Without	Sui generis manner	Music
Robinson (2005)	Persona theorist	Within and Without	Seen as expression of an implied protagonist in the work	Pictures and Music
Ridley (1995)	Persona theorist	Within and Without	Expressivist/Resemblance	Music
Abell (2013)	Persona theorist	Doesn't discuss	The picture's maker performs an expressive illocutionary act committing the picture to possessing E	Representational pictures
Budd (1995)	Persona theorist	Neither (uses term possesses')	P looks how E feels	Music
Vermazen (1986)	Persona theorist	Without	P is experienced as a paradigmatic expression.	Language
Wollheim (1987)	Persona theorist	Within (but not developed using this terminology)	P is experienced by the viewer as corresponding to E	Pictures

The tabulated summary of the issues discussed in Chapters Two, Three and Four shows that many participants in the debate do not consider 'artistic expressiveness' to be a person-possessive concept. Davies says,

> It seems to me that there always must be an inferential or imaginative leap in hearing the expressiveness of music as the expression of an

[100] Although I do not discuss all these authors in this paper, I have included all the theorists writing in the area for completeness.

> emotion felt by someone (for instance, an imagined persona). Is this inferential or imaginative leap both justified and required for recognition of music's expressive character in the standard case? I argue that the answer to this question is 'no'. The music presents emotion characteristics in the way it sounds without expressing anyone's felt emotion.
>
> (Davies, 1999:283)

This suspicion that mandating personae overpopulates the ontology of expression is at the heart of the disagreement between impersonalists and persona-theorist. One way therefore in which a persona theorist might convince the impersonalist is by mitigating this specific worry. In the next chapter I consider how effectively the most well-developed persona theory in respect of pictorial expression meets this challenge.

In this chapter I have explored a difference between figure scene and design perspectives and pictorial perspectives by which appreciators engage with representational (scenes) and non-representational (design or abstract) paintings. I examined the idea that pictorial perspectives function as framing devices that arise due to visual or perceptual metaphors. However, it was not clear how (visual) perceptual metaphors were operationalised in the phenomenon of expression. In particular, the metaphorical accounts failed to explain how the emotion concept is specified. There is an obvious contrast to be drawn between Emma's expression of joy and a painting that expresses joy. But, as I have been arguing, the impersonalist models neglect to theorise adequately the way perspectives play their role in the phenomenon of expression. This oversight leads them to mischaracterise how emotions enter the viewer's experience and how it interacts with the various components that make up adequate apprehension of the work. Moreover, the notion of a special metaphorical perception does not satisfyingly link the experience of the emotions seen in pictures to the value of them. Including the motivation we have to make them, seek them out and contemplate them.



Figure 26 Rembrandt van Rijn, Self-Portrait with Two Circles, c.1665-6

5 The 'Inherited' Perspective

So far, it has been noted that there is widespread agreement that some works of art are expressive of emotion. Meanwhile, it has been shown that there is disagreement over the claim that a hypothetical persona or implied artist's mental states are a necessary condition on the phenomenon of expression. In Chapter One I argued towards a synecdoche view of human emotional expression and perception, where an expression part stands for the whole expression. My aim was to provide a way to think about the human case that could guide us in the painting case. In Chapters Three and Four I examined several theorists who think that the possibility of scene and design expression shows that the persona theory must be false. I have been arguing that these impersonalist theories leave us with impoverished models of what specific art pieces can mean. In particular these impersonalist theories could not satisfactorily explain the emotional perspective of a painting overall without smuggling a persona into the story. Consequently, these impersonalist interpretive models cannot be the right view of the phenomenon of expression and we should consider an alternative; namely, a persona theory.

Various types of persona theory have been proposed to explain artistic expression but since Jenefer Robinson's is the most well developed in regard to paintings I will be focusing on it in this Chapter (Vermazen, 1986, Abell, 2013, Trivedi, 2001, Cochrane, 2010b). To contextualise her model, here is a brief overview of alternative formulations. Persona theorists share the basic claim that in seeing the emotion in pictures, we *should* imagine or have a sense of a person to whom we can attribute that emotion (Robinson, 2005, Levinson, 2006b, Vermazen,1987). The appeal of this basic claim is that it explains the connection between picture and emotion thereby explaining why viewers report perceiving psychological states in insensate mediums. Representing what is in the picture as coming from a persona is a way of bridging the gap between picture and psychological kind.

This basic claim is filled out in different ways running the gamut from radical or strong versions through to weak or hypothetical versions. The persona theorist par excellence

was Tolstoy, who championed an expression theory, where the picture functions more or less as a device through which the artist's emotions and feelings are transmitted to the viewer (Tolstoy and Maude, 1962, Collingwood, 1938). Understood as a causal account of how the picture comes to be expressive it fails to explain the nature of pictorial expression and makes the unjustified assumption that when feeling sad this causes whatever we then do to express sadness. But not everything I do when sad expresses my sadness. So, the causal story is false. Guy Sircello interprets the connection as a logical relation where manifestations of emotion are logically connected to the inner state that cause it. On this view, we look at the smiling face and see the smile as a happy state, fusing the 'act' and the 'thing' (Sircello, 1972).[101] But this leaves no room to explain fake smiles, angry-looking expressions sported in repose, or grimacing in response to a strong and unpleasant smell. Acknowledging these shortcomings, but still in the spirit of a persona theory, there are options on the table for a more moderate formulation. These consider the persona not as the actual author but as an implied author or presence in the work who unifies and coheres meaning, and whose emotional perspective the viewer inherits by empathising with them (Robinson, 2005, Robinson 2017). Implied authors are the psychological extensions of their makers hence the account can be weakened further by severing that connection. For example, a weak account posits only a hypothetical persona as a necessary condition on us being able to perceive some sui generis property as the emotional expression by a hypothetical persona (Cochrane, 2010b, Levinson, 2006a, Levinson, 2006b).

An aspect of expression that I argued in Chapter Four has been overlooked even in these models is the perspective from which an emotion is expressed. I suggested we pay attention to *two perspectives* from which our use of 'expression of emotion' must be understood. These are the without and within perspectives respectively. Roughly, the without perspective is pertinent to how an emotion *looks*, whereas the within perspective pertained to how the expression *feels from the inside*. As the analysis has shown, the two perspectives show up differently in the phenomenology of the perceiving subjects, which suggests we should not assume that there is a one type fits all experience of expression in pictures. Instead we should consider whether the

[101] See in particular (Sircello, 1972:409)

various ways the viewer grasps the expressive meaning of a work can be explained under one unitary *model* comprising several ways of experiencing. A persona theory is well placed to do this. Our experience of a paradigmatic emotion will depend in part on our point of view on it and since a persona theorist may argue that expression issues from a specific and occupied point of view there should be some way to make sense of how the one influences the other. That is, how the point of view of the expression is linked to the way we understand the viewer to be apprehending the work.

How does Robinson unpack this? She can be interpreted as holding that the point of view *indicates* an implied artist. But it is not clear that her arguments secure such a claim. She also seems to hold that expressive points of view are occupied by particularised and determinate beings. But it is not clear why a persona theory would need to secure this claim. Nonetheless there do seem to be advantages that Robinson's model has over its impersonalist rivals. In particular, its ability to makes sense of the expressive meaning that is not exhausted by what is expressed by the figures, scene or design of a painting. This is the additional expressive meaning that seems to arise from our impression of the kind of person who is executing the picture.

But these advantages need to be evaluated in the light of some problematic features of her view. Her headline claim is that viewers see the expression as the artist's expression of emotion. But her insistence on a psychological tie between artist and implied persona seems unreasonable. In addition, her evocation claim that spectators must be aroused to empathetic 'fellow-feeling' in order to adequately understand pictorial expression, is not well motivated.[102] This second aspect might seem tangential to the main issue of whether or not personae are implicated in expressive meaning but, as Davies points out, the notion of a persona may often creep in when explicating the manner in which viewers come to understand the work. He says,

> I do not doubt that auditors often listen to music as expressing someone's felt emotions—the composer's, the performer's, or those of an imagined persona. I agree that there might be heuristic value sometimes in encouraging a person to approach music in this fashion. Perhaps she can better come to appreciate the music's expressive character by entertaining the thought of its embodying a narrative

[102] In Chapter Seven I provide a detailed alternative account of the valenced way in which the phenomenon of expression arises and in particular how this is distinguished from an empathic response.

> about the emotional life of an imagined persona. Nevertheless, I reject the strong view that the perception of music's expressiveness always and necessarily involves such inferences or imaginings.
>
> (Davies, 1999:283)

Applying Davies' remarks about musical expression to the picture brings out the need for persuasive arguments to show that personae are *always and necessarily* part of both what makes something an expression and the phenomenon of expression. This prepares the ground for Chapter Six, where I modify the normative tone of Robinson's headline claim that viewers *should* view the picture as an expression of persona's emotion. I propose an alternative constitutive formulation grounded on a theorisation of the role perspectives play in our experience of seeing paintings. I argue that viewers *do or must* see the emotion as the persona's expression.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In the first section,(5.1), I set out Robinson's persona theory. Robinson's particular strategy exploits the concept of an implied persona who 'unifies' and 'specifies' what is expressed (Robinson, 2017). Lopes challenges this view, as we saw in Chapter Three, by attacking what he takes to be a flawed assumption motivating the personalist account: the priority of figure expression (Lopes, 2005). Once we acknowledge this flaw, he argues, there is no good reason to prefer a persona theory to an impersonalist theory. In (5.1.2) I will argue that Robinson qua personalist can pre-empt this strike by clarifying the relation between (a) what a picture expresses and (b) what is depicted as expressing in the picture. I consider whether Robinson is correct to say that a persona theory unifies the meaning, or whether it is better to press the idea that impersonalism diminishes it and that, should it be accepted, we would be left with an impoverished view of what specific art pieces can mean. I then challenge her argument that the artist implies her actual expression in the work through the persona in (5.1.3).

In the final section, (5.2), I turn to investigate the second part of Robinson's two-step model. I examine Robinson's argument that bodily responses, and our awareness of these bodily changes makes a necessary contribution to affective empathy, and so adequate apprehension of artistic understanding. I raise two concerns about the limitations that this places on adequate apprehension. First, I consider whether

Robinson places unduly restrictive limits on what counts as an emotion and so what can be expressed in a painting. Second, I consider whether the dependence on affective empathy correctly construes what is valuable about the artwork.

5.1 Robinson's implied painter

In this section I will evaluate Robinson's persona theory according to which pictorial expression is always an expression of someone's actual mental state or disposition. Her theory distinguishes between (1) 'pictorial expressions' which we engage with as if it they are [whole] expressions, and (2) mere 'skilled depictions of emotions' for example, emoticons. (2) can include expression by figures, scenes and designs that may well be configured in ways we would conventionally associate with expression, but which do not warrant 'rich' encounters (in the sense Lopes intended) or the compassionate empathetic encounters that Robinson thinks real artistic expression can trigger.

For Robinson "a genuine pictorial expression of emotion…is a genuine expression of emotion in a person, normally the painter" (Robinson, 2019). This could be taken to endorse both,

> (Pa) viewers should view the expressive content as if it is a genuine expression and
> (Pb) the creation of expressive content should be understood as a genuine case of expression.[103]

(Pa) and (Pb) are compatible, hence it is open to a persona-theorist to commit to both. But (Pa) does not imply (Pb), and vice versa.

According to Robinson, pictorial expression derives from the idea of a genuine expression call this 'E7'. She holds that a picture expresses *only if* the artist expresses, by articulating her mental states (M) through the work: (Pb). For the sufficient conditions of expression to be met, a competent viewer must be able to pick

[103] Theorists who claim (Pa) include Levinson (2006) and Vermazen (1986). Theorists who claim (Pb) include Robinson (2005) and Wollheim, (1983b, 1987)

up the expression: (Pa) (Robinson, 2007:36, Robinson, 2005:270, Robinson 2017a). The artist articulates (M) through an implied persona, whose (i) expression is picked up by viewers and (ii) who is a psychological extension of the actual artist. This second (ii) condition is only weakly construed, as she thinks sad artists can make happy paintings. Her intention is to avoid the problems of so-called transmission theories according to which the actual artist's emotions are said to be directly transmitted through the vehicle of the painting to a receiver (Tolstoy, 1962, Collingwood,1938).

Thus, Robinson takes it that Greenian congruences and Peacockian perceptual metaphors are going to be insufficient for expressiveness. She says,

> Expressive qualities are emergent properties of artworks, dependent upon non-expressive qualities but not connected to them in very tight, rule-governed ways, so that we can never be sure that every large orange and purple painting is 'aggressive' or that every grey painting with wispy lines in it is 'melancholy'.
>
> (Robinson, 2005:258)

An expressive painting is the culmination of something that begins with the artist 'articulating' their emotion. This involves some combination of releasing and withholding emotional feeling funnelled through an implied painterly persona. This persona functions as the expresser and this unifies and determines what is expressed (Robinson, 2017a:260 -263). In a discussion of Spiegelman's *Maus*, Robinson says:

> Barring any reasons for scepticism about Spiegelman's sympathies, it seems clear that the horror and dread expressed by the implied author of the picture reflect traits of compassion and distress that can safely be attributed to the artist himself.
>
> (Robinson, 2017a: 255-257)

In this way, it is suggested that a psychological link operates as a conceptual tie between implied and actual artists. Because implied artists are a construct of the actual artist's mind, they are constrained by the actual artist's own psychological profile and so contain "traces" of them when extended into the pictorial world (Robinson, 1985). She says *The Scream* is,

> full of repressed desires, melancholy, and angst, and this is of course an important side of Munch's own personality
>
> (Robinson, 2017a:257)

Figure 27 Edvard Munch, The Scream, 1893

Noting that there is more to pictorial expression than merely depicting a figure in an expressive posture or with an expressive facial expression, she says that those depictions which merely *look* sad or happy, such as models in a Calvin Klein advert, or emoticons, are not really cases of pictorial expression. They are examples of *technê*: skilled depictions of emotion which, "fall into the category of objects with expressive qualities: they can be comical or sexy or happy or sad, but they do not explore the emotions in the way that the Romantics emphasized as a or even the central goal of great art" (Robinson, 2017a:265) see also (Robinson, 2005:2005-228). The difference between the two apparently rests on how the artist has used what he paints to "articulate or individuate an emotion" often without knowing "what he will express until he has expressed it" (Robinson, 2005:267). For this reason, some depictions of emotion are, and some are not, also pictorial expressions of emotion. Pictograms and sentimental *technê* elements are "typically subordinate to and explained by the overall expression of emotions or emotional attitudes by the artist or his persona in the

picture", where the implied persona acts as a proxy for the mental states of the actual artist (Robinson, 2017a:263). Robinson's view is that paintings "do not merely depict or describe emotions; they explore and articulate the artist's emotions in such a way that viewers can recreate for themselves the emotions expressed" (Robinson, 2019:100).

5.1.1 The challenge from Lopes

As discussed in Chapter Three, Lopes accuses Robinson of taking figure expression to be *the* paradigm case of pictorial expression and as a result, to have developed an erroneous genealogy of personalism in order to retrofit scene and design expression to figure expression. His argument is that because of this,

> [s]cene expression raises a missing person problem. Unless there can be expression in the absence of a being, to whom the expressed emotion is attributable, then either there is no scene expression or the being in question is one not depicted.
>
> (Lopes, 2005:58)

He continues to say that there is no good independent reason to "attribute the emotion that is putatively expressed by a scene to some person who is not depicted" and so the "expression of emotion does not require that there be anyone to whom the emotion expressed is attributable" (Lopes, 2005:59). Robinson's crucial error according to Lopes, is to assume that viewers sustain a figure expression line of thought in the absence of figures (Lopes, 2005:70). But "once this assumption is dropped" he notes we "may adopt an impersonal theory […] a dog can smile when it is not happy (and so can zombies)" (Lopes, 2005:70).

5.1.2 An error

Lopes' aim is to discredit the motivation for persona theories. But there is an error in his analysis. By confronting it, Robinson would neutralise an objection to arguments in support of (Pa) and (Pb).

Lopes' error is to conflate his categories of expression with a picture's expression of an emotion. He says figure expression is, for persona theorists, the central manifestation of a transitive expression. That is, all expression has to be explained in reference to figure expression because persona theorists have privileged figure expression as the paradigm case, and this motivates the hunt for the missing person. But if the personalist is not motivated by the missing person problem, as described by Lopes, then his objection is neutralised. And, indeed, the persona claim is not motivated by the missing person problem. Firstly, persona theorists do not argue that simply seeing depicted figures expressing emotions is sufficient for seeing a picture as being an act of expression. The Flickr algorithm might compile rows of illustrated smiling faces, each showing those faces expressing happiness, yet I do not see the Flickr webpage as an act of expression. Secondly, figure expression does not need to be the starting point for an expression. We can think about the experience of the Rothko or the Af Klint abstract on its own terms without reference to a missing figure.

Yet, instead of rejecting Lopes' analysis, Robinson tacitly accepts the notion of the categories and develops her argument in response to them. In doing so, she accedes to his construal of the 'missing person' accusation even though this does not reflect her actual motivation. It would have been better to confront Lopes by pointing out that pictorial expression on her view is *not* modelled on figure expression and to develop this line of reasoning. After all, persona theorists do not argue that simply seeing depicted figures expressing emotions is sufficient for seeing a picture as an act of expression and this point should be much clearer.[104] Robinson's reply to Lopes is that the missing person is "a persona" of the artist and also an "internal spectator" in the picture-world (Robinson, 2017a:261). Her argument leads with the point that "form and content" are interdependent, and that Lopes is wrong to claim there are brute facts about the expressive qualities of design expression and that it comes apart from figure and scene (Robinson, 2017a:262). She says,

> Kokoschka's *Self Portrait* […] shows the painter looking anxious and insecure (as in 'figure expression'), but also conveys anxiety and

[104] In her replies to critics, Robinson is happy to accept that "Brassey perspicaciously points out that pictorial expression on my view is *not* modeled on figure expression" (Robinson, 2019)

> insecurity in the agitated passages of paint, the awkward perspective and the vague, unstable use of space (design expression).
>
> (Robinson, 2017a:262)

But there is an unresolved tension in Robinson's reply to Lopes. The above quotation suggests that she thinks that design expression is solely responsible for giving us the implied persona expression (figure expression is responsible for the figure 'looking anxious', design expression for how the picture 'conveys anxiety'). "Design expression" must refer to design expression as we understood it from Chapter Three, since she denies that there "is a fourth species of pictorial expression, in addition to figure, scene and design expression" (Robinson, 2017a:265). According to Lopes, design expression, "is wholly attributable to the picture's surface design and not to any figure or scene it depicts" (Lopes, 2005:57). However, this contradicts a different response she makes to Lopes, namely, that: "Figure, scene and design 'expression' in and of themselves are only 'expressive elements,' not genuine artistic expressions of emotion" (Robinson, 2017a:265). It may be that the categories are significant in the way we come to see the picture as expressive, but on the basis of her Kokoschka example alone, it is difficult to see how they relate to each other. [105]

My main concern, however, is that Robinson leads with the idea that Kokoschka's expression specifies and unifies what we see in the picture. I think that there is an alternative way that she can phrase the motivation for her persona theory, now that Lopes' challenge to the figure expression starting point has been neutralised. This alternative links to Robinson's observations concerning the formal qualities of the picture as well as the things we see depicted in it and brings out Walton's observations about the different levels at which we understand a picture. For example, at first glance, Hopper's painting *Nighthawks* is a straightforward scene executed in a "light touch" noir-ish style. But given due attention, we can see a more serious or deeper meaning in the picture. *Nighthawks* exhibits stylistic features that seem incompatible with each other: for instance, the faces are rendered in a quite crude and mask-like way, while the ambience of the picture overall is sophisticated and self-assured. This can encourage the

[105] In Robinson (2019) she says, "I am grateful to Brassey for pointing out this interesting ambiguity which has large consequences for my view and helps to indicate why I think it is preferable to Lopes' view."

view that a naïve painterly style is being put to use by a mature, skilled artist. Walton suggests that this kind of multi-level impression of an implied painter operates at a "deeper level" than just taking it that the work is painted by a naïve illustrator and can lead theoretically to the viewer experiencing a 'naïve illustrator' in some paintings that "derives from an obscure partial awareness of a multi-level situation of this kind" (Walton, 1976:52).

Since Lopes' categories of expression can only account for meaning derived from the formal (visible) qualities of the picture surface, meaning is restricted to what goes on *inside* the represented pictorial world.[106] Robinson can push the worry that this is insufficient to capture the full extent of expressive meaning. The appeal of (Pa), in contrast, is to be found in how it explains these additional levels of meaning, unavailable to interpreters working solely with Lopes' categories. If so, then there are good reasons to consider the argument for implied expression.

An obvious counter from the anti-persona theorists could involve denying that implied personae have any place in the interpretation of paintings. However, Robinson would appear to be on firm ground as (1) we need to account for more than the meaning of the visible formal properties of the picture, and (2) implied (narrator) personae are well established in the (relatively mature) philosophy of literature, where they are broadly understood as conveying intentions, beliefs or norms that do not belong to any of the characters in the novel (Booth, 1983). Without a principled reason *against* extending (2) to pictures, Robinson is free to push for (Pa).

There is, however, the following objection to (2). Although some pictures, like some novels, give us the impression of the kind of person who created them, we should be cautious about how we extend the concept from narrative literary works to pictorial expression. As we saw, Walton notes that for those novels that have implied narrators, the narrator plays a crucial role because,

[106] For a discussion about the possibility of irony or meta emotional perspectives being determined hypothetical intentions thereby resolving the internal pictorial tensions (rather by the recourse to the intentions of an artist) see Daniel Nathan (1982)

> He mediates the reader's access to the rest of the fictional world; we know what happens in the fictional world only from his reports about it.
>
> (Walton, 1976:50)

Walton's objection is that how viewers represent the pictorial world is direct and does not involve a mediating gaze of an implied painter. This relegates these extra pictorial points of view and downgrades them from 'narrator-proper' roles. I judge that a (fictional) tragedy has occurred by being told by an (implied) narrator, 'baby shoes for sale; never worn'. In contrast, I can judge (in the pictorial world) that there is a listless dynamic between the people in the bar by how they appear directly to me. Unless Robinson has the resources to deny this initial observation, the expression of an implied painter is going to play an incidental, rather than crucial, role in how the viewer gleans the expressive meaning of the picture. These considerations would undermine Robinson's claim that an implied painter specifies and coheres what is expressed in the picture.

Since I provide my own extended reply to Walton's objection in Chapter Six, I have simply noted this qualification on Robinson's arguments for (Pa). I now put the issue to one side since even if one can make out the case for this multi-level experience of (Pa), there is a more pressing issue that needs addressing, concerning the move from (Pa) to (Pb).

5.1.3 Moving from (Pa) to (Pb)

Having dealt with Lopes' objection to the motivation for personalism, I would like to now turn to the way Robinson's argument moves from (Pa) to (Pb). I note some difficulties with the move and also some reasons to be cautious about the way (2) extends to pictures.

Robinson proceeds in more or less the following way. In real life, we form reliable impressions of people by looking at how they dress, the way they talk and so on (Robinson, 1985). An extrovert may wear bright colours; a confident character may strut; a wit produces pithy humorous observations and it is these traits that necessarily

and inevitably reveal character. Similarly, in reading a novel or looking at a picture we may form an impression of the kind of person who authored or painted it. Sensitive prose and elegant brushstrokes will reveal aspects of the artist's personality which readers and viewers will pick up through some kind of epistemic seeing.

Even putting to one side the worries about whether we can reliably infer facts about, say, Josephine's psychology from her preference for ditzy chintz skirts, and simply granting Robinson the inference in real life, it is still not at all clear how this transposes to the case of pictures. This is in part due to her two-step notion of transitive pictorial expression: the claim that viewers can infer facts about the artist's psychology on the basis of a construct, the implied persona. For example, if it is the case that Hopper expresses his melancholy in *Nighthawks* then when the viewer views the melancholy as issuing from his implied persona (a construct) in the work in virtue of the implied persona that Hopper has constructed (hereafter *Hopper)*, the viewer views Hopper's melancholy.

Robinson has told us that because *Hopper* is the creation of Hopper, *Hopper* is necessarily shaped by and linked to the personality of Hopper. So, if one picks up on an expression of melancholy by *Hopper* we also pick up on Hopper's melancholy. Robinson relies on this psychological link to move from (Pa) to (Pb).

This is tendentious as it implies painters cannot create implied personas that are psychologically distinct from themselves. A well-known counterexample to this, however, is Tolstoy's ability to write with compassion while lacking compassion in his personal relationships.[107] For this reason, it expects too much of impressions since it cannot be that viewers go from (Pa) (viewing the painting as an expression by *Hopper*) to (Pb) (understanding the painting to be an expression by Hopper), since *Hopper* is merely a construct and so has no psychological reality. I cannot, when engaging with the ventriloquist's doll, legitimately move from the impression of sentience to believing I am picking up psychological states of the doll that are somehow given reality by an extension of the ventriloquist's states. So, it is not clear how viewers pick up on the

[107] As documented in Anne Edwards (1982).

emotions or traits of Hopper by constructing *Hopper.* Even if viewers form the impression of an implied persona, since there is no entailment from (Pa) to (Pb), the fact that a viewer has the impression of an implied painter who expresses melancholy is not an argument for (Pb). The concern is that the distinction between the two claims that a personalist can make, (Pa) and (Pb), is being glossed over.

Robinson could argue that viewers infer a sincere connection between artists and their implied personae, by relying on extra-pictorial biographical information. The problem with this attempted solution, however, is that even if the viewer identified *Hopper* as Hopper, it would still be the case that the viewer was connecting with *Hopper* and not Hopper. Put in the counterfactual mood, the viewer would understand the picture even if they did not make the identification. So, the link between *Hopper* and Hopper is not conceptual and, as we have noted, we do not have grounds to allow that it is psychological.

For these reasons, one cannot accept that the expression of an implied persona is also the actual expression of the artist. This should, however, not discourage further reflection on the significance of our impressions of a painting's origin. Arcing drips, bold palette knife work, and delicate glazes of paint may suggest a sensuous, agitated or careful personality in the style of the work. We can recognise this and seek an explanation for why a viewer might choose to represent the implied persona as if it were a psychological continuation of the actual artist. That is, we may question why viewers make this connection, without supposing that the connection reflects a constitutive tie between two distinct identities. A viewer who sees the painting as an expression by Hopper would be making a harmless transition from viewing the expressive content as transitive to seeing the creation of the expressive content as a transitive act of expression. On this story, Robinson's move from (Pa) to (Pb) could be understood as a benign further claim, entertained but not entailed by the central issue. Meanwhile, implied expression can still be understood as a significant source of expressive meaning for paintings and, moreover, one that the impersonalist struggles to explain. In the next section, I shift topic and consider whether Robinson's second condition is helpful or harmful to her claims about the role of the persona in artistic expression.

5.2 Robinson's empathic viewer

In this section I turn to examine the relevance and feasibility of Robinson's second jointly necessary condition in regard to the issue about the persona. The first necessary condition, recall, was that the viewer construct a hypothetical persona who is supposed to specify and unify the overall emotional perspective on the picture. The second necessary condition is that the viewer empathises with the persona in order to fully access the expressive meaning of the painting.[108] This makes the second condition pertinent to an assessment of the first condition. Empathetic perspective-taking is supposed to solve the epistemic problem of how viewers know what the picture expresses. Since it is supposed to encourage and develop a valuable transferable skill, it is also meant to solve the value problem. I will proceed as follows. In (5.2.1) I briefly rehearse Robinson's second condition before evaluating it in (5.2.2). I will conclude that contrary to her goal, Robinson's empathetic condition has the unintended consequence of harming her persona claim.

5.2.1 What is 'empathetic perspective-taking'?

I am going to evaluate whether Robinson's second claim about empathetic perspective-taking helps or hinders her persona claim. A preliminary question here is, what is 'empathetic perspective-taking'? The notion can be introduced by drawing a broad distinction between two ways in which the phenomenon of expression is thought to arise: in either a dry-eyed or misty-eyed manner. Following O.K. Bouwsma, we can say that dry-eyed experiences are merely cognitive and are sufficient for understanding the expression of emotion in the picture (Bouwsma, 1950, Kingsbury, 2002). Against this, several theorists argue that cognition is not sufficient for adequate apprehension and cite a further misty-eyed feature that is required adequately to understand the work.[109] Misty here is a placeholder for an emotion, imagined emotion or other affective state.

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[108] In this, she follows Wollheim who produces a three-tiered schematic account of the novel which has at its apex artistic expression and which is conceptually tied to the inner process' of the novelist. See Wollheim (1983).

[109] A further controversy involves how to spell out misty-eyed'. Some theorists claim viewers empathise (Robinson, 2005, Green, 2007), sympathise (Matravers, 1998) or imagine emotions in pictures. It is then a further question whether imagined emotions involve pretence or whether they are transparent to real feeling (Walton, 1994, Currie

Robinson's solution falls firmly within the misty-eyed category of audience responses. Her solution to what fills the 'misty' placeholder is given first in terms of physiological arousal in Robinson (2005) but reconstructed more specifically as affective empathy in her later work (Robinson, 2010, Robinson, 2017b). Her notion of affective empathy is drawn from the work of Heidi Maibom in which an empathiser re-enacts or simulates a target's emotional condition exactly (Maibom, 2014). It is by duplicating the expressed affective states that the viewer is granted access to the expression. In this way, a viewer who adequately understands the expression is engaging in this affectively augmented form of comprehending.

Shelby Moser and Ryan Doran have described the augmenting feature in the following terms. Empathy can stand for scenario where A can come to know what B is feeling through simulation and which is compatible with A not having any concern for B (Moser, 2019). However, Robinson's notion involves empathising *with concern*. The difference between 'understanding' and 'adequate understanding' is then as follows. One can 'understand' in the sense of comprehending *that* dementia damages memory, but by asking Chloe to be understanding in regard to Grandpa, she is being asked to comprehend *with care* about his condition.[110] It is in this sense that Robinson uses the 'empathising' because she holds that adequately understanding what someone else feels "is impossible without emotional engagement with them and their predicaments" (Robinson, 2010:78). It is this way of understanding real people that Robinson thinks carries-over to our understanding of pictorial expressions. Moreover, Robinson holds that the affective aspect appropriate to adequate understanding involves the viewer undergoing an actual physiological arousal which individuates the expressed emotion that is partly perceived in and partly inferred from the painting (Robinson, 2005:258).

Robinson's notion of empathetic attention therefore goes beyond the mere activation of a viewer's sub-personal motor mimicry (Coplan and Goldie, 2011). For instance, Gregory Currie has argued that sub-conscious mimicry, also referred to as a primitive or

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and Ravenscroft, 2002). I am bracketing out this debate in order to more narrowly assess Robinson's second condition. Specifically, in respect of how it helps or harms her persona claim.

[110] I take it that the distinction Robinson is seeking to articulate here is similar to one Lopes identified as a distinction between poorly and richly seeing the expression in the picture as discussed in Chapter Three.

proto empathy, is implicated in our appreciation of visual artworks (Currie, 2011a). Primitive or proto empathy is supposed to convey range of sensory and affective information through simulative processes, such as for instance, the smoothness of a sculpture or the painfulness of pierced flesh and explains why our flinching response is triggered when apprehending for instance, *Muhammad Ali* (figure 28).
However, Robinson is making a claim about a self-conscious identification with the persona's first-person experience of the pictorial scenario. Hence, her condition requires more than the simulation of sub-personal processes in order to be satisfied.



Figure 28 Carl Fischer, Muhammad Ali, 1968

In this way, Robinson holds that empathetic emotions have epistemic value in regard to pictorial expression. Just as we may simulate a real person's affective states in order to

know how they feel, a viewer who successfully simulates the affective states of the persona comes to gain adequate epistemic access to that persona's emotional perspective.

It is worth noting, for reasons that will become clear in the next section, that Robinson marries up her notion of empathy with her broader neo-Jamesian commitments in respect of emotions (James, 1884). Whether we are actually frightened by a sudden crash of thunder or empathising with a frightened persona, our response will unfold in stages. Initially, we react with an essential non-cognitive affective physiological appraisal which only later moves into a cognitive monitoring and adjustment phase.[111] So in empathising with a frightened persona we will feel frightened and later come to reflect on this, thus "gaining deeper understanding of the work" (Robinson, 2010:77).

Thus, in addition to a similarity in respect of what painterly and paradigmatic expressions *are* (expressions of emotion), there is a further important similarity in respect of the way viewers get clear about what emotion is expressed. In this way the phenomenon of expression is shown to be valuable. The value is found in the way it can "exercise and enhance our empathic skills, namely, by giving us practice in *taking the emotional perspective* of another person" (italics as per original Robinson 2017b:350).

In summary, Robinson thinks her second condition involves empathy in a "far more central way"(Robinson, 2017b:350) than the alternative accounts admit (Green, 2007, Lopes, 2011).[112] The first condition explains how viewers are "invited to see the world as the artist saw it" and empathetic perspective -taking provides the access a viewer needs to "experience the artist's emotional attitude towards the subject-matter of the picture" (Robinson, 2017b:350).[113] The second condition enables the viewer to experience "the situation as it is depicted, that is, from the emotional perspective of the

[111] For a complete description of the account, see Chapter 3 in Robinson (2005:57–99). For more on Robinson's view of emotions as process see Robinson (1995, 2005, 2018).

[112] Robinson is relying for her notion of empathy on the work of Maibom (2014).

[113] This locates her idea in the vicinity of Wollheim's idea of the phenomenological transformation that occurs when the world seems to be Hockney-ish, Crosby-ish or Munch-ish; a phenomenologically richer experience than merely experiencing a depiction rendered in a painterly style or genre. See Wollheim (1987:98-100).

artist… from the perspective of Géricault's horror and indignation" (Robinson, 2017b:361).

In the next section I evaluate how well this second condition integrates with the first condition and whether the first can survive the loss of the second.

5.2.2. Criticisms

Robinson claims that understanding expression properly requires the viewer to empathise with the persona target. I show that there is reason to think that empathy is neither necessary nor at times apt for gaining access to the expressed perspective. In addition, there is reason to think that her neo-Jamesian commitments in respect of empathising would need to be dropped for the theory to deal with a satisfying range of cases. I then turn to her account of expressive value. Her view commits her to the idea that the empathising skills rather than the pictorial expression is the locus of value. But this seems to overlook the sense in which the adequate understanding discloses the value of the emotion seen in paint. In addition, there is an independent worry that can be raised about the capacity to empathise while simultaneously taking the perspective of another. As a result, the second condition looks to be bolted on to the model rather than being part of the core engineering.

5.2.2.1 Solving the epistemological problem

According to Robinson, empathy is supposed to solve the epistemic problem; that is, how viewers know what the picture expresses. They know what the picture expresses because they feel what it expresses and by monitoring and reflecting on their feelings come to realise what the target of their empathy feels namely, the persona. However, one might worry that given the possibility of the sub-personal mimicry outlined by Currie, we do not need an implied persona to trigger our empathetic responses. We may flinch when looking at a picture of flesh being sliced or poked and feel extreme discomfort. But since this is also true of what it is like for a novice to witness surgery, even when they believe a patient to be under full anaesthetic and so feeling nothing,

there is reason to think there can be cases of empathy without the need for perspective-taking in the sense Robinson insists on.

A reply to this is that in the case of the anaesthetised patient, one may still be positing a persona only in this case one is imagining that the persona *would* flinch were they awake. But to this one can press the further retort that the expressing pictorial persona lacks the actual suite of mental states our empathising tracks in real person cases and so we must not assume that our responses do smoothly carry-over. So whether or not persona can in fact be a target of empathy at all is an open question (Vassilakis, 2019).

While this is not enough to block the possibility of empathising, our confidence in the claim that it is necessary should be undermined. We might, for instance, think that given the difference between real life persons and hypothetical personas we have to bring about the feeling another way. For instance, it could be that Bob understands that the pictured shipwreck should be seen from an indignant perspective (perhaps he has been told this is the right way to see it) but he uses his memory of a time when he was feeling indignant to bring about the affective augmentation. Bob is now imagining an emotion rather than empathising which may augment his understanding of the persona's expression.

There is a further reason to think that empathising is not the only way to gain access to the persona's perspective. This reason arises due to Robinson's neo-Jamesian commitments in regard to what emotions are. As Irene Martínez Marín points out, this commitment is incompatible with the possibility of a viewer being able to take the perspective of a persona, who is expressing a self-conscious emotion, such as nostalgia or shame (Martínez Marín, 2019). In self-conscious emotions, both the subject and the object of the emotion are the self. Unlike being afraid about the dog, or about the virus, when I am ashamed, I am ashamed about myself and when I am nostalgic, I am concerned about the irrevocability of my own past and so on. Robinson's notion of empathy is not able to grant access to these self-conscious states since the viewer would have to imagine they were in fact the persona in order to get the intentionality of emotions to point in the right direction. For instance, Bob would need to imagine that he (Bob) was nostalgic in order to duplicate the persona's affective state but then he would

be imagining the wrong target (himself rather than the pictorial persona). In addition, a characteristic of self-conscious emotions is that they involve intellectual feelings rather than physiological arousal (Goldie, 2009).

This means that unless we jettison Robinson's notion of what an empathetic emotion is (essentially a physiological arousal) it will not be possible to feel what the persona who express self-conscious emotions feels. This leaves our experience of the nostalgia in *Melanie and Me Swimming*, the envy in *Mr and Mrs EJP*, the narcissism in Albert Dürer's *Self-Portrait*, and shame in Jenny Saville's *Propped* unaccounted for under Robinson's model.



Figure 29 Michael Andrews, Melanie and Me Swimming, 1978–9

But Robinson has rejected this kind of modification to her view (Robinson, 2005:22, Robinson 2019:115). She suggests that we categorise these putative intellectual

emotions of these kinds not as emotions, but as long-term attitudes and we should, along with moods, exclude them from the set of things the pictorial persona can express. Yet her reply contradicts her own discussions of pictures which she thinks can "express nostalgia for a graceful Arcadian world" (Robinson, 2005:252).[114]

In the light of the differences between real people and pictorial personae as well as the limitations the range of emotions that may be understood empathetically, it seems prudent to remain suspicious of the necessity claim.

Figure 30 Albrecht Dürer, Self-Portrait, 1500

5.2.2.2 Solving the value problem

Robinson also claims that the second condition (i.e. empathetic perspective-taking) can solve the problem of expressive value. She follows Lopes (2011) in thinking that by practising empathy with pictures we gain a valuable and transferable life skill. By casting value in these terms, she suggests that empathising has intrinsic value and that since pictures can be instrumental to improving our empathetic skills, our experiences of adequately apprehending them may be valuable too.

[114] This is also unexpected given her usual strategy of making use of the empirical data which considers nostalgia at least to be an emotion Van Tilburg et al. (2018).

A concern that can be raised here is that empathetic experiences are not the only type of experience of pictures that can claim to have instrumental value. A purely cognitive understanding of sadness could teach a viewer to recognise sadness without getting caught up in an other's suffering. This would be a useful skill for doctors or therapists. Hence, that argument in support of her claim is undermined by the fact that the value of expression can be accounted for by other transferrable skills. However, this is not in itself an argument against (or problem for) her view; it is just that one argument in favour of it does not hold up.

Robinson could avoid getting entangled in these kinds of arguments by being clearer about what kind of value empathising with the picture is supposed to give you. It seems unlikely that non-empathetic or emotionally engaged looking will fail to involve any value. Whether or not that case can be made out, it seems orthogonal to the question of the kind of value that is released or made available to the viewer in virtue of them apprehending the picture mistily as opposed to dry-eyed. Hence, what needs more explanation is the link between empathetically perspective-taking and accessing the full value of the pictorial expression. However, she does not unpack or develop this point.

One might then complain that the second condition fails to get value into the experience in the right way. What we want to know is how the affective apprehension can be revelatory of the value of the expression. In the sense in which Wollheim suggested that performing a ritual discloses the value of ceremony (Wollheim, 1993a). Taking ritual to be analogous to that of adequate apprehension, the idea is that "the meaning a ritual possesses inherently" may be enhanced "by the way it is performed" (Wollheim, 1993a:14). On this view, meaningfulness is bound up with the pleasure derived from the activity of getting clear or articulating some fine-grained emotional condition. In the case of the picture, this articulation is worked out by attending to a constellation of expressive features and the way these can map on to a constellation of emotions. Value arises from the way we get clear on "the attitudes, emotions and feelings encouraged toward the subject matter" (Wollheim,1993:8). This is *the pleasure that the viewer actually feels for themselves* in understanding the expression. In this way, adequate understanding of expression can be intrinsically valuable. It gives expression to our deepest human concerns by offering us prescribed encounters which allow us to reflect

on the complexities of our emotional lives.[115] This amounts to the idea that it is not the destination but the journey that matters. In other words, the value of expression is disclosed by the viewer emotionally appreciating the painting as opposed to them practising and enhancing the transferable empathetic skill.

5.2.2.3 Background sceptical worries

There is an additional background concern about the notion of empathetic perspective-taking. I have argued that it does not seem necessary to solve the epistemic problem and that it does not solve the value problem. I will now consider whether the notion itself is internally inconsistent using an argument found in Goldie (2011) and explored in Matravers (2018).

Robinson holds that the viewer ought to feel exactly what the persona expresses. She takes this claim to be consistent with the standard model of affective empathy due to Maibom (Maibom, 2014). But as Matravers points out things may not proceed quite as smoothly as Robinson supposes. He agrees that when the affective empathiser,

> imagines themselves in the place of the [persona], inputs the [persona's] beliefs into their cognitive systems while blocking the connection between those systems and motivations to act, the wheels turn and a certain emotion results.
>
> (Matravers, 2018:60)

But he notes that to 'imagine oneself in the place of the persona' is ambiguous between two meanings. Either, (a) the viewer is imagining being in Géricault's circumstances as he expresses the horror or (b) the viewer is imagining *being Géricault* in his studio horrified and painting the work (Matravers, 2018).

It seems that Robinson has (b) in mind. But there is a problem with this. There is reason to doubt (b) is achievable for the viewer (Williams, 1973). For it to be the case that someone, say JR, imagines being a historical deceased figure (say TG), would imply that

[115] Wollheim relates this fit' between inner complex conditions and outer' expressed and public triggers for contemplation to the Hegelian notion of feeling at home (zu Hause') in the world (Wollheim,1993:8).

JR is temporarily delusional or that she can imagine being metaphysically identical with something she believes she is metaphysically distinct from namely, TG.

Robinson can reply that she does not need such an ambitious notion of empathising. All she requires is something like an "in-his-shoes perspective-shifting" which involves the more modest project of "consciously and intentionally shifting your perspective in order to imagine what thoughts, feelings, decisions, and so on you would arrive at if you were in the other's circumstances" (Goldie, 2011:302).

However, this means that Robinson's notion of empathetic perspective-shifting is "conceptually unable to operate with the appropriately full-blooded notion of first-personal agency" (Goldie, 2011:303). Yet this is exactly what is required to see the pictorial world through the eyes of the persona according to her jointly sufficient and individually necessary conditions. The viewer only gains a full understanding of *The Raft of the Medusa* or *Nighthawks* when they take the perspective of *Géricault* or *Hopper*.

How might a defence of Robinson proceed here? One option involves simply allowing that empathetic emotion is an actual felt emotion and then re-running the standard model with the following modifications,

> (Option A)
>
> In imagining *The Raft of the Medusa* from *Géricault's* perspective, Jenefer feels (imagined) horror and indignation about the plight of the shipwrecked crew.[116]

A problem with this solution is that the object of Jenefer's emotion is now the shipwrecked crew. Taking the perspective of *Géricault* is then left out of the imaginative project. It is open to Robinson to counter this by saying that the perspective-taking falls into a wider *imaginative* project. But then she must concede that what she is feeling is imagined emotion, not actual emotion at all. According to Option A, empathising drops out of the account. Hence, when we reformulate the standard model of affective empathy in this way, Robinson is forced to give up perspective-taking.

[116] This is an adaptation of formulations proposed in Matravers (2018).

Alternatively, Robinson could adopt,

> (Option B)
>
> Jenefer generates in herself some emotion which is a prototype of *Géricault's* emotions and by doing this is imagining she is Géricault.

According to (option B) the form of imagining is left unspecified but what matters is that Jenefer is now feeling, through whatever triggers she can make use of, more or less the same thing Géricault was feeling about the subject he painted. This does not add up either to empathy or to a real emotion, but it captures the underlying idea that Jenefer is now seeing the picture from the perspective of someone, who like *Géricault*, is horrified at what is happening to the crew.[117] Hence, by accepting the alternative imagining emotions model (option B), Robinson can keep perspective-taking. But she is now forced to give up empathy.

This analysis illuminates a general background worry about the internal incoherence of a notion of 'empathetic perspective-taking' since affective empathy "takes us away from the centrality of perspective-taking" (Matravers, 2018:72). This provides good reason to drop Robinson's second condition and seek alternative solutions to the epistemic and value problem.

Conclusion

It this Chapter I have examined and criticised Robinson's persona theory of pictorial expression. In the first section, I argued that impersonalism impoverishes our comprehension of some expressive paintings because it fails to fully reveal all the meaning in the work that only persona expression will explain. While this falls short of providing an argument for Robinson's controversial claims about the actual painter, it provides a reason to accept (Pa). However, there remains a highly complex and

[117] Although this might seem a disappointing result, in a recent article Robinson suggests that something like this is going on when viewers apprehend Kokoschka's portraits. She says, that the viewer's response to the portrait subject involves recreating the mindset of the artist toward their subject and that by doing so, accessing the works meaning, see Maes (2020).

unresolved issue: namely, whether, in picking up on implied expression, we pick up on the mental states of painters or their implied personas, or if we merely imagine that we do so. In the second section, I examined the efficacy of Robinson's notion of empathetic perspective-taking. The condition was supposed to solve the epistemological problem and the value problem. But I argued that it is not necessary to solve the first one and it does not sufficiently solve the second one. Although this created problems for the conditions jointly holding this was not intended to sink the persona-theorist project. It is open to a persona-theorist to find an alternative account of affective imagining that better explains the tie between the viewer and the imagined persona.

In the next chapter I put forward a novel way to model a persona theory. One that is friendly to many of the interesting contributions we have already discussed, yet better equipped to explain the epistemic significance of persona and how they play their role in the phenomenon of expression.



Figure 31 William Steig, Abel's Island, 1976

6 A New Perspective on Emotions

I have been arguing that an analysis of how we see emotions in pictures requires us to pay greater attention to the perspectival structures in which both emotions and pictures are embedded. My task in this chapter is to show that doing so leads, inevitably, to a theory of expression rooted in the idea of a persona.

We first encountered the argument for a persona theory in Robinson's work. Although I rejected Robinson's controversial claims about the actual painter, I did not find reason to reject the central claim that viewers see the expression of emotion in paintings as someone's emotion. There was a further problem, however, generated by the idea that the hypothetical persona was discovered by the viewer empathetically taking the persona's perspective. The recommended remedy was to drop the empathy condition in favour of 'in her shoes' perspective taking.

Despite the proposed corrections, to my mind Robinson's way of approaching the problem of the persona is still misleading in regard to the *object* of engaging with pictorial expression. As if the central purpose is to identify the missing person, like one would solve a game of Cluedo. By finding out who did it, what they used to do it and where it happened (in the morning room for Cassatt, in the bathroom for Bonnard, and in the dining room with a knife for Bacon). In a sense, Robinson uses the persona to augment the expression and this makes it appropriate to read her work as proposing a normative account. She thinks viewers should or *ought* to see the picture as an expression of Delacroix's outrage or Kokoschka's obsessive curiosity for his subject. In contrast, what I am proposing is a constitutive persona theory. My plan is to analyse the viewer's imaginative shift into a persona perspective. The analysis will show that viewers must or *do* see the picture from the persona's emotional perspective. This is what we mean when we call a painting sad and expression cannot get going without it. The arguments in this and the following chapter are an attempt to establish this conclusion.

As I suggested in Chapter One, there are no legitimate obstacles to thinking we can immediately and directly see emotions in the face. A key part of that argument involved a demonstration of how seeing emotions arises from occupying a partial perspective on a part of the whole emotion. This established the importance of perspectives and the risk of overlooking them as well as providing a synecdoche model of what emotions are. In Chapter Two I began to map the paradigm case onto pictures. I presented a simple and intuitive but false solution (E1). I showed how one might be tempted to conclude from this that pictorial expression, unlike paradigmatic cases, can occur impersonally. I then proceeded to examine and evaluate literalist and metaphorist interpretations of the phenomenon (E2-E6). My conclusion was that impersonalist models neglect the role perspectives play in the phenomenon of expression. I concluded that (a) a more explicit account of the perspective from which the emotion was being expressed was required and (b) the perspectival structure within which picture seeing is embedded must be incorporated into the theory. The failure adequately to theorise these aspects left it obscure how emotional content enters, and valences, the viewer's experience.

But what is meant by perspective? When discussing other artistic mediums notably literature and film- 'perspective' is put to use to explain the expression of ideals, politics, morals as well as emotions (Gaut, 2007, Moran, 1994, Camp, 2018, Coplan and Goldie, 2011, Currie, 2010, Goldie, 2000, Goldie, 2003, Goldie, 2012). But, despite the ubiquity of the word 'perspective', it is not entirely clear how we are to unpack the concept. Part of the problem is that the term is used to stand for something that seems essentially diaphanous or contentless. Elisabeth Camp who recently produced work on this, describes it as an open-ended interpretive principle which she cashes out in terms of psychological comprehensibility (Camp, 2018). But her analysis does not extend to pictorial cases. Other thinkers are less clear about what they take the term to precisely mean, although this has not prevented them from putting the concept to systemic use in order to explain the character of our engagement with fictions. Typically, it appears as shorthand for the psychological point of view audiences are expected or required to cultivate on the fictional world in order to fully understand it. Additionally, it has been claimed that "we should think of the value of art as partly deriving from its providing a kind of cognitive affective perspective onto the world" (Gaut, 2007:171). One might take from this that perspectives at once grant epistemic access to and disclose the value

of a work.[118] But it is not at all clear how they might do so. Richard Moran suggests that it has something to do with immersing ourselves vividly in an imagined situation. He says,

> Imagination with respect to the cruel, the embarrassing, or the arousing involves something more like a point of view, a total perspective on the situation, rather than just the truth of a specifiable proposition. And imagining along these lines involves something more like genuine rehearsal, "trying on" the point of view, trying to determine what it is like to inhabit it.
>
> (Moran, 1994:105)

I take it that part of the appeal of using a term like 'genuine rehearsal' is to signal that it is the *way* of relating to the content that matters here. But the idea remains puzzling and elusive. Unless we can get clearer as to what a perspective is and what it might mean to 'try one on', talk of perspectives can sound like a philosophical dodge. To this end, I am going to attempt an answer.

I will proceed in four key steps. I begin in (6.1) by clarifying the distinction between actual and non-actual perspectives as I will be using the terms. In (6.2), I then articulate and address a small puzzle that is generated when one is unclear about the perspectival structures involved in non-actual perspectives. I apply these lessons in (6.3) to the painting case before turning in (6.4) to draw out some principles about the way perspectives play their role in the phenomenon of expression. Finally, in (6.5), I consider and reply to some objections that might be raised against the constitutive persona theory.

[118] I am guided by a notion of disclosing value' that originates in Daniel Vanello (2018).

Figure 32 Mary Cassatt, Mother and Child, 1902

6.1 The actual and non-actual perspective

To begin with I will clarify the distinction between actual and non-actual perspectives as I will be using the terms.

6.1.1. Actual perspectives

An actual perspective is the one taken on the things we are seeing.[119] The mobile phone, the half-drunk coffee, the open notebook, these are all objects located in some position relative to my actual perspective as I write these words. I see the cup to the left, I see the phone placed just beyond reach to the right and I see the notebook splayed open next to the keyboard. If I stand up and walk over to the cupboard *over there* and now look at the

[119] I take it object seeing is a spatial rather than propositionally organised experience Peacocke (1992).

items, they will appear repositioned relative to my new perspective. My actual perspective is just the perspective I am actually occupying and from which I perceive the world. As Hopkins notes,

> In vision, the things we see are presented within a distinctive perspective… Although the distance in which something looks to lie can vary, it cannot shrink to nothing. Everything seen is presented as occupying some location spatially separated from that of the point of view
>
> (Hopkins, 2010:357)

What does it mean to say that objects are presented as 'spatially separated' from the perspective taken on it? The spatial point of view afforded by one's visual experience is perspectival in the following respect: it seems to involve the perception of X from Y, where X and Y are spatial locations, and where X is not identical to Y. We are not ordinarily self-conscious of this perspective on things presented to us in vision. I do not think to myself whenever I see an object, 'I am seeing x from my actual perspective'. But objects in the world are as a matter of fact presented to me as being in various locations relative to the location that I am actually occupying.[120]

6.1.2 Non-actual perspectives

Where does one's perspective go when one imagines content? One way to answer this is to think about what happens to my perspective when I recollect an incident or event from my past or when I anticipate the future.

When I was twelve, I was asked to play the piano in a local music festival. But on the day my nerves got the better of me and I fluffed the recital. The embarrassment was so acute that even now I can vividly recall the humiliation which promptly ended any further public performances. When memories of that day flood back, I sometimes recall the feeling of trepidation as I walked down the long aisle toward the grand piano, which looked huge and imposing. I recall feeling weak-kneed at the sight of the encouraging and expectant faces of unknown parents and grandparents, my own at the front looking immensely proud. And then I recall seeing them overshadowed by the enormous beast

[120] For a repudiation of the idea that visual perspectives are essentially perspectival see Lopes (2003b:214).

waiting for me on the plinth. I replay events from what was at the time my actual perspective. That is from what is sometimes called the field perspective (Nigro and Neisser, 1983).[121] But this of course is not the perspective I am occupying as I recollect.

No doubt in an attempt to reframe past events, I sometimes imagine watching myself from an observer's point of view in the concert hall. In my mind's eye I see a small girl, with a questionable crew cut, about to perform, clutching a musical score with a look of determination mixed with confusion. The whole memory can feel slightly less pathetic this way. Seen from some god's eye view of the room, I can watch with something bordering on benevolence rather than sheer terror, as this small kid steps forward. In this recollection, I seem to be watching from a perspective no-one occupied at any time and it is still not one I am occupying now, while recollecting (Grysman et al., 2013, Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2011).

In addition, and far too often when I should be attending to my work, I imagine how things will be from some non-actual perspective. I might be giving into daydreaming or modelling how things will go in the future. For example, I may envisage how the den will look from the garden once I have installed the new LED coloured lights. Or how delightful the delicately coloured spring flowers will look, bathed in sunshine sitting in a blue vase on the desk. In these cases, the scene that I imagine is imagined from some point of view. But I need not imagine these things being located relative to the actual spatial location I occupy.

[121] In an influential paper Nigro and Neisser (1983) coined the terms field' and observer' memories to stand for the two different points of view one can have on an autobiographical recollection. They say, "[i]n some memories, one has the perspective of an observer, seeing oneself "from the outside." In other memories, one sees the scene from one's own perspective; the field of view in such memories corresponds to that of the original situation."



Figure 33 Missy Dunaway, Sketchbook, Instagram

Non-actual perspectives can therefore vary along both spatial and temporal dimensions.[122] I may recall the embarrassing piano recital when about to drop off to sleep, or think about the new lighting for the den while sat at my desk, or imagine how lovely it will be to have the flowers as company on my desk while out on the High Street. Like actual perspectives, they are constituted partly by what they are on as well as where and when they point. Suppose the delicate flowers are sitting on my desk right now and I am looking at them. I can exchange my actual perspective on the flowers for a non-actual perspective on them by simply closing my eyes and imagining the flowers in the position that they actually are. So, theoretically my represented and actual perspectives can be coincident. However, this would be a highly unusual case. Ordinarily, when representing a perspective on x it is not one that that is actually occupied on x, when representing it.

[122] By varying along temporal dimensions, I mean that we can imagine things with the following kind of content: It is 1994 and I am looking at the flowers on my desk'

I want to take away from this discussion a distinction between,

(1) A perspective you are actually occupying (actual perspective)
(2) A perspective you are representing (a non-actual perspective)

6.2 The perspective you represent

So far, all that I have pointed out is that we have the ability to represent things in the world from perspectives we are not actually occupying. In other words, I have distinguished between an actual perspective and a non-actual or, as I will allude to it, a *represented* perspective.

Represented perspectives divide into further sub-categories. To motivate the first sub-category we can think about the following small puzzle. Suppose you close your eyes at your desk and vividly imagine a tree. You imagine the tree standing in the middle of a garden. To the left of the tree you imagine a red balloon and to the right a green balloon. The imagining generates a small puzzle. The puzzle is as follows; how can there be a perspective to the left and to the right of something if there is no-one who is part of the imagined scene looking at the tree (Martin, 2002)?

One unsatisfactory reply is that we must be imagining someone in the imagined scene looking at the tree and balloons. For instance, one might follow Berkeley who argued that an unperceived, yet conceived object is a logical impossibility (Berkeley, 1971). Following a Berkleien argument one could say (1) visual experiences necessarily represent scenes from a point of view and (2) any experience that implies a point of view also implies first-personal occupants of the point of view (see Lopes, 2003). In representing the tree we must therefore also represent an experiencer observing the tree. We could then attempt to extend this to the kind of imaginative enterprises we have been discussing. But, as Williams has pointed out, we want to accommodate the possibility that objects in the world can persist even when no-one is looking at them given the phenomenological evidence. Williams' argument undermines the Berkelien

claim by showing how that position is incoherent, since the cases tacitly assume an imagined perceiver (Williams, 1973:27)

The better answer here is to say that the imaginer represents the perspective on the imagined tree and balloons, and, unless there is an additional requirement, intention or instruction to imagine someone occupying the perspective, the viewpoint is merely constructed and left empty. The thought here is that the imaginer seeks to imagine in the most efficient way possible, and unless there is a reason to increase the burden of what must be imagined they merely imagine the perspective without having to also imagine that it is occupied. That is, the viewpoint on what is imagined persists but there is nothing occupying it. Of course, things may have been otherwise and rejecting Berkeley's master argument does not preclude us from imagining things otherwise. One could imagine someone seeing the tree and the balloons. But even so, this does not obviate how, in contrast to your actual perspective, which is necessarily occupied by you, represented perspectives need not be occupied by anyone. So, in addition to not actually being occupied by you, you may represent a perspective on a scene without representing a bearer of that perspective. Although I am not insisting that we must commit ourselves to the possibility of representing empty perspectives, for the sake of clarity any imagined perspective that does not seem to require a bearer of the perspective will be referred to as an empty perspective.

This provides a way to answer the small puzzle and to articulate a further distinction. Representing a perspective does not entail that you represent it as occupied even though our actual egocentric visual perspectives are always occupied (by our actual selves). Equally, one is not precluded from representing a perspective as filled or occupied. Furthermore, even if a represented perspective was represented as filled or occupied by someone, most people would agree that occupation is not going on in quite the same sense as it is in the case of actually seeing. It might be represented as occupied in the past, or the future. Whereas my actual perspective is necessarily occupied *here* and *now*.

This part of the discussion provides a further distinction between:

(2a) A represented perspective (qua empty)

(2b) A represented perspective and a represented occupant (qua occupied)

6.3 The perspective you represent on the painting

What does all of this have to do with paintings?

The canonical viewing position (in a gallery) is to locate oneself facing the picture, a few feet back from it. This is the viewer's *actual* perspective on the work and as we have been discussing, necessarily one that they occupy. I do not deny that this actual perspective obtains whenever the viewer adequately apprehends a painting. My claim is that in addition to occupying their *actual* perspective and looking at the painting, the viewer *represents* a perspective (that they are not actually occupying).

The viewer in the gallery looking at picture knows that the scene is being depicted from some perspective that is not their actual perspective.[123] For example, when a viewer apprehends Hopper's *Nighthawks* they see a street with a café on the right, a row of terraced buildings in front and a dankly lit street area straight ahead. Since the viewer is not actually standing in the street or in the 1950s, they must posit the represented perspective in order to see the picture aright.[124]

This means that when we look at a picture, we typically perform some kind of imaginative act. We represent the perspective from which object or events in the picture are seen as being located or taking place. In this sense, it is uncontroversial that all adequate engagement with paintings *is* mediated. It is mediated by the represented pictorial perspective (hereafter 'pictorial perspective').

[123] A discussion of this can be found in (Hopkins, 1998:195-6).

[124] An exception here involves paintings that fool the eye. That is, trompe l'oeil paintings which viewers mistake for being parts of the actual world. In these cases, viewers experience a perceptual illusion where there is no need to posit a represented perspective. The viewer just takes it that they are looking at actual objects located relative to their actual perspective.

For this reason, I take Walton to have overlooked the primitive need for a mediating perspective in *all* picture appreciation. For example, when he says,

> When we look at a picture it does not seem that there is a (fictional) personality mediating our access to the fictional world, nor that we are presented with someone's conception of it; we "see for ourselves" what goes on in the picture-world. But the situation is not as simple as this. We should remind ourselves *that paintings are sometimes said to present a certain vision or view of reality, or to depict things from a certain perspective or point of view*. One possibility is that in the case of some depictions the artist-or, more likely, what I call the "apparent artist"-serves some of the functions of a narrator.
>
> (my italics for emphasis Walton,1976:51)

The pictorial perspective is spatio-temporal. It can be a perspective on something in the pictorial world from above, side-on, or underneath. It can be a perspective in the future, past, or at no particular time. For example, in the picture *Bidigal Reserve* (Figure 34) the beach is seen from above at some indeterminate period from the 1970s. The pictorial point of view hovers above the scene like camera attached to a remote-controlled drone. Given that we do not need to hover in the air to see the beach in the picture from the aerial perspective, our actual and represented perspectives must somehow be co-ordinated so that we see the picture aright while maintaining our actual perspective on it. For this reason, it makes sense to say the viewer imaginatively occupies the pictorial perspective. So, typically, the pictorial perspective is one that is not coincident with the perspective the viewer actually occupies but which is necessary to accessing the content of the picture. In this way we can say that imaginative perspective-shifting is a typical characteristic of the viewer's required representations for adequate pictorial engagement.[125]

An objection that can be raised here is that there is an important difference that is being overlooked, between represented perspectives (when imagining and recollecting) and represented *pictorial* perspectives. The difference is that in imagination and recollection the objects, events, and their features are not now perceived whereas in pictorial seeing only the pictorial perspective is imagined. The picture exists. In *Bidigal Reserve* and

[125] Occupied and unoccupied perspectives are also referred to as forms of centrally imagining' acentral imagining', imagining from an external perspective' or sensory imagining from an unoccupied viewpoint'. The terms originated in Wollheim (1984) and are discussed in Goldie (2006).

Nighthawks, the depictive features of the picture are real sensuous properties of the work which prescribe the kind of perspective to be represented on it. For this reason, various and important features of the picture are determined by facts that lie beyond the imagination of the viewer. For this reason, we should not simply talk of visualisings and the phenomenon of expression in one breath. We should not assume that the account of represented perspectives smoothly transfers from the imagination case to the apprehension of pictures.



Figure 34 Stephanie Burns, Bidigal Reserve, 2010

In the next section I examine the implications of this difference.

6.4 Seeing, visualising and representing perspectives

Represented perspectives have long been discussed in regard to sensory imagining (Hopkins, 1998, Hopkins, 2010b, Martin, 1992, Martin, 2002, Martin, 2017, Noordhof, 2002, Nanay, 2015). What is sensory imagining? Sensory imagining is a general term for

a non-propositional class of experiential imaginings where "distinctive episodes of imagining or imaging" seem to "correspond to our use of the distinct senses: so we talk of visualising corresponding to seeing, or listening in one's head parallel to audition, and so on" (Martin, 2002:403). I might for instance, sensorily imagine swimming in the sea, imagine the tang of the salty water on my skin, the drag of the current against my limbs, the intermittent sound of squealing from the shore as I duck my head under the waves. Or, as I strive to outline a philosophical puzzle, I might flick through a rolodex of different paintings in my head. In this way "imagery can both accompany and also constitute trains of thought" (Martin, 2002:403).

Within this broad class of sensory imaginings, it is a matter of continuing debate how each particular sensory mode is presented to the subject and, pertinently to what we have been discussing, whether it is presented within a perspectival structure.[126] Hopkins points out the relevance of this to our understanding of pictures. He says,

> Experiences are not the only representations that exhibit this kind of perspective. I have argued that visual imaginings also do, and that this is what distinguishes them from imaginings in other sensory modes. Pictures, I have suggested, are another example. In a picture everything depicted is depicted as spatially related to a point that, while not itself visible in the picture, is an implicit part of how the picture represents things as being.
>
> (Hopkins, 2010:358)

Theorists are generally in agreement that visual imagining (visualising) is presented within perspectival structures (Hopkins, 1998, Giardino and Greenberg, 2015). But controversy alights on how best to spell this out (Lopes, 2003b). In the following section I will argue that we can draw out some principles from this controversy to illuminate the way perspectives play their role in the phenomenon of expression. My approach is two-pronged. First, I show that an argument from Martin about the separability of perspective and content can be used to further our understanding of the mediating pictorial perspectives. Second, I show that by getting straight on a particular way in which evaluative (emotional) perspectives differ from visual perspectives we can divine

[126] For a discussion in regard to differences between sensory perspectives see Martin (1992) and also Chapter Seven in Hopkins (1998). For a discussion of cross-modal sensory imagining see Lopes (2003b).

a principled way to predict when represented perspectives will be represented as empty or occupied.

6.4.1 Visualising

Visualising is distinguished from other sorts of imagining. That is, to supposing, or falsely supposing, and imagining-that because when we visualise, we imagine what is seen *from the inside* or *the within perspective*. Hopkins argues that visualising is "tied to seeing by sharing its contents, and in particular the structure within which it represents space" (Hopkins, 1998:184). Hence, when I travel back in my mind to the fateful day of the recital, or when I anticipate enjoying the flowers on my desk, I am imagining "the 'sightline' frame of reference" (Hopkins, 1998:186). This is familiar from actual seeing and accounts for how I am imagining these scenes *from the inside*, egocentrically or self-reflexively. On the other hand, there is a crucial difference between actual and represented sightline frames of reference. Only in actual seeing is the egocentric or self-reflexive structure *immediately and unselfconsciously* tied to proprioceptive action. Represented perspectives give the appearance of egocentricity, but they "never guide action in this way" (Hopkins, 1998:186).[127]

But this is just to say that once again, my imaginative endeavour must involve a represented perspective on the imagined content. When visualising a tree, the subject *represents* the perspective that mediates their awareness of the tree. In the visualising case, as in the recollecting case, it seems to me that the represented perspective is part of what is imagined and so is part of the imagined world. According to Martin, we should think of the perspectives we are representing when visualising X as a distinct component of the visualising. That is, we should think of visualising as comprising both perspective and content as two component parts of a single (whole) enterprise. In a well-known passage he says:

[127] I examine the implications of this difference in section 6.5.2. I am ignoring due to space limitations the wrinkle presented by cases where robotic arms and so on are used in surgery or examples that arise from say drone piloting. However, I am confident that these can be explained without compromising my core claim.

> There must be a point of view within a visualised scene, at least where the visualising involves perspectival elements and those determine aspects of what is visualised.
>
> (Martin, 2002:407)

For there to be imagined *scenes*, that content must appear within a perspectival structure. This places imagined perspectives *in* the scene imagined and so constitutes part of what is imagined. Further, the content is partly determined by the perspectival structure. If I imagine a perspective on the flowers *to the left*, then the content of what I imagine will only include the facing parts of the object that would appear were the flowers seen *to the left*.

But a worry that is raised here is that if perspective is part of the imagined scene then what is imagined contains an experience (an experience of seeing). Visualising will according to this interpretation of Martin's thesis just be imagined seeing and this will overpopulate the ontology of visualising. It will populate the imagined world not just with the objects that are imagined but also a visual perception of them. Historically this objection is associated with Bernard Williams, who compares visualising to watching a film or a theatrical production, where the audience exploits a point of view on the narrative without inserting this point of view into the narrative itself. In other words, as long as I do not have first person thoughts about my role in representing a perspective on the content, I can perfectly well imagine the content without imagining anyone is experiencing that content (Williams, 1973:37). Williams suggests, we should think of the point of view associated with visualising analogously: as one which can be, but need not be, within the imagined scene. And if it is not in the imagined scene then there is no reason to think that that scene has to contain an experience.[128]

A reply to this, that defends Martin and is compatible with Hopkins (1998), makes use of the distinction made earlier between representing perspectives as empty or occupied. It confronts a concern about whether or not we must imagine experiencers *filling* or occupying the 'other end' of the perspective taken on visualised content. Martin's proposal is often characterised as entailing this commitment (Noordhof, 2002,

[128] An objection aimed specifically against Martin's thesis is found in Noordhof (2002).

Nanay, 2015). That is, as entailing that the represented perspective must be represented as filled whenever it is part of the imagined scene. In other words, when visualising the flowers, I must be visualising someone sitting at my desk, or visualise someone reflected in the window, looking at the flowers. This is problematic because the phenomenology does not support such a claim. I can imagine the flowers to the left without appearing in the imagined content. But this characterisation of Martin's proposal is inaccurate. There is no such entailment, and this is evident in the way the visualising is described. If it were the case that the experiencer appeared in the imagined scene, this would be "indicated" by talk "of imagining someone seeing the [flowers]" (Martin, 2002:411). Martin's argument appeals to the case of imagining the red and green lights. He says,

> One can visualise a red light to the left and a green light to the right. If you now visualise the reverse—a green light to the left and a red one to the right—how you are visualising is different from the first case. Furthermore, this doesn't just reflect a difference in the episode of visualising, rather the two differ because what is visualised is different in the two cases. In the one case the red light is on the left, the green on the right; in the other the green is on the left, the red on the right.
>
> (Martin, 2002:408)

His conclusion about the cases is that there is a difference in what is imagined (red to left vs. green to the left) and that difference can only be explained if the point of view is within the imagined world. If the perspective on the lights were deleted from the imagined scene, "then what appears in visualising to be a difference in the scene imagined, and not just a difference in one's state of mind cannot be so" (Martin, 2002:409). In this way Williams' worry that represented perspectives are not part of the overall content of a scene can be assuaged.

As I have been arguing when one represents a perspective in the imagined scene, the imaginer can merely imagine a perspective and then stop. They do not have to go on and imagine an occupant of that perspective. I have also argued that represented (imagined) perspectives are part of the imagined scene and that this is compatible with the possibility that we can merely represent perspectives. It is however open to us to go further to fill them out and thus to imagine someone occupying the perspective and seeing the scene.

6.4.2 What makes a painting sad

So far I have argued that when visualising both the imagined perspective and content are part of the imagined scene. However, paintings are dis-analogous to visualisations in the following way. When looking at a painting "we really see *something*" whereas in visualising nothing is actually seen (Williams, 1973:37). However, Williams thinks that just as "there can be no reason at all for insisting that [the imagined] point of view is within the world of what is visualised" the audience's viewpoint on artistic productions is not part of the pretend world we imaginatively encounter (Williams,1973:37). He says,

> But the fact that in visualisation I am as it were seeing is not itself necessarily an element of what is visualised
>
> (Williams, 1973:35)

In this section, I will defend the claim that when we look at a picture, we imaginatively shift into a perspective that is part of the picture. That is, we represent (qua imagine) the perspective on an object that is presented to us in vision.

In Chapter One, I argued that we can see emotions in faces because we can instantiate a partial perspective on a part of a whole emotion. In this Chapter I have been arguing that when we visualise, we imaginatively duplicate the perspectival structures of seeing. We imagine a partial perspective on an imagined part of an imagined whole object which is why I see the sunbathers on *Bidigal Beach*. I see the body parts as parts of whole bodies. When enacting the kind of seeing appropriate to pictures, we imaginatively represent a perspective on the depicted part of a depicted whole object. This can contribute to our understanding of figure expression. The imagined perspective on Rembrandt's *Self Portrait* is, when the picture prescribes it, an imagined partial perspective on a whole person. I do not experience the portrait as depicting someone who has an incomplete torso and no legs. In this way, I experience the picture as depicting someone with a human mind which is feeling human emotions and it is by mediating my awareness of the portrait through the represented perspective that I come to see the emotions in the depicted face. In this way, represented perspectives can reveal visible and invisible parts of the depicted object.

Two worries can be raised against what I am arguing. The first worry concerns why we should think represented perspectives are part of the picture and not something imposed by viewers. The second worry concerns when we must represent the perspective as occupied. I am claiming that whenever there is an expressive painting this indicates that the viewer is representing an occupied perspective. But I have as yet offered no reason for this claim.

In answer to the first question, why should we think that the perspective mediating our access to pictures is part of the picture and not determined by the viewer? Here is a simple reason. Suppose you are attempting to follow an Ikea instruction on how to build a bedside table. The instructions are mainly produced using simplified geometrical drawings of each component part, usually with some kind of arrow showing how these fit together and it what order. It would be odd to think that seeing the depicted objects was neutral in regard to which angle of projection or perspective the user wanted to adopt and apply. Rather, the depiction is manifested according to certain conventions (usually isometric perspective) and this is prescribed to the user as part and parcel of the depictive meaning.

Figure 35 Edward Hopper, Nighthawks, 1942

This principle extends to paintings. The café in *Nighthawks* (Figure 35) appears to be 'to the right' and the beach in *Bidigal Reserve* appears to be 'far below' and these spatial determinations are contained in the picture. Depicted objects are rendered with parts of their surfaces presented to view and other parts hidden from view, or unseen and this carries with it an instruction to the viewer to represent the perspective from a specific viewpoint. The horses in the Lascaux caves are presented from the side, the portraits of the deceased Fayem are presented from the front and the fruit on Cezanne's kitchen table is presented from above. So, the facing part of the object depicted plus its relation to other depicted objects within shared pictorial space determines the point of view that must be represented in order to see it. This is true even when the picture seems to convey explicitly that what is being shown is something that must be 'seen as unseen'. For example, Michelangelo's scene of God and Adam touching fingers on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. Since these events are supposed to take place before anyone would have been around to see those events unfold, we must imagine the scene from an unoccupied vantage point. Nonetheless, the pictorial perspective on the depicted objects is determined and prescribed by the picture.[129] Furthermore, as Hopkins has pointed out, admitting that picture seeing and object seeing share a perspectival structure in no way commits a theorist to thinking that the two "are phenomenologically alike" nor that "our epistemological relations to the things" represented must be the same (Hopkins, 1998:184).

I now turn to answer to the second worry: what principled reason is there for thinking we *must* imagine the painting from an occupied pictorial perspective in order to adequately apprehend expressive paintings? What I mean by adequate grasp is getting the expressiveness to come into view. This why I described my view as constitutive. Whereas Robinson, as we have seen, thinks the adequate grasp picks out some normative higher achievement, to do with understanding with care. So far, it has been argued that seeing the painting aright requires the viewer to represent a mediating pictorial perspective. When representing a perspective on depictive content it is open to the viewer to represent the perspective as either empty or occupied. Often there will be cues in the picture as to whether the viewer can or should represent the perspective as

[129] See Chapter Six in Walton (1990). There is the possibilty that this scene can be seen' through Adam's eyes, but there is no insistent reason to see the scene this way.

occupied. For example, the painting may depict someone looking back out of the picture as if acknowledging the presence of an occupant standing at the origin of the viewpoint (e.g., figure 36).

Figure 36 Gustave Courbet, The Desperate Man,1843-1845

Or, the picture may depict a scene voyeuristically (e.g., figure 37).

Figure 37 Johannes Vermeer, Woman in Blue Reading a Letter, c.1663

Whether or not it is appropriate to represent the perspective as occupied when apprehending depictive meaning will vary according to each picture. But when it comes to representing an emotional perspective, the viewer must represent the perspective as occupied. The viewer can experience the expressive properties only if they represent the perspective as occupied by an emoting persona. This is someone imagined to be experiencing the scene and can be identical with someone in the scene as it is with figure expressions. In a sense to be explored, emotional perspectives point in two directions: forward to the sensuous properties of the painting and backwards to an emoting occupant. Why are emotional perspectives self-referring in this way? Because the emotion is made salient by mediating what is seen in the picture through the mind of something that is emoting. The perspectival framing does more than provide a viewpoint on the scene. It is *self*-reflexive. It points back at the mind that is emotionally framing it, and in this way, it satisfies the person-possessive feature of the emotion concept and the requirements for being a persona theory.

There are of course further questions about what the persona theory means in terms of what the viewer represents as occupying the point of view. For instance, does this persona theory endorse particularity (a requirement to imagine a particular persona) or specificity (the requirement to imagine some specific set of traits ascribable to a persona type)? If this is not made clear, confusion can arise as to whether the viewer represents a particular person (e.g. Hopper or Munch) or whether they represent a specific set of traits without ascribing them to any particular person. To be clear, my thesis endorses specificity. Specificity can cover a range of cases as the two following examples will show. In the first example, one apprehends the melancholy in Nighthawks by representing a melancholy person kind, but not any particular person. In the second example, one apprehends Self Portrait with Two Circles by representing an unhappy contemplative genius struggling to come to terms with his own ruin.

There is a longstanding issue, which is familiar from debates over demonstratives for example, as to whether sufficient specificity will individuate a particular. I want to remain neutral in regard to that debate here. This neutrality is compatible with the observation that viewers often do take a list of specific traits to suffice for reference to an individual. A virtue of the specificity persona theory is that it admits wide variance in

the number of traits an expressive painting may instantiate. This variance can explain the potential for greater degrees of sophistication and individuation in regard to the represented persona. For example, the Rothko painting may only warrant representing a genderless sad outlook, while the Rembrandt self-portrait involves a long enough list of prescriptions that one is warranted in representing Rembrandt. So, specificity is well placed to handle the full range of cases.[130]

From now on I will simply use 'particularity' and 'specificity' as shorthand to distinguish between a persona theory that is committed to implied or hypothetical particulars and one that holds a persona is represented from a list of descriptions or ascriptions. As discussed in Chapter Five, Robinson can be interpreted as holding a particularity thesis. A worry about particularity is that this excludes many cases where we do not have any sense of a particular persona expressing, yet still have the valenced encounter that I show involves representing a type of expresser undergoing the emotion. Thus specificity is a further reason to find my theory appealing in comparison to Robinson's theory.

However, one might worry that a specificity persona theory ends up overlapping with Peacocke's view. In Chapter Four, I criticised Peacocke for saying that a viewer does not have to think of "a particular unhappy person. The content of the metaphor can just concern a property, or a system of relations, or both, rather than these as instantiated in a particular individual" (Peacocke, 2009:273). This criticism of Peacocke was not intended to be a rejection of a specificity thesis per se. My criticisms in that section were intended to show that Peacocke's account is not sufficient overall for a persona theory nor adequate to explain the phenomenon of expression. This means that even if Peacocke were to correct his view along the lines I advocated, my position would still be that his model (metaphorical perception) remains less convincing than mine.

These perspectives, while the types of things tokened by individuals, can be shared. It is because we can share them that we can grasp what the perspective is like. And to grasp

[130] It is interesting to note that in paradigmatic expression we would, by contrast, talk of particularity. For instance, Sophie apprehends *Emma's* joy or *this child's* sadness.

what it is like we have to have the emoting occupier of the perspective. If they were not shareable at all then the notion of an expressive quality would not get off the ground and this links shareability of perspective and occupied perspective two very different claims in a surprising way. For this reason, the theorisation of *what it is like* to experience the phenomenal point of view is a discussion about a specific type and not a discussion about tokening a particular's view. This means that a single point of view (a type of experience) can have multiple occupants, which means that the emotional pictorial perspective can be represented by multiple viewers. And this is precisely an abstract way of saying that the viewer self-consciously represents the scene from the point of view of an emoting occupant. This is compatible with the idea that expressiveness can be expressive of non-particular (or general) kinds of emotional perspectives. When a picture is expressive of sadness, it may be expressive of sadness in an almost infinitely specific way.

Thus, for expressive pictures there is a principled reason to represent the perspective on the picture as occupied. Call this view 'E8'. In the next section I offer a further argument for the constitutive persona theory by showing how it solves both the epistemological problem (how viewers know the picture is sad) and the value problem (why the phenomenon of expression is meaningful).

6.4.3 The epistemic role of mediating perspectives

According to the constitutive persona theory, viewers know what a picture expresses because the activity of constructing and populating the picture persona specifies what it expresses. Represented emotional perspectives enable viewers to gain mediated access to expressive pictorial content just as represented visual perspectives do for depictive content. But emotional perspectives are dis-analogous to visual perspectives in respect of the epistemic role they play in revealing content.

How might we specify the difference between emotional and visual perspective? Speaking imprecisely, one might say that the difference is found in what it is like to instantiate the perspective. But this does not really take us very far forward. In a widely cited paper, Thomas Nagel argued that the phenomenal character of *all* conscious

experience is accounted for by a perspective (Nagel, 1974). He says that "every subjective phenomenon is essentially connected with a single point of view" (Nagel, 1974:437). In Nagel's influential terminology, there is *something it is like* to perceive which leads us to ask *what it is like* to perceive. So, simply saying 'there is *something it is like* to see X' is not enough to get the distinction between the visual and the emotional properly in view because there is *something it is like* to all experience. There is something it is like to see the red building façade in *Nighthawks* just as there is something it is like to emote.

However, there is a difference in what it is like to represent a perspective on a cube, a red building, and a sad street. The difference is found in the kinds of properties these objects instantiate. A cube instantiates a 'mind-independent property' for example, spatial extension. Whether or not an object is cuboid is not determined by how it looks to an observer. The conditions on something being cuboid are not anthropocentric. In contrast, the red building instantiates a 'response-dependent property'; that is, the story about the redness of the building is going to have to mention the world and human perceptual systems. This, however, does not entail that whether or not the building is in fact red is determined by one's perceptual experience. The conditions on an object *being* red, do not depend on how the object appears to Smith or Jones. Mental states (such as sadness), however, are essentially mind-*dependent*. That is, they simply are properties of mind. While there is something it is like to represent a perspective on 'external' mind-independent and response-dependent, and 'internal' mind-dependent properties, *what* it is like varies.

As I argued in Chapter One, all perspectives are partial and all seeing is essentially perspectival. There, 'perspectival' stood for the egocentric spatio-temporal vantage point or outlook from which objects are seen. But I also said that since perspectives are contentless in themselves, they are partly characterised by what they are on. I suggested that we can think of them as structuring tools that can be phenomenally adjusted by changing *how much* of an object they 'grab'. I am now developing this initial claim by saying that *how much* of the perspective points to external objects and how much of it points to internal objects (to the mind or self) determines whether the represented perspective is empty or occupied.

When Sophie *sees* the red building (i.e., when object seeing), she occupies the perspective on the red building. But the existence of the red building does not depend on Sophie (or anyone else) perceiving it. Another way of putting this, is that the existence of the red building would persist regardless of whether Sophie or anyone else happened to be looking at it. As a result, it seems fair to say that when Sophie represents a perspective on a depicted red building in a painting, she is not required to, in addition, represent what she sees as contained in a represented mind. In other words, the self-reflexivity of seeing is not entailed in our seeing of depicted objects or persona dependent. At least, there would need to be an argument to show that it was required. Conversely, representing emotional perspectives does re-introduce the self-reflexivity of object seeing. This is because in representing a sad outlook, one represents an essentially persona-*dependent* property, namely sadness. Thus, seeing X from a sad perspective depends on the perspective being occupied by a sad expresser, who contains the sad scene in their mind. Hence, in order to represent a sad perspective on a street the represented perspective must be occupied by something emoting or expressing sadness.

Although emotional perspectives are special in this regard they are not exclusively so. Emotions share this feature with all affects (such as pains, itches, or the state of hunger). The particular component of affect that can be appealed to here is the felt awareness of emotions, pains, or itches. These feelings mark out what it is like to instantiate sadness, pains, and itches from what it is like to see coloured objects, like red buildings. A sceptic could disagree by saying that aches and pains can be envisioned in terms of facial contortions or movements of body parts. But this is only going to tell you what these conditions look like, *impersonally* as I have argued in chapters Three and Four. Impersonal perspectives just are empty perspectives and empty perspectives will fail to trigger the correctly valenced phenomenology because they preclude a subject from grasping the ache, pain, or itch from the inside, or *self*-reflexively. For example, we can recognise that a child is itchy with chicken pox by the child repeatedly scratching at themselves. But this is not yet to sensorily imagine the perspective from which the child is experiencing itchiness. To do so involves imagining the *mind-dependent* qualities of itchiness. Martin suggests that,

> we should think of imagining an itch as experiential and like a sensation of an itch and hence the same, and yet deny…that [it is] the same, since in having a sensation of an itch there is an actual itch of which one is aware, while in imagining an itch there is no itch.
>
> (Martin, 2002:406)

If we follow Martin in thinking that imagining affect is like undergoing affect, with the additional thought that it is not an actual itchiness, what makes it like an itch? Surely it is like an itch in that it must involve the feeling of itchiness (albeit less vividly than an actual itch). On Martin's account there is no instantiation of itchiness, just the mere representation of itchiness. Likewise, with the associated motivational states. That is why the difference between feeling an itch and imagining one from the inside is a difference in kind, and not in degree, on his account. In consequence, "less vivid" does no explanatory work when it comes to the difference between feeling and imagining an itch.[131] We might also think that it must involve the motivational states that track bodily itches the urge to scratch the place that it is itching.[132] This implicates the self in the imaginative episode is a way that is not required when imagining a sharp right angle, or the way dappled light on the red building can give the appearance of orange and yellow patches.

But why think that imagining an *emotional* perspective falls on the side of imagining pains rather than colours? As I have argued, emotions are complex. They involve both feelings and intentionality and because they involve feelings, they are affective states. Further, since they are affective states, they are experiential kinds. When the viewer represents an emotional perspective, they represent the pictorial contents as contained in the mind of something. That is, in the mind of the persona. Representing the persona discloses to them what the emotion being expressed is like, because they must represent a token of the type of emotion expressed. This means that emotional perspectives play their role differently to visual perspectives. To borrow a phrase from David Wiggins, constituting the represented persona perspective, "is not that *by which we tell*. It is part of the telling itself"(Wiggins, 1987:207-208).

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[131] Martin holds this was Hume's mistake (Martin, 2002:397 footnote 27).

[132] See Chapter One.

6.4.4 The intrinsic value of mediating perspectives

I have been arguing that impersonalist as well as rival persona-theories fail to identify the significant link between the imagined emotional outlook and the valence of painterly expression. In this section, I will argue that it is by representing an occupied emotional perspective on the picture that the expressive valence is disclosed (Vanello, 2018, Goldie, 2009, Montague, 2014).[133] The matter will be couched in terms introduced in Chapter Five. That is, in terms of misty-eyed viewers.

In the previous section I said that emotional perspectives were essentially subjective or *self*-reflexive. If this claim were accepted it could prompt the following sceptical complaint in regard to how the phenomenon is valenced. The complaint is that the new persona theory, like Robinson's normative theory, fails to show that the expressive quality (the feeling) is a property of *the picture*, and not of the viewer who is imagining the persona. The feeling of the emotional perspective is then reducible to *viewer feeling*. It is viewer feeling that causes the emotional valence which is attributed to the picture. The emotional perspective, once deconstructed in this way, seems to accrue value by stirring up the bodily feelings of the viewer. The problem this can create for the new persona-view is as follows. If imagined emotional perspectives involve a viewer's imagined feelings, and if these are caused by and distinct from the visible pictorial content, then the new persona theory appears to collapse into an arousal theory of pictorial value. As a result, the new constitutive persona theory does not advance us beyond the account of expressive value found in Robinson's normative persona theory.

The complaint assumes that emotional *feeling* is exhausted by bodily feeling. The assumption is relatively uncontroversial, adopted by cognitive and non-cognitive emotional theorists alike.[134] A theorist who makes this assumption can say that *misty* personae perspectives refers to the viewer's bodily feelings. In this way, the valenced quality turns out to be a property contained within the imagining viewer (cf. Goldie, 2009). Robinson accepts this result for her normative persona theory. She uses it to

[133] The notion can be drawn from Goldie (2009).

[134] For a discussion how this claim unites so-called non-cognitivist, Jamesian and perception theorists see (Goldie, 2009:223).

explain the difference between an inadequate dry-eyed and adequate misty-eyed appreciation of the work. She holds that a dry and a misty viewer can both be attending to *The Raft* and thinking, 'the shipwrecked crew are dying', and that only the misty viewer who in addition tokens the horrified perspective, understands it adequately (with care). In this way, the difference between being dry and misty is a matter of 'tacking feeling onto' understanding, rather than apprehending the picture with some distinctly valenced phenomenology.[135] And as long as emotional feeling is exhausted by bodily feeling, the persona theorist's moves here seem to be fairly limited. To understand the painting property 'with feeling' is to understand it with feelings 'added-on'. But, as I have just argued, the sceptic can use this to complain that the appearance of the painting is merely a cause of, and not constitutive of, some added-on viewer feelings.

However, the new persona theory does not have to assume emotional feeling is exhausted by bodily feeling. Following Goldie (2009), they can say that bodily feelings are not the only emotional feelings that there are. Some emotional feelings are intentional feelings. What Goldie means by this, is that a higher emotion, such as shame, schadenfreude, guilt and so on, has a feeling fingerprint that is in part made up of what it is directed at. This means that the feeling part of the emotional perspective is not a mere effect of that which is perceived, as we might think a hangover is an effect of drinking too much wine. As Goldie observes, some emotional feelings, like feelings of guilt towards a failing in one's duty are "*about* one's violation of duty" whereas the hangover is not "*about* one's drinking too much" (Goldie, 2009:235). In this way, some *feelings towards* the world are "integral to, (sic) the way we take in the world in emotional experience" (Goldie, 2009:236). Similarly, one might think that the feeling of the imagined emotional perspective can also be integral to what it is aimed at in the picture world.[136]

[135] This is adapted from Robinson's original discussion involving the pinching of a pencil, see (Robinson,2005:96)

[136] The sceptic may attempt to modify the complaint by saying that the emotion is entirely in the viewer but not specifically in their body. In this way, the sceptic identifies the key reduction as being to the viewer's mental states. They will then say, the emotion is not in the picture, it s just a property of the viewer . However, my argument still has the resources to block this with the move I go on to make about the phenomenology.

What this suggests is we do not need to deconstruct imagined emotional perspectives in the way the sceptic suggests. That is, into a perspective on something in the picture on the one hand with bodily feelings added-on by the viewer on the other. Instead we can think of representing melancholy or joyful outlooks as unified and holistic ways of taking in the picture world, where what they are on and about is revealed *in the way the world appears* to the persona. This comports well with the observation that the world can appear altered to a subject as their emotional condition alters. For example, when we desire or long for something, say a chocolate éclair, the éclair *appears* tasty or delicious to us. But, once this desire has been satisfied, the pastry no longer *appears* delicious (although we might say, 'I suppose it would look delicious to someone with an appetite').[137] In a similar way, Susan Siegal has noted how, "[i]t is sometimes said that in depression, everything looks grey" (Siegel, 2012:1). If we take emotional perspectives to be valenced by emotional feeling like this, we might think that the represented depressive's feeling towards the landscape revealed by that world's desaturated appearance. In this way, the valence of emotional perspectives "are bound up with cognition and perception and are not the mere effects of cognition or perception" (Goldie, 2009:232).

This accords with what we have said so far about the interdependency between a perspective and what a perspective is on, and how we understand value more generally. This is why I have been arguing that the phenomenon of expression isn't merely about getting the extension of the emotion concept right. It's about exercising the concept in the right way in experience. It is impossible to specify the emotional perspective independently of what it is a perspective on. This is why what the picture expresses and why it has value is not merely a matter of idiosyncratically representing personae to occupy represented perspectives. The exercise requires the viewer to pay attention to the actual features and cues of the painting and to 'try on' a prescribed perspective. For you are not going to be able to say what the expressive value is unless you acquaint yourself with the perspective, since the perspective changes the way the picture seems to you. This aligns the phenomenon of expression with the phenomenology of the way

[137] The example originates in Goldie (2009).

our emotional perspective 'turns and clings' to the appearance of the world.[138] Representing the emotional perspective makes salient the expressive qualities of the painting because this kind of felt evaluation is an essential characteristic of it. It embraces the fact that emotional perspectives *just are* evaluative person-possessive concepts. Hence, I am arguing that specifying the emotional perspective independently of what it is on (the picture or the world) is not going to be possible. However, this is not to deny there may be certain prerequisites. For instance, that you can become aware of something in the world by finding the world salient to you in some profoundly valenced ways. My point is that unless you acquaint yourself with the perspective, you are not going to be able to say what that way is, because the perspective changes the way the world is for you. This is how we can truly represent the same situation in different emotional ways, which speaks to Wittgenstein's observation that the world of the happy man is different from the world of the unhappy man (Wittgenstein, 1961: §6.43). In imagining emotional perspectives on the picture (and as the picture cues us to do), we therefore tap into a deep well of intrinsic value. Since the expressive meaning is bound up with the activity of representing the perspective as occupied, the value is found in the pleasure derived from the activity of imagining the attitudes, emotions, and feelings on the subject. In this way, the constitutive persona theory of expression is intrinsically valuable.

[138] Wollheim used the evocative phrase cling and turn' to describe the way envy can pervert the appearance of the world WOLLHEIM, R. 1999. *On the emotions,* New Haven, London, Yale University Press.



Figure 38 Claude Monet, Haystacks, 1890-1

6.5 Objections

6.5.1 No *principle* for occupation

The first objection that may be raised against the constitutive persona theory concerns the putative distinction between merely represented perspectives and representing an occupant of the perspective: that I have not provided the necessary and sufficient conditions for representing occupants. I cannot rule out the possibility that mere spatial perspectives require at least a conscious occupant construed minimally (in terms of animal or even machine 'minds'). Hence, there is no principled reason to distinguish or privilege emotional perspectives in respect of occupants.

There are two ways to take this objection. Either that all represented perspectives on pictures are occupied, or that occupation is always optional. I am not attempting to disprove the claim that all represented perspective must be occupied, although it seems

to me pre-theoretically unlikely. What I am trying to do is show why emotional perspectives mandate personas in a way that visual perspectives do not. For instance, paintings like figure 39, in which the yellow seems to pop out in front of the dark blue and the reds and which is visually delightful but which I do not find expressive.



Figure 39 Andy Burgess, Abstract Pattern, Instagram Post

But the sceptics may have in mind as their example Manet's painting *A Bar at the Folies-Bergère* (Figure 40). Even children with basic pictorial seeing skills will be able to make out the scene. But those who have been briefed on the history of the picture may in addition make out the hazy figure reflected in the mirror as Gaston La Touche and notice that several revellers are his friends.

Figure 40 Edouard Manet, A Bar at the Folies-Bergère,1882

The viewer may then choose to represent the mediating perspective as occupied by Gaston La Touche. If they do then this will enable the viewer to identify that it makes sense to recognise Méry Laruent, behind her the popular actress Jeanne Demarcey, and the woman with binoculars as Mallarmé's mistress. If the viewer does not imagine the scene through the eyes of Gaston, how these individuals would be retrievable as 'his friends' would be mysterious.[139] This shows that it is not only evaluative perspectives that must be represented as occupied and since it is optional for the viewer to represent this perspective as occupied by Gaston, doubt is cast on the claim that occupation is ever mandatory.

[139] Thank you to Anthony Savile for calling attention to this example. There is the possibility that Manet could have identified the figures in a diary, but this does not disprove that adequate engagement involves seeing the scene through the eyes of Gaston.

A reply to this involves thinking about the different ways of satisfying whatever condition is required for representing a perspective as occupied. Representing a perspective and representing an occupant of that perspective are two distinct activities. I have suggested that the first does not entail the second.[140] Furthermore, there may be more than one way in which represented occupants get into the represented perspective. One way that they can get into the perspective is by an intention or willing, as it is with Gaston occupying the perspective on the *The Folie*. Whichever *Gaston* one constructs to occupy the perspective, will effect what further content one can see in the picture. In this case it leads to beliefs about the people depicted in the picture being 'friends of mine', where 'mine' stands for *Gaston,* and this extends and deepens *depictive* content. In this case the viewer is cued to fill out the perspective with an occupant who they imagine has beliefs about the depicted objects and so they can see those depicted figures as specific individuals. We might say increasing the biographical facts salient in the picture is intention-dependent and requires hypothetical particulars. In order to gain access to the recognitional powers that track with a perspective like *that* we need to explicitly will or intend to represent the occupant.

There is however another way that occupants get into the perspective. This way comes about when the perspective involves a mind-dependent object. Mind-dependent objects are those that only exist when being perceived (or experienced). The revellers are not mind-dependent in the sense that they would continue to exist even if Gaston was not perceiving them. Suppose a painting shows figures screaming or running about. Unless I posit another mind (or one of the depicted people), as an occupying persona, in addition to the depicted people, this image can be an image of terror but not a terrifying image. The ambience or emotional 'air' of a scene cannot get into the picture unless there is a mind experiencing it that way. When representing an indignant perspective on the shipwreck, or a melancholy perspective on the café, we are taking it that the situation is being experienced with indignation. This is why gaining mediated access to mind-dependent objects or features of the scene involves substantively different ways of occupying a represented perspective. This is the case, whatever holds for intending or

[140] If the content of spatial perceptions were affordances (that is, seen as possibilities for action) that would entail that spatial perspectives were occupied. However, I am saying that spatial perceptions do not entail affordances.

willing an occupant into the perspective. Mind-dependent objects depend on occupants to exist. Hence, the manifestation of the represented perspective entails also representing it as occupied. It is not clear that this is the case for mind-independent objects like rafts, cafés, seascapes and trees or even figures (bodies).

But that is all 'occupied perspective' provides. Who occupies it may remain completely indeterminate. Or it may be made more determinate by considerations relating to the work or cues in the work. The sceptic could say that the idea of the indeterminate mediating emotional persona is too diaphanous or nebulous to merit much interest. Merely pointing out that experiential imaginings are imaginings of *someone's* experience is vague or relies on some unsatisfying 'black box' machinery that fails to spell out the respect in which representations include or involve a persona. The discovery that imagined emotional perspectives are occupied by indeterminate particulars is both insubstantial and unproductive.

Here is a quick reply. Suppose you ask me if that empty chair is occupied. It is in order for me to simply answer, 'yes, that the chair is occupied', it does not require that I identify the individual that occupies it. I merely identify that it is occupied by the specific kind of thing that can occupy it. In this way, understanding emotional perspectives to be occupied by a sort of emoting persona does not entail that one must also identify who the emoting persona is.

One might worry that I am suggesting that some particular person is sitting there but I do not know about any of their traits. On this interpretation we have particularity but not specificity. However, what I meant is that by identifying that the chair is occupied, I mention a specific kind of thing, the kind of thing that can occupy a chair. In a typical conversational context we would expect this to be a person, or something with the capacity to 'sit in a chair' and this does not require me to identify any person in particular. As I argued earlier in the chapter, I do not insist that in representing the occupant of the perspective the viewer must minimally represent 'Vanessa Sher in 1992' or 'Edward Hopper age 45'. Instead, my theory starts with an ontological discovery. It says that in order to represent the encounter with the valenced expressive contents of the picture adequately, the viewer must represent an imagined perspective,

and in addition represent or populate this perspective with the kind of thing that has the capacity to token the ascribed emotional qualities.

A sceptic can reply that even if the analysis of expression of emotion in painting persuades you that a persona is required ontologically, there is no reason to insist a minimally specified persona is phenomenologically present. That is, in cases where a viewer represents a sad outlook, the phenomenon is fully described by saying that the viewer feels sadness. Thus, the persona vanishes from the phenomenology and my theory collapses into an evocation account. However, my argument is that for the valenced encounter to occur the viewer must attribute at least one emotional trait to the perspective, and since I have shown that even one such attribution requires representing an occupant or expresser, the worry that the persona can disappear from the phenomenology is deflected. To be clear, the suggestion is not that you need to phenomenologically think about a persona, but that the content of your mental state is a specific emotional way of seeing, which is to say, 'this kind of thing's way of feeling toward the world'. Hence, a viewer who lacked the concept of 'someone's emotional outlook' would not be able to adequately apprehend the painting as sad. Even though it may seem attractive to thin out the persona and so avoid the controversial metaphysical commitment, I am arguing that this would make the weightiness of the valenced experience mysterious. My theory demystifies the weightiness by showing how occupied perspectives get into and inflect the mental state.

6.5.2 No *persona*

A second more serious sceptical worry is that that the identification of a represented emoting occupant amounts to no more than a trivial fact. That is, the proposal leads to no further important or surprising epistemological discoveries in respect of the persona. All it shows is that it is open to viewers to pretend that the occupied perspective is filled by someone else, but this does not entail that it is filled by a persona. The argument can be filled out in weaker and stronger formulations. A weaker construal of this argument suggests that in scenarios where the identity of the occupant is indeterminate, the viewer simply represents *themselves* occupying the perspective. The weaker construal undermines the necessity of representing a persona. A stronger

formulation is that the viewer can only represent themselves occupying the perspective. That is, it is conceptually impossible to fill a self-reflexive perspective with anything other than *myself*, as in the actual viewer of the picture. This is because the imagined perspective, while prescribed by the painting and taken on it, exists in *my* mind. The stronger construal says the new constitutive persona theory is absurd.

I am going to answer this objection in two parts. In the first part I will clarify what is meant by a *self*-reflexive perspective. In the second part I will clarify who is 'self' in represented perspectives. I rehearse a way to differentiate between an actual and non-actual self in our sensory imaginings. Together, these clarifications provide a defence against both the weak and strong construal of the objection.

6.5.2.1 *Self*-reflexive perspective

Bracketing out the issue of emotions for now, a represented *self*-reflexive perspective is one where the self is *invisibly* part of the pictorial content. So, for example, if there was a painting called (say) 'What Napoleon saw at the beginning of the Battle of Waterloo', with the British Army arrayed before him, we could imagine the perspective as occupied (by Napoleon) even though he was not depicted.

Figure 41 William Sadler, Battle of Waterloo, 1815

In comparison to represented perspectives which merely provide a spatially centred scheme of reference, representing a perspective and additionally representing an occupant of the perspective, introduces the notion of a *self*-centred scheme of reference. This represented self occupies the subjective psychological point of origin of the picture. The painting doesn't need to present this imagined self as a visible object in it yet we imagine experiencing the pictorial goings as depicting scenarios as seen (and felt) by him (or her). The self-reflexive perspective makes the experience of the picture meaningful in *the right manner*.

6.5.2.2 Who is Self?

David Velleman points to a confusion that can arise here from thinking of the imagined occupant reflexively, as 'self'.

> [T]o think of persona reflexively, as 'self' is to also think of him as "me". If I think of the image has having a particular subject…it becomes a way of thinking that I am [the expresser]
>
> (Velleman, 1996:50)

This natural confusion can lead to the strong objection that what I am referring to as the persona-self is in fact the actual-self (the viewer). The objection is as follows. I cannot escape thinking about the occupant of it as "me" because imagining a self-reflexive perspective is to imagine that I am seeing the scene. When I (VB) represent the melancholy perspective on *Nighthawks,* what I am doing is similar to what I do when I recollect seeing the street in lockdown, empty and lonely and quiet. The memory of the locked down street and the imagined experiencing of the *Nighthawks* street both occur in the mind of VB. For this reason, the sceptic can say that surely, I *is* VB. VB is the person who is self-reflexively present in the picture. Thus, personae have no place in the explanation.

But this is to confuse *the way* of thinking (or imagining) with *what* you are thinking about. Velleman shows us that as long as we can have first personal thoughts about people that are not you, we can make sense of what is happening in the pictorial case (Velleman, 1996). Velleman provides a way to think about the two selves that are

required to enact adequate apprehension of the picture. They are the actual-self (VB) and the represented-self (in his terminology the 'notional' self, in mine the 'persona' self). The sceptic says that seeing the melancholy picture requires VB to think about the represented-self as 'me'. They then assume that this 'me' *is* VB. That is, they assume the is of identity to be holding between 'me' and VB. However, this sceptic is wrong to interpret the relation between 'me' and VB as one of identity. In Velleman's words,

> The word "self" has two related but ultimately distinct strands of meaning. It connotes both identity and reflexivity… On the one hand, a past self of mine might be one and the same person as me, identified at some time in the past. On the other hand, a past self might be someone in the past whom I can think of reflexively, in the first-person. In the first sense, selfhood is a metaphysical relation that holds between persons at times, if they are the same person. In the second sense, selfhood is a psychological relation that holds between subjects who are on first-personal terms.
>
> (Velleman, 1996:65).

Imagining a situation *self*-reflexively involves thinking about the occupant as 'me' but it does not entail an identity relation holding between 'me' and VB. When VB imagines the melancholy perspective on *Nighthawks*, this does not entail that VB imagines VB occupying the melancholy perspective. VB is thinking about *Hopper* as occupying the represented perspective and VB can do this without falling into a delusion that she VB is the same person as *Hopper.* As Velleman continues,

> When I think of the image as having a subject, it becomes a way of thinking about that person reflexively, as "self." And to think of a person reflexively, as "self," is also to think of him as "me." If I think of the image as having a particular subject, such as Napoleon, the image becomes a way of thinking about Napoleon as "me," and so it becomes a way of thinking that I am Napoleon.
>
> (Velleman, 1996:50).

To mark the distinction between imaginings where 'me' is VB and where 'me' is merely represented-self, Velleman introduces the notion of genuine and pretend reflexivity. We can see how this is useful in determining the pictorial case when we compare and contrast two types of sensory imagining; an autobiographical recollection and a fantasy.

An autobiographical recollection (a type of remembering) relates the actual self to events in one's personal past from a first-person perspective. I already gave an example of such a memory when I recounted the disastrous piano recital from my earlier-self's perspective. When I recollect this and other significant moments in my life, I am invisibly part of the memory. In recollecting I have a genuinely self-reflexive thought that picks out VB at its centre "by mentally pointing to [her] in a distinctively inward-directed fashion" (Velleman, 1996:60). Although I have put this in terms of an identity relation, the thought originates from Locke who said that memory makes a person 'self to himself' across time (Locke, 1690). I am positing a genuine psychological tie between former (and future) selves of VB by drawing on Velleman's perspectival sense in which one can be self-to-oneself, immediately and unselfconsciously when vividly recalling the past.

The question is, how genuine is the connection between selves when we indulge in Walter Mitty imagining? For example, when we sensorily imagine 'better than' alternative selves. That is, our fantasy counterparts who are better than our actual selves; more accomplished, more popular, more influential selves that suddenly know how to fly a plane, perform brain surgery or slay the room with a killer witticism. In our Mitty moments we are taller than, sassier than, sharper than, kinder than we actually are.

One way to distinguish between actual past selves of mine and pretend selves involves appealing to a causal chain of the right sort. VB is VB in the piano recital recollection because of the causal connection VB now has to VB at that age. Velleman has pointed out that in addition to the causal connection, when I recall VB at the piano recital, I am also aware that VB now is VB then and that this is a further requirement on a genuine case. He says, "[i]n memory I really think of the [represented] subject as "me"; in imagination, I only pretend to" (Velleman, 1996:60). This connection holds because VB now experiences an actual experience of VB then. But when VB imagines completing mile 26 of a marathon this causal connection is missing. No past self of VB completed a marathon and given the state of VB's knees no future self of VB will either. Of course, if VB intends to complete the marathon next year, she can establish a causal connection by way of her prospective memory. As long as the intention to complete the marathon is

preserved as I cross the finish line (which involves a future feat of memory), one can argue that 'VB 2020' *is* 'VB 2021'.

In the pictorial case however representing the occupant is not chained down by these causal connections so there is no guarantee that when VB thinks of *Hopper* as 'me' for the purposes of seeing the melancholy in *Nighthawks*, VB's imaging is about VB.[141] What does the lack of guarantee prove? It casts reasonable doubt on the claim that the occupant of the represented perspective must be a self of mine as opposed to a self I imagine being. This more tenuous connection between occupant-me and the genuine VB is sufficient to block a collapse of the persona theory into an arousal view. It is not necessarily VB who is the occupant and it is not a failing of a persona theory if it is unable to also sort out the controversy over identity. Persona-selves, ones we wilfully construct according to the prescription of the picture and relevant extra-pictorial cues, are not guaranteed to be psychological predecessors or successors of our actual selves. When the viewer imagines the sad (or happy) perspective by imagining that they are the persona occupying the represented perspective, they do not add new features into the picture. Hence, expressive pictures contain a persona insofar as the picture is framed in a self-centred scheme of reference that is centred on the persona.[142]

Conclusion

In this chapter I have provided a novel defence of the view that awareness of the expressive qualities in paintings is mediated by non-actual occupied perspectives. Noticing this said nothing about who the occupant is. The claim is that emotional perspectives indicate a represented self, however indeterminate. While this provided an important first step towards a defence of a persona-view, it did not yet provide support for the view itself, except insofar as it rendered the unoccupied emotional perspectives implausible, and so narrowed down the sceptic's options. In the second part of the

[141] There is an interesting discussion here about broken causal connections that may follow from forgetting in Martin and Deutscher (1966).

[142] A further reason to distinguish my persona theory from evocation theory is that my persona theory is a specificity thesis whereas evocation theories are particularity theses. Evocation theorists identify a particular's emotion (the viewer's) which must then be projected back into the picture.

chapter, I argued that the represented self must be understood as a pretend self or persona, and not conflated with the actual self.



Figure 42 Howard Hodgkin, Portrait of Mrs Rhoda Cohen, 1962

7 Interacting Perspectives

In this Chapter I want to sketch out one way in which the new persona theory can demonstrate its productive credentials. It is intended to further the case for personae, by showing what they do. In particular, I will discuss a contribution the new persona theory can make to one of the perennial debates in the literature concerning emotional and evaluative responses to pictorial expressions. For reasons of space, I will be restricting my comments to a specific issue. However, I hope to establish the potential the view has to progress research beyond this single issue.

As we have seen, some theorists suggest that fully understanding a pictorial expression requires a viewer to respond empathetically to it (Robinson, 2017b, Green, 2007, Walton, 1999, Matravers, 1998). Theorists disagree on the details, but the issue raises an interesting puzzle for the constitutive persona view. That is, how we should understand the nesting or embedding of perspectives in the phenomenon of expression. Should we anticipate that the new persona theory will assume Robinson's notion of empathising? What is the aesthetic relevance of a viewer's emotional response? And, do *expressive* pictures pose special problems in this regard?[143]

I will begin in (7.1) by outlining a puzzle that is generated by the new persona view. The puzzle concerns the nature of the connection between actual and represented perspectives. In (7.2) I examine an existing solution: that the viewer bridges the gap between the perspectives by re-enacting persona expression. I flag a reason to resist plugging this solution into the new constitutive model. I then turn in (7.3) to outline an alternative concept of interacting persona perspectives. Drawing on the theory of affective imagining, I argue that we can extend and develop the analogy with memory. In particular, I apply Peter Goldie's notion of bridging and aligning emotional perspectives in (7.4) (Goldie, 2003, Goldie, 2012). I use this to highlight a mode of engagement with pictures that respects the integrity of the perspectival roles involved.

[143] Thus, proponents of dry-eyed apprehension reject arousalism, for entailing that feeling is a necessary part of the phenomenon and arousalists resist dry-eyed theories as missing the point of expressiveness or misunderstanding how emotions play an epistemic rather than constitutive role.

7.1 The puzzle of perspectival integration

In Chapter Six I argued that pictorial seeing involved representing perspectives on the sensible properties of the picture. With the exception of illusionistic pictures (e.g. trompe l'oeil) it was observed that moving slightly to the left or right of a picture does not change the angle of the represented perspective. The explanation for this was that the represented perspectives is determined by the painting and not the viewer. Hence, it is not altered by the viewer altering their spatial relationship to the picture. This explained why *Bidigal Reserve* continues to be seen from above even when the viewer has to actually look up to see it hanging on the wall.

The illustration 'Spatial' (figure 44) sets out in simplified form the various perspectival roles that can be involved in seeing depictions. For example, seeing De Chirico's *Mystery and Melancholy of a Street* involves the perspective of the little girl-figure on her surroundings, a mere represented perspective on the street scene and the viewer's actual perspective.



Figure 43 'Spatial'

Spatial generates a small puzzle. How do these various perspectives relate to each other? How can an external (actual) spatial perspective interact with an internal

(represented) spatial perspective? Further, what can we say about the relation of dependence that is represented by the red arrow? The answers to that question should be dealt with in the literature concerning depiction.[144] A related yet distinct puzzle is generated by expressive versions of Spatial. According to the new persona view, to see the pictorial expression the viewer must represent a pictorial perspective and represent an occupier of the perspective. That is, it is in virtue of representing a persona occupying the represented perspective that the viewer gains mediated access to the pictorial expression. The relations holding in the expressive puzzle can be illustrated as shown in figure 44.



Figure 44 'Expressive'

Although the representation of the represented perspective is dependent on the actual viewer, the represented perspective is part of the pictorial content. We can think of both the represented and figure perspectives as being internal to the picture as they were for Spatial.[145] The actual perspective is external to it since it is the perspective of the viewer (e.g. standing in the gallery). This means that, for example, when Colette apprehends *Melanie and Me Swimming*, her perspective can be different to the persona's

[144] Michael Polanyi coins the phrase transnatural' perspective to refer to this but he does not offer an explanation for it. There is some discussion of this in respect of the significance of perspectives depiction in Chapter Seven of Hopkins (1998).

[145] I am not suggesting that figure expressions are necessary for pictorial expression.

perspective. Not only in terms of its temporal location (Colette's temporal location is 'actual', and the persona's perspective is located at some indeterminate point probably in the past) but also in terms of type. Colette may feel nostalgic, but the persona arguably observes the scene with a mix of quiet pride and happiness contemplating the child who appears to be nervous as she struggles to stay afloat. The difference is that now *all* the perspectives are emotional. The puzzle this generates is as follows: how do we respect the gaps between these perspectives yet bridge them in a single unified experience of the work?

Table 2 Expressive Perspectival Roles

Key	Perspectival Role	Description
Represented	The perspective of an emoting persona	The expressive way of representing
Actual	The actual perspective	The viewer and representing subject.
Figure	The perspective of an expressive figure	A represented (depicted) emotional subject

The question concerns the relation of dependence that holds between distinct perspectival roles and the possibility of integrating two (or more) emotional perspectives in one unified experience of the picture. My ambitious proposal is that the internal perspectives can be embedded or nested in the external perspective without necessarily being conflated. Roughly, the idea is that I can take an embittered view on a nostalgic perspective. That is, there is a way of co-ordinating multiple self-reflexive and *from without* (figure) attributive emotional perspectives in one coherent apprehension of the picture. In some sense, we do this when consulting an old-style paper map to get ourselves around an unfamiliar part of the city. To motivate this proposal, I first want to point out a reason to resist thinking that the viewer, if misty at all, must be misty in the empathetic sense Robinson proposed.

7.2 Re-enacting emotions

The thought that empathy is an aesthetically relevant response to expressive pictures is widespread (Matravers, 2017, Matravers and Waldow, 2018, Coplan, 2004, Coplan and Goldie, 2011, Walton, 1999, Green, 2007). As we have seen Green, Robinson, Matravers and Walton have all given arguments to the effect that empathetic responses or emotional arousal are a necessary condition on the phenomenon of expression. Lopes endorses the possibility (though not the necessity) of empathising with pictures because he holds that the "empathetic response picks up on the very same features, whether they figure in seeing-in or face-to-face seeing" (Lopes, 2011:119). Meanwhile Gregory Currie argues that our empathetic sub-personal systems involved in motor-mimicry are implicated in the way we experience pictures (Currie, 2011a:91). Going by these research outputs our empathetic engagement with pictures can seem ubiquitous.

I am not going to argue that the empathy view is untenable.[146] My aim is more modest I want to show that the constitutive persona theory allows us to consider a credible alternative to empathetic engagement. Given this, one may ask why bother to consider an alternative at all? Here is one reason. The notion of empathetic perspective-shifting invokes a re-enactment account of emotional imagining and because of this the viewer ends up mis-representing the temporal location of the expressive properties in the picture. The expression ends up in the present. To correct this, the viewer is required to take the extra step of intending or projecting the empathetic feeling back into the picture. The alternative I propose does not require this additional step.

How does empathy misrepresent the temporal location of the expressive properties? The prevailing view is that when the observer re-enacts the target's emotion, the observer feels 'something like' that target's emotion, including feeling an imagined

[146] As Lopes has noted however, the various accounts of empathising tend to run aground when it attempts to show both what is continuous between empathising face-to-face and empathising with pictures and what is distinctive about the pictorial case. His own solution invokes the idea of social referencing to explain our responses to scene expression (Lopes, 2011:133).

version of that target's emotion (Coplan and Goldie, 2011, Matravers, 2017, Matravers and Waldow, 2018). More controversially, it has been proposed that when the observer re-enacts the target's emotion, they feel that emotion (Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002). That is, when you are feeling amusement that you imagine is in the picture, it is still real amusement, since '[t]here is no imagining that has an amusement-like character; there is only being really amused' (Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002:190). For my purposes what matters is an assumption that both claims share.

The pre-occupation of re-enactment views (as I will call them) with the subject's adoption of the target's emotional feelings, comes at price. That price is a mistaken assumption concerning temporal matters. For Sophie to empathise with Emma's joy, is for her to experience a token of the same type of emotion that Emma is feeling. The problem with the picture case is that Emma's joy is time-indexed to the time Emma experienced the joy. That is, the joy in the picture is not happening 'now' (although it could be happening 'here' in the pictorial sense). Yet in empathising, Sophie tokens the joy 'here and now'. Hence, a presupposition of the empathising views is that empathy makes pictorial emotions *present* to the viewing subject (since it lacks time indexing features).

But how might it do this? Hopkins has suggested that we have the capacity to re-enact or re-live temporally distant events by being mentally transported to them (Hopkins, 2014). This notion can be put to use to describe a similar kind of temporal transportation that must occur if one empathises with the pictorial expresser.[147] When the viewer re-enacts and re-creates the represented perspective, they will be temporally transported to the persona's temporal perspective. Thus, by becoming aroused to full-blooded emotion *now*, they seem to be experiencing (absent) pictorial emotions as temporally present.

The problem with this is that it is not quite true to phenomenon of expression. We not only get a token of the same type of emotion, we get it time indexed as well. When I apprehend *Nighthawks,* I experience the melancholy perspective as occurring at the

[147] The notion of temporal transportation is not discussed in Hopkins (2014). Hopkins does not endorse a persona theory.

same time as the café scene, that is at some point in the past. Hence, by adopting the empathetic account, I must be both empathising and *pretending* that what I am feeling now is part of a past event. Unless this additional step of pretending is built into what I do, my experience will be consistently misrepresenting the temporal location of the represented emotions in pictures (Soteriou, 2018b).[148]

One might worry that although the empathy view can adjust the temporal location of an event that is in fact temporally present, it has other unappealing consequences. For one thing, it seems to commit the viewer to experiencing the emotion as 'in the picture' or 'in me now'. The problem with it ending up in the viewer, is obvious. It is in the wrong place and so will need to be projected back into the picture (cf. Walton, 1999). Although this is significant debate in its own right, the relevant problem that we need to address here is that if the viewer feels the emotion, then how does this help achieve what everyone thinks is the desired end-state: namely, the viewer apprehending that it is X that feels it?[149] Once again, the metaphor of projection which was rife in the early empathy literature, seems almost irresistible. The problem with it ending up 'in the picture' is that it makes it mysterious as to how the viewer can feel an emotion that is different to the one in the picture. In other words, in a case where there are two genuinely distinct perspectives e.g. when I represent nostalgia at time 't' in 1900 (persona perspective) whilst also feeling my own bitterness 'now' in 2020. My complaint is empathising views require these two perspectives to be aligned in a way that is going to require this additional step just discussed and this is going to limit the sophistication of a response (since on my story, I do not need to share the nostalgia but can repudiate it).

In an attempt to fix this, we might try to get rid of the temporal pretending move. We could say that the viewer is mentally transported to the time of the expression. That means that the persona expression is in the right temporal location after all. The viewer,

[148] In Soteriou (2018b) the discussion concerns episodic recollection, but the point applies to the picture case too.

[149] This is a difficult issue that presents across the empathy literature. The standard accounts of empathy suggest that O feels empathy for X if O feels what X feels because X feels it'. However, there is just no good account of O feels what X feels'. Further, what the viewer feels may well require essential reference to what a figure in the picture is emoting, in which case the claim that the viewer feels what the figure feels is incoherent (say the figure is Romeo feeling unrequited love for Juliet).

like Dr Who, transports themselves to 't-persona perspective'. However, the problem with this is that the viewer's phenomenology would make it seem as if the expression is happening in their temporal present. Mental transportation would make it seem to the viewer that things were occurring to them *now*. But this is exactly what we are trying to avoid since it eliminates an important aspect of the viewer's phenomenology. That is, experiencing feelings that are directed at something that is not now actually present. Hence, the phenomenon is not a matter of empathising.

In the light of this, one might be inclined to consider an alternative account of emotional imagining. One in which the temporal location of the imagining (now) is not determined by the temporal location of the emotional object (picture time). Since the alternative account can correctly locate the temporal aspects of the expressive properties, it promised to be a more parsimonious alternative. The new account will better fit with the constitutive persona view and I turn to examine it in the next section.

7.3 Inter-acting emotions

The particular account I have in mind appeals to a notion of affective imagining found in Margherita Arcangeli and Jerome Dokic (2018). This is a special class of emotional phenomena that can occur when episodically recollecting one's personal past (Arcangeli, 2018). That is, when the past is made present in a way that neither overwhelms nor is overwhelmed by one's present emotional status. For example, feeling sad about the happy wedding or feeling embarrassed about the innocently made yet tactless remark. The explanation Arcangeli provides of these sorts of episodic memories can be used to explore the Expressive puzzle. I will show how it opens up the analysis to interesting research from which we might make sense of a holistic aesthetically relevant emotional response to the picture.

Arcangeli's notion of affective imagining is intended to capture how, when we imaginatively re-live an episode from our past "the emotional import of the latter transpires in modified form at the phenomenological level of our present memory"

(Arcangeli, 2018:139).[150] For example, I may remember delightedly eating endless sweets, watching TV and doing no exercise during the pandemic lockdown, while now feeling this behaviour is rather shameful.[151] The shameful feeling now inflects the memory, so that I no longer have a delighted memory of the time I stuffed my face and lazed about. I now have a memory tinged with shame of a time when I was delighted to be guzzling treats and lolling about on the sofa. Further, there is no tension to my recalling the event with multiple emotions, some of which were not present at the time the event occurred. There are various ways of accounting for this sort of hybrid affect in the memory literature (Currie and Ravenscroft, 2002, Dokic and Arcangeli, 2015, Goldie, 2012). What is pertinent to the pictorial puzzle is that investigations into affective memories assume that we have a capacity to emotionally imagine in a way that both respects the gaps between perspectives and bridges it.

But what is meant by bridging the perspectival gap here? Following Arcangeli we could say that "our imagination is constrained when the represented perspective directly affects the actual perspective" (Arcangeli, 2018:146) and causes the subject to spontaneously update their emotional record of the past event. When this happens, the subject is said to be both actually feeling an emotion and representing the earlier emotional event. In other words, these are misty subjects, mistily representing past events first-personally. In this way, we might think of a graded way of accessing the sad memory. Once you have passed the 'representing persona' threshold of mistiness, you can think back with dry-eyes, or sometimes, apprehend it with misty-eyes where dry and misty are not absolutes but shades of intensity. Simply put, recollected nostalgia and occurrent bitterness might interact, with, for example, the former possibly gradually overwhelming the latter.

Not everyone agrees that we can in fact have these kind of emotionally hybrid memories. They deny that we can integrate, interact or bridge between past and current perspectives. They may instead hold that the original memory is stored with the affect and then recalled out of storage, like an engram. In recalling the memory, the subject

[150] I am drawing on the memory literature since an analysis of perspectival integration that relied solely on pictures as exemplars risks being accused of encouraging a kind of confirmation bias.

[151] Whether or not the recreated emotion is real or as-if' is not my concern hence I can remain neutral on this point.

either re-lives the emotion stored with the memory, like smelling the faint trace of perfume found on discarded clothes, or they are triggered to undergo a separate and new emotion about that former episode. Recalling that I greedily gorged on a whole cake yesterday now triggers feelings of guilt (Debus, 2007).[152] Emotions occur now or occurred in the past.

There are however good reasons to think that we can do more than passively bear witness to our emotional memories. Consider for instance, the way Goldie recalls the following event,

> I shamefully made a ridiculous fool of myself last night, getting up on the table and gleefully singing some stupid song.
>
> (Goldie, 2012:48)

The purpose of articulating the memory in this way is to emphasise that

> in memory my external and internal perspectives are integrated[...]I tell it the way I remember it, and I remember it the way I tell it.
>
> (Goldie, 2012:48)

We might also posit here that Goldie's memory of the night out with his colleagues has been emotionally modified in the recollecting. At the time he happily played the fool but now the event 'feels' embarrassing. This kind of emotional revision is fairly commonplace. It neither eliminates the temporal location of the original event nor does it trigger a new emotion. Instead it updates our evaluation of the original event. Moreover, reinvigorating the past with modified emotional content does not entail that actual perspectives determine the emotional meaning of the represented perspective. One can accept that a thinker has work to do to realise the full expressive potential of the past without needing to also accept that understanding the past necessarily confabulates it. In the ordinary course of events, we often look back over past events and 'discover' things about ourselves, about those we care about (as well as those we perhaps ought to not care so much about), by applying the lens of experience. This is such a powerful and prevalent way of thinking that it is often implicated in the way we shape the procession of our lives (Goldie 2000). In effectively integrating perspectives, a

[152] Dorothea Debus (2007) refers to autobiographical past-directed emotion' arguing that emotional imaginings are new' emotional responses to what is remembered.

subject does more than fit together a static set of facts. She influences what is seen through a dynamic set of psychological and affective principles and, I am arguing, this can also be way of extending and deepening the phenomenon of expression.

Notice too that the affective memory correctly locates temporally distant objects. This is because the past temporal perspective is part of what is represented in order to represent a perspective on the past event. The represented perspective includes a temporal aspect within which the occupier is time-indexed. This means that the represented perspective correctly temporally locates the self that it is mediating access to (cf. Soteriou, 2018). Meanwhile, the subject's actual perspective and act of representing is not determined by the temporal location of the past perspective. So, the past is not represented as being coincident with the subject's actual present. When imagining like this, no further work is required to 'put' the represented emotion back into the appropriate temporal location.

7.4 Inter-acting viewer and persona

Using the analogy of an affective memory we may now begin to see how emotional integrating applies to the case of pictorial expression.[153] My strategy is to map the structure of an affective memory to the emotional imagining appropriate to expressive pictures. The purpose of this exercise is to analyse whether this interaction has any aesthetic value for the phenomenon of expression. For one might think of it, as we did of the link between hypothetical and actual artists, as an extra (and harmless) feeling. In order to assess this, I will consider whether it can extend a viewer's understanding of the work overall. I will ask, can emotional imagining, a complex made up of several perspectival parts including one external to the picture, be aesthetically relevant?

The new persona theory holds that pictorial expression is constituted by representing an expressing persona who occupies the represented perspective on the pictorial scene. In explicating that model, attention was paid to the sense in which the expressive

[153] The memory case is a good correlate with which to make the pictorial puzzle perspicuous because here too we are dealing with affect-laden perspectives connected through an embedding or nesting relation. In memory, as in the phenomenon of expression, it seems that one could entertain a perspective that is different to your current evaluative response but is importantly engaging with the past one in so recollecting it.

qualities were related to the perspective of the persona. When it comes to emotional imagining, the suggestion is that the expressive events can now be recounted from the viewer's actual emotional perspective. What is meant by "recounted" is something like Maria Schechtman's notion of a "mental telling" where a subject uses a "dynamic set of principles" that acts as a lens "through which, with or without conscious awareness, an individual understands" aspects of the picture (Schechtman, 1996:116). Supposing that the viewer was able to verbally articulate what goes on in the phenomenon of expression. The idea is that she would do more than merely list a chronicle of facts about what she experienced. She would organise her understanding from a continuous perspective so that she could "recount events in a way that renders them intelligible, thus conveying not just information but also understanding" (Velleman, 2003:1). This is what the affective memory seems to do. That is, recount the past in a way that organises what is remembered as an intelligible series of events with additional explanatory power.

This is what seems to be going on when Goldie recounts his office party. Here is a reminder of what he said,

> I shamefully made a ridiculous fool of myself last night getting up on the table and gleefully seeing some stupid song.
>
> (Goldie, 2012:39)

The way Goldie recounts this event qualifies it as an affective memory because the past episode has been recalled in a way that modifies its emotional import (Goldie, 2012). At the time Goldie was gleeful (figure) as he was acting the fool (represented). But now recalling it anew he understands his earlier foolish glee to be shameful. Not least because he now realises, in hindsight, that his colleagues were not laughing *with* him, but *at* him. The actual, represented and figure perspectives are all nested and contained within one holistic act of remembering. Furthermore, the shamefulness is neither 'in the past' nor happening 'now'. The shamefulness is now part of the memory and appears in part of the making the past present in the putative affective manner in a way that modifies its emotional import. How might this map over to pictorial cases?

We can apply this structure to cases of what I have been calling emotional imagining. Table 3 shows how the inter-acting perspectives in Goldie's affective memory could correlate to the interaction of emotional perspectives in the pictorial case.

Table 3 Inter-acting Perspectives

Perspective	Affective Memory	Emotional Imagining		
	Goldie	Rothko	Bosch	Géricault
Represented	Ridiculous	Melancholy	Demented	Indignant
Actual	Embarrassed	Melancholy	Blank Indifference	Compassionate
Figure	Gleeful	N/a	Tortured	Desperate

We can devise for each pictorial case a recounting that demonstrates a weak and strong case of inter-acting. For example, when looking at a Rothko some people report feeling moved to tears as if they are catching the feeling of the picture. Some reports make it sound like an emotional contagion (Elkins, 2001). This can be explained by saying that the represented and actual perspective are *strongly* aligned (cf. Arcangeli, 2018). The represented strongly constrains the actual and blurs the distinctness between the two. As a result, not only does the actual feel like the represented feels, but the represented may be difficult to distinguish from the actual and thus the feeling also takes on an extra sense of intimacy. Contrastively, a viewer may attend to the Bosch and become aware of the demented outlook on the tortured figures but fail to be stirred by this. Here the actual and represented are not aligned since the actual is critically distanced. As a result, the viewer is only weakly immersed in the phenomenon and may describe themselves as dry-eyed. These can be compared to Goldie recalling his singing at the office party gleefully (strong) or dispassionately (weak). Beside strong and weak alignments there are cases of moderate alignment where, for Goldie, a new hybrid emotion inflects the memory. In that case, the actual and represented (and potentially figure) perspectives are active, aligned but distinct. Julian Barnes provides an extended and eloquent example of moderately aligned recounting in his chapter *Géricault: Catastrophe into Art*,

> We see survivors on a raft hailing a tiny ship on the horizon…Sunrise, we deduce, and the ship arriving with the sun, bringing a new day, hope and rescue; the black clouds overhead (very black) will soon disappear… even so the rescuing vessel is not coming towards the

> shipwrecked. This would be the plainest rebuff of all from fate: the sun is rising, but not for you.
>
> (Barnes, 1988:28-35)

Barnes' recounting can act as a guide and encouragement to the viewer to go further than apprehend the expression (Barnes, 1988). They can strive to integrate the actual with represented in a way that modifies the aesthetic import in an act of emotional imagining. Barnes says that Géricault has captured,

> the moment of supreme agony on the raft, taken up, transformed, justified by art, turned into a sprung and weighted image, then varnished, framed, glazed, hung in a famous art gallery to illuminate our human condition.
>
> (Barnes, 1988:39)

I am suggesting that we interpret Barnes' critical insights as an example of our capacity to make the represented perspectives present, and so aesthetically relevant. A capacity that is primitively identified in memory but which we have learnt how to put to use in our practices of picturing. On these occasions we do more than perspective-taking and emotionally re-enacting. We respect the epistemic, emotional and temporal gaps that hold between perspectives and bridge them, with sophisticated emotional effects. And as with affective memory, emotional imagining has the additional virtue of correctly locating the temporal perspectives involved. So, the (represented) persona perspective is not automatically represented as being coincident with the (actual) viewer's perspective. Unlike empathising, no further work is required to 'put' the represented emotion back into the appropriate temporal location.

7.4.1 Aesthetic and emotional import

So far, I have drawn on emotional imagining to provide a credible alternative to empathetically inter-acting with the persona. This leaves outstanding the question concerning the aesthetic relevance of emotional imagining. That is, can the expressive meaning (and value) of a picture be increased by emotionally imagining the expression? An answer that can be sketched here makes use of Goldie's notion of a particular type of moderate alignment in respect of viewer and persona in emotional imagining. We can call this ironic imagining. Ironically imagining, in the sense to be explained, extends and increases the complexity of represented expressers. In Chapter Five, Robinson's

suggestion that the implied persona could reveal aspects of their personality unselfconsciously through style was discussed. Her idea was that just as we can reliably infer facts about, say, Josephine's laziness, which she did not intend to reveal to us, from her unwashed and crinkled shirts, we partly form an impression of the implied persona based on the *look* of the brushstrokes (Robinson, 1985). The sensitivity, elegance or carelessness of brushstrokes were said to be made salient to the viewer by way of a conceptual tie between real artist and implied persona. But this argument was shown to be flawed since it implied that painters could not create implied personas that are psychologically distinct from themselves. Despite this, the observation that pictures may include dramatically ironic or indirectly ironic expressive content seems right if difficult to explain. Indeed, Walton noted that we seem to detect extended characteristics of putative persona in ways that seem mysterious (Walton 1976:59). Currie has also identified and explored the way pictorial content can appear ironic, opening up an epistemic gap between what is strictly speaking expressed in the picture and the viewer's actual perspective on it (Currie, 2011b).[154] The thought common to these different lines of research, couched in terms introduced here, is that what the represented perspective reveals can outstrip the self-awareness we can attribute to the persona. This can be likened to how we might raise an eyebrow at a friend who earnestly confesses 'I used to be conceited but now I'm perfect', thereby acknowledging their unwittingly expressed breath-taking arrogance.

Goldie has proposed a solution to the mystery. In moderately aligned emotional imagining, there is an ironic epistemic and evaluative gap that opens up between perspectives. Although these are distinct, they can be bridged and interwoven through a psychological correlate of ironic thinking (Goldie, 2012:26). Briefly, this involves binding the internal and external perspectives together. The technical explanation can be gleaned from the way authors make use of free indirect style in works fiction (Wood, 2008). By enacting this form of ironic emotional imagining the viewer can "inhabit omniscience and partiality" because the epistemic gap that opens up between perspectives "simultaneously closes that gap and draws attention to its distance" (Wood, 2008:11). In this way the viewer understands the scene through the

[154] See in particular Chapters Seven and Eight in Currie (2010).

represented persona's eyes while at once seeing more than the persona can see. They treat the persona like an unreliable narrator, and this enables the persona to express more than their emotional perspective. Because all of this takes place in one efficient experience it inflects the epistemic meaning of the expression by manifesting "an important indeterminacy or openness to interpretation as to whose perspective is being revealed" (Goldie, 2012:35).

This means that not only is there an additional layer of expressive meaning created by inter-acting perspectives, but this meaning is, where it reveals hitherto hidden aspects of the persona's character, aesthetically relevant. When Barnes entreats us to attend to Géricault's masterpiece and experience how "the sun is rising, but not for you", we can now see that he is weighing on this capacity for emotional imagining. We might also think that this is what Dürer so brilliantly invites us to do when we apprehend his coldly luminous and charismatic self-portraits. We do not just engage with represented *Dürer*, we can fold this into our actual external perspective, by bridging to it in a way that interweaves who is audience, who is sitter, who is worshipping and who being idolised. To understand precisely how things seem to be for *Dürer* we need to know more than *Dürer* seems to know. We need to open up and bridge the epistemic gap using a pictorial analogue of free indirect style.

An objection here is that apprehending the pictorial expression this way is not a genuine *aesthetically* relevant response. They are instead combinations of idiosyncratic (actual) and pictorial (represented) contents. In this way one may be prepared to acknowledge the possibility of emotionally imagining 'free indirect style' but deny that the meaning that arises from it is correctly accounted for within the phenomenon of expression. A dry-eye theorist will say that whatever feelings the viewer has should not intrude into the pictorial content (Kingsbury, 2002). This avoids an interpretation in which the viewer's psyche is muddled up into the pictorial content. If each viewer were, for the period of attentive apprehension, part of what is represented by projecting their own feelings into the picture, then every expressive picture would vary in content as

each successive viewer apprehended it (c.f. Wollheim, 1987:102).[155] By restricting what is aesthetically relevant to dry-eyed apprehension, the viewer's feeling cannot constitute what the painting expresses. Misty apprehensions, by contrast, make mysterious any notion of correctly or appropriately apprehending what is represented. In this way, the dry-eyed proponent takes their misty-eyed opponent to be guilty of making statements like '*Nighthawks* is melancholy' of merely biographical interest, revealing something about the viewer and not the painting.

Here is a reply. I can agree that there is some measure of idiosyncrasy in the response once we let in misty apprehensions qua inter-acting emotional perspectives. However, it is not clear how problematic this really is. It remains an open question what a 'correct' interpretation or experience of the work is (Hume and Lenz, 1965). A single painting may produce a range of responses in different viewers or in the same viewer at different stages of their emotional maturity. My view can help explain why variability of response is no bar to acceptability or correctness. Inter-acting perspectives involve ordering, aligning and wrapping perspectives together in a structured form of thinking, so that the salient properties are realised as imbued with feeling. This explains the more subtle emotional interactions that may take place in the phenomenon of expression.

It also opens up the possibility of a tolerable idiosyncrasy. To illustrate what I mean by this, I am going to give an account of Chuck Close's *Big Self Portrait,* which makes use of the model I have been explicating.

[155] Developing this point Michael Baxandall (1988) has argued many paintings intended for early Renaissance audiences contain meanings that must now elude us because we can no longer instantiate the Quattrocento man' values required to mistily elucidate the subtleties in the work.



Figure 45 Chuck Close, Big Self-Portrait with Cigarette, 1967–1968

Close has described how he created this painting by blowing up a photograph and transposing the photographic marks to canvas with a brush. He says, "I decided to work from a photograph so I could accept some things as a given, so I wouldn't have to think about compositing or the invention of shape".[156] The transposition was not entirely faithful. He hesitated and so there are pauses between marks. He introduced pentimento by scraping back areas he wanted to 'correct' with razor blades. His starting point, a monocular snapshot, is transformed into something more than a record of its making. It introduces a (represented) persona perspective.

On one level, the painting expresses an insouciant arrogance. Ripe with teenage ambivalence, it seems to at once scream 'Get me!' and also 'I couldn't care less if you do'. We are prescribed to represent a perspective located somewhere beneath his enormous

[156] https://walkerart.org/magazine/chuck-close-discusses-big-self-portrait-1967. Last accessed 28th October 2019.

head, forcing us to look up, admiringly at him. He looks down on us, squint-eyed from the smoke, slightly combatively. A look that is accessed by attributing a third person perspective to the depicted part of the (whole) emotion seen on the face. The overall ambivalence between perspectives is not resolved at the represented persona level. There is something slightly off about this posturing. Close is not yet the famous man he will become, yet his modesty seems too raw for him to *want* to reveal here. A tension arises from this, a compelling confusion between arrogance and humility and it makes it difficult to work out what and where the represented emotional perspective *is.* In addition, there is something discombobulating about this experience for the viewer, which is accentuated by the sheer immensity of the work. A kind of confusion in regard to the self-referring perspectival relations.

An explanation of this phenomenological confusion can be drawn from David Lewis' discussion of a two-god universe. In Lewis' example, we must suppose that two omniscient perspectives co-locate in a single possible world and that they know exactly which world it is. Therefore, they know every proposition that is true at their world (insofar as knowledge is a propositional attitude, this makes them omniscient). But the inevitable integration or nesting of these two all-powerful perspectives unexpectedly leads to a loss. As Lewis puts it,

> I can imagine them to suffer ignorance: neither one knows which of the two he is.
>
> (Lewis, 1979) p.520

In a similar way, the persona and the actual perspectives may be interacting without any experientially apparent hierarchy. In which case, the viewer may 'see' all that the persona 'sees' yet be ignorant in respect of which of the two perspectives is the mediating and which is the actual. This suggests that although my experience of the Close painting is idiosyncratic, because it relies on my actual emotional engagement, it *is* aesthetically relevant. In this case, what seems to happen is that the represented perspective at once constrains and is in turned constrained by the actual perspective in some non-hierarchical fashion. This leads to a loss (of certainty in regard to the boundaries between roles) which leads to an interpretive gain (a feeling of uncertainty, arrogance and humility).

There are two final comments. First, if I am right about actual feeling being aesthetically relevant (although I do not argue it is necessary or sufficient) for adequate apprehension, then this leaves the alternative view proposed in this chapter no worse off than its rival namely, empathising. Second, the alternative view is in a better position than competitor accounts to explain how actual feeling can enhance or unlock additional levels of expressive understanding. For it is the indeterminacies that emotional imagining generates that leads to a holistic interpretative gain on empathising and dry-eyed attention. The gain can be attributed to the way the expression now 'belongs' or 'co-locates' partly in the represented perspective and partly in the actual perspective from which the picture gets experientially recounted.

Conclusion

I have argued that according to the new persona theory, the represented persona is misty-eyed. But this does not entail that the viewer must be misty-eyed too. This means that the new persona theory can accommodate dry-eyed apprehension (albeit ones where what is represented as occupying the perspective is a misty persona). Yet it has the additional resources to explain how actual misty-eyed perspectives can be aesthetically relevant by deepening and extending expression. In this sense, the new persona theory exposes how the argument for either dry-eye cognitivism or misty-arousal presents participants in the debate with a false choice.

I drew an analogy with emotionally recollecting taken to be a way of thinking over the past with emotion. The crucial thought was that in emotionally inter-acting with a non-actual event, we can discover and articulate expressions of emotion that belong to that non-actual event, but which we may have been unaware of at the time of the event. In this way, I will end this thesis by thinking back to Daumier's *Fatherly Discipline*. This was used to introduce the intuitive but false model (E1), to explore the category of figure expression (Chapter Three) and the idea of pictorial perspective (Chapter Four p.139). I want to compare an experience of *Fatherly Discipline* to a paradigm emotion case. Here is the paradigm case. I blast my daughter, blaming her for the mess in the kitchen. Now contrite, I recall that earlier behaviour, and the blasting is intelligible in

the light of the irritation she caused. But I now concede, my reaction was slightly over the top. The contriteness is partly what identifies my earlier excessiveness but more significantly, it alters the way the past feels. What arises is a peculiar emotional resonance a dissonant vibration of explosive anger that has been ineluctably infected with shame. Using that paradigm case to guide us, it can now be shown how this layering of perspectives is manifest in some expressive pictures. In the Daumier picture, the father blasts his rampant toddler, blaming him for driving his mother to distraction for lack of sleep. I can represent the figure's perspective (explosive) and the persona's perspective (amusement). Finally, I am moved by this scene (wry sympathy). And this is partly what identifies the exploding father as harmless rather than threatening. This alters the way the picture feels. What arises is a peculiar emotional resonance a dissonant vibration of explosive anger that has been ineluctably infected with benevolent humour.



Figure 46 Johannes Vermeer, *A Lady Writing a Lette*r, c.*1665*

Conclusion

In this thesis, I have attempted to outline a new framework in which to explore the phenomenon of pictorial expression and to describe this in a way that seems both familiar and new. Familiar, in the sense of capturing an experience that resonates fairly easily with those that enjoy experiencing expressing paintings, and new in the sense that it makes a contribution to the philosophy literature. Two issues were examined in detail in the thesis. The first issue involved the epistemic role played by perspectives in directly and mediately seeing emotions in faces and pictures respectively. It was shown that whenever we see pictorial content, what we see is mediated by a represented *pictorial* perspective. The second issue involved the property that the perspective is on. It was shown that when a represented perspective involves a mind-dependent property, such as an affect (and itch or an emotion), the viewer had to represent an occupant of the perspective. An occupant that was the kind of thing that could instantiate the emotional perspective. This secured the second claim, that adequately seeing expressive content in paintings mandates imagining a persona occupying the imagined perspective.

The represented persona was characterised as a notional subject who was potentially completely indeterminate (although it may be made more determinate by cues in or relating to the work). The distinction between the actual-self (the viewer) and the persona-self, who is a pretend self the viewer imagines being was clarified. With the perspectival roles articulated, the theory could be applied productively to advance the perennial debate over dry and misty-eyed criticism. In this way, the potential for the new persona view to contribute to our understanding of other puzzles appears strong.

To close, I will sketch out some further lines of enquiry which this project has raised. A first concerns the relation between perspective and narrative. In our everyday discourse we make frequent reference to pictorial narrative. We share the intuition that cave paintings depicting hunting scenes are the earliest forms of storytelling, that quattrocento paintings magniloquently encapsulate tales of good and evil and that Hogarth's multipart works are blunt painterly essays in humour, politics and social empathy. Yet, a more precise question about the role of narrators in these

putative pictorial narratives remains relatively underexplored. I have argued that perspective is a more fundamental mechanism than narrative. But with this foundation stone in place the pathway opens up to consider the variety of ways narrators may be part of picture meaning. These investigations can also shed light on three further perennial debates about our engagement with pictorial fictions. The possibility of so-called fictional emotions, the puzzle of disparate response (why do we applaud Judith beheading someone) and why we may resist imagining in the prescribed way.

A second, and related enquiry would be to investigate the temporal aspects of static paintings. I have given some indication of how the experience of painting can be mediately filtered through a frenzied perspective (Bosch) or a slow, meditative gaze (Bonnard). A potential line of exploration involves examining the relationship between facture, brushstroke and temporal perspectives to build up complex and compelling time-indexed content in a still medium.

A third project would be to investigate how far this persona theory of pictorial expression generalised to other artistic mediums? For instance, could we make sense of the idea that musical meaning is similarly embedded in perspectival structures (whether or not we consider these to be spatially governed as they are in the visual case). Does an adequate appreciation (by listening) to the expression of the work involve representing an emotional (first-personal) perspective on the sounds? Further, we might investigate similarities and differences holding between specific kinds of visual and music works (say, vocal works and figurative pictures, and, instrumental works and abstracts).

Finally, throughout the chapters, the term 'adequate apprehension' has been used. An additional question concerns the relation between adequately apprehending and standards of correctness. It would be interesting to explore whether we can arrive at a unified notion of adequate apprehension (what it is like to experience X) and correctness (what X is expressed) in the light of Kant's remarks about *imputed* judgements.

Overall, I hope to have shown that a persona theory can be both substantive and productive, progressing the investigation into the expression of emotion in the arts.

Girl Writing a Letter

William Carpenter, 1993

A thief drives to the museum in his black van. The night watchman says Sorry, closed, you have to come back tomorrow. The thief sticks the point of his knife in the guard's ear. I haven't got all evening, he says, I need some art. Art is for pleasure, the guard says, not possession, you can't something, and then the duct tape is going across his mouth. Don't worry, the thief says, we're both on the same side. He finds the Dutch Masters and goes right for a Vermeer: "Girl Writing a Letter." The thief knows what he's doing. He has a Ph.D. He slices the canvas on one edge from the shelf holding the salad bowls right down to the square of sunlight on the black and white checked floor. The girl doesn't hear this, she's too absorbed in writing her letter, she doesn't notice him until too late. He's in the picture. He's already seated at the harpsichord. He's playing the G Minor Sonata by Domenico Scarlatti, which once made her heart beat till it passed the harpsichord and raced ahead and waited for the music to catch up. She's worked on this letter for three hundred and twenty years. Now a man's here, and though he's dressed in some weird clothes, he's playing the harpsichord for her, for her alone, there's no one else alive in the museum. The man she was writing to is dead? time to stop thinking about him? the artist who painted her is dead. She should be dead herself, only she has an ear for music and a heart that's running up the staircase of the Gardner Museum with a man she's only known for a few minutes, but it's true, it feels like her whole life. So when the thief hands her the knife and says you slice the paintings out of their frames, you roll them up, she does it; when he says you put another strip of duct tape over the guard's mouth so he'll stop talking about aesthetics, she tapes him, and when the thief puts her behind the wheel and says, drive, baby, the night is ours, it is the Girl Writing a Letter who steers the black van on to the westbound ramp for Storrow and then to the Mass Pike, it's the Girl Writing a Letter who drives eighty miles an hour headed west into a country that's not even discovered yet, with a known criminal, a van full of old masters and nowhere to go but down, but for the Girl Writing a Letter these things don't matter, she's got a beer in her free hand, she's on the road, she's real and she's in love.

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